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ABSTRACT 
 
CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE-BASED 
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS:  A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SCHOOL AND 
DISTRICT DECISION-MAKING APPROACHES 
 
Jessica K. Beaver 
Richard M. Ingersoll 
 
Performance-based accountability systems provide schools and districts with 
detailed student performance data on the front end and demand that schools meet 
rigorous minimum proficiency thresholds on the back end or face a set of sanctions 
that ratchet up year after year.  The process by which schools and districts make 
decisions for improvement in order to meet these requirements, however, is opaque 
at best.  Each district is like an island unto itself, with its own political context, 
financial constraints, demographic and economic makeup, human capital, and social 
dynamics.  Especially given the immense amount of money spent every year in 
improvement grants to districts, as well as the plethora of vendors touting new 
products, there is a clear imperative to understand how schools and districts select 
particular programs or strategies for improvement above other options.   
In this dissertation study, I apply the literature on search and decision-
making in other disciplines to the field of public elementary and secondary 
education, paying particular attention to schools and districts under pressure to 
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improve from performance-based accountability systems.  I employ a comparative 
case study approach, using three consecutive years of data from a stratified random 
sample of eight schools (nested within their districts) in Pennsylvania.  I find that 
schools and districts are under immense pressure to demonstrate student 
achievement gains, and that this pressure extends to all phases of the decision-
making process, including problem identification, search, and the decision point.  
Despite this pressure, I find that schools do not descend into chaos when making 
decisions for improvement – they generally approach the decision-making process 
in a linear manner and let building-level administrators employ a “middle-out” 
approach to decision-making.  But on the other hand, schools are far from purely 
rational organizations, as there are forces internal and external to the school or 
district that constrain decision-making processes.  Although these constraints affect 
all stages of the decision-making process, they have the most severe influence on the 
search phase.  Finally, I create a framework that advances the literature on decision-
making in education by establishing four distinct typologies of decision-making 
approaches.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Why Study Decision-Making in Education? 
 
The culture around school improvement is both expensive and complex.  
Walk into an exhibition hall at any education-related conference and scores of 
vendors are eagerly hawking their products, asserting that their products are 
aligned, research-based, and will measurably boost student achievement.  Not only 
do these products come with hefty price tags, but there is also a great deal of 
complexity involved in selecting a particular product as a strategy for school 
improvement.  New programs typically require that schools provide professional 
development to teachers and other classroom-level personnel, meet community and 
school board expectations, and contain the appropriate mixture of components that 
– school leaders hope – will improve student achievement. 
Given the high stakes associated with decision-making in schools and school 
districts, one might assume that administrators spend a great deal of time and effort 
selecting the right programs to fit the needs of their students.  In some cases, that 
assumption is correct.  Some schools task a team to look at student performance 
data, conduct brainstorming sessions for possible solutions to identified problems, 
bring in various vendors for hands-on demonstrations of new potential products, 
and formally present their choice to the school board before they adopt a new 
improvement program.  But there is an alternative scenario as well, one in which an 
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administrator discovers that her school has failed to meet performance targets one 
year, and solves this problem by calling a friend in a neighboring district and asking, 
“what do you use?”  She then unilaterally purchases the same product, with very 
little vetting of the new program’s alignment or fit with her district’s unique context 
or needs.   
The variation in these two approaches – and there are, of course, many more 
approaches to decision-making than just these two – may not seem striking if one 
were to view schools as akin to small businesses.  After all, some businesses run 
their operations in a tightly controlled manner with formal frameworks that guide 
their decisions, whereas others operate in a more laissez-faire manner, letting new 
trends and ideas influence their decisions.  But schools are not businesses; they are 
special types of organizations with unique contextual factors that shape their 
operational characteristics and abilities.  Because public schools are funded by 
taxpayers, they must answer to taxpayers.  Because they serve an underage clientele 
whose participation in the system is mandatory, they have a certain amount of 
freedom in their decision-making process, but certain restrictions as well.  And 
because the organizational hierarchy of public education is notoriously flat, schools 
often develop a divide between administrators and teachers that can create 
disconnects during the decision-making process.  Perhaps most importantly, 
because schools must answer to districts, states and the federal government, there 
exists strong top-down pressure to improve performance on a specific and targeted 
outcome measure: the state standardized test.  Performance-based accountability 
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systems demand that schools meet rigorous achievement thresholds on these tests 
or face a set of sanctions that ratchet up with each passing year of 
underperformance.  The fundamental assumption of performance-based 
accountability is that providing information to schools and districts about their 
students’ academic performance will push them to improve, so long as this 
information is coupled with strict performance guidelines and benchmarks, as well 
as incentives to change.  
 In this dissertation, I examine in depth the relationship between 
accountability pressure and the decision-making process in schools and districts. 
This area is ripe for inquiry, as the means by which schools and districts process 
top-down pressure for improvement, search for solutions to identified achievement 
problems, and ultimately make decisions for improvement remains somewhat of a 
mystery.  The reason for this is that performance-based accountability systems 
leave this process intentionally vague, assuming that states and local education 
entities know best how to improve the academic performance of their own students.  
Because each district is like an island unto itself, with its own political context, 
financial constraints, demographic and economic makeup, human capital, and social 
dynamics, the resulting decision-making processes may range from collaborative, 
evidence-based decisions to uninformed word-of-mouth recommendations and 
everything in between.  But although the law might encourage a diversity of 
approaches to decision-making for improvement, it can be very frustrating trying to 
understand just how a particular program or strategy for improvement was selected 
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above other options.  Especially given the immense amount of money spent every 
year in improvement grants to districts, as well as the plethora of vendors touting 
new instruments, curriculum materials, and other tools, it would be useful to 
understand how schools and districts make decisions for improvement.  More 
specifically, it would be useful to understand how schools and districts search for 
solutions to identified problems and then translate that search process into 
decisions about new programs or strategies for improvement.   
Unfortunately, the literature on search and decision-making in public K-12 
education is fragmented at best, and at worst is even contradictory.  For example, if 
we are to take accountability theory at its word, the decision-making process in 
schools and districts is logical, orderly, and strictly guided both by input data and 
desired outcome measures.  On the other hand, another popular line of thinking 
describes decision-making in public education as completely chaotic and lacking any 
real forethought or methodology.  Accepting one theory over another has important 
implications for policymakers and educators alike:  If we believe that the decision-
making process is rational and logical, then it follows that schools and districts with 
similar characteristics will follow roughly the same path toward their eventual 
decisions; but if we believe that decision-making is utterly chaotic, it seems that 
very few conclusions can be drawn at all.   
Although some literature exists on the various barriers to successful search 
processes in organizations, few studies pay specific attention to the search process, 
choosing instead to analyze the decisions themselves or their implementation. This 
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dissertation attempts to fill those gaps by applying the literature on search and 
decision-making in other disciplines to the field of public K-12 education, with 
particular attention paid to schools and districts that are under pressure to improve 
within the context of performance-based accountability systems.  The theoretical 
framework draws upon several different frames for analyzing decision-making in 
public education, including rational choice theory, bounded rationality, 
organizational theory, sense-making theory, and the garbage can model of decision-
making.  The primary goal of the study is to create a framework that integrates the 
various lines of thinking into a coherent and comprehensive model for analyzing 
search and decision-making in schools and school districts.    
Accordingly, I investigate three main sets of research questions.  The first set 
of questions asks descriptive questions around each of the phases of the decision-
making process – problem identification, search, and the decision point.  I pay close 
attention to the search phase in particular, asking how schools and school districts 
search for solutions to perceived or formally identified needs for improvement.  The 
second set of questions asks about the degree to which decision-making in 
education can be characterized as chaotic.  Accordingly, I ask about the various 
factors that constrain the decision-making environment.  Finally, I offer a third 
question, which is whether a new framework might be created that characterizes 
school and district search processes based on the underlying characteristics of the 
organization.  
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 To answer these questions, I employ a comparative case study design.  The 
sample for my study is eight schools and their corresponding district offices in 
Pennsylvania, the majority of which were identified by the state as “in warning” for 
failure to meet accountability targets following the 2007-2008 school year.  I use 
three consecutive years of in-depth case study interviews from school and district 
administrators, staff, and teachers to home in on how these people approach the 
decision-making process, as well as the factors that support or hinder their efforts.  
In total, there were 212 interviews with 144 individuals over the three-year period.  
For my cross-case analysis, I use a series of case-ordered descriptive matrices, 
which allow me to detect trends and differences across cases.  The variables for 
case-ordered descriptive matrices correspond directly to my research questions.   
The structure of my dissertation is as follows:  In this chapter, I review a 
range of decision-making approaches – from the rational to the chaotic – that are 
presented in the vast, multi-disciplinary literature on decision-making.  I explain 
how each approach treats the search component of the decision-making process.  I 
also explore the decision-making literature that is explicit to schools and districts 
that operate in the context of federally mandated accountability policies, such as the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and No Child Left Behind.  In 
Chapter 2, I turn my attention to the particulars of my dissertation study and 
present my research questions and my qualitative comparative case study approach 
to addressing them.  These questions aim to fill existing gaps in the literature base, 
particularly with regard to the search component of decision-making in public 
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education.  I also detail my study sample, data collection, and analysis approach.  In 
Chapter 3, I present each of the eight case study districts in my sample.  Chapters 4 
and 5 detail the findings from my research, both the descriptive work and the 
analytic task of establishing typologies of school approaches to decision-making.  In 
Chapter 6, I present a framework on school decision-making.  Finally, in Chapter 7, I 
discuss the various implications of my work for policymakers and practitioners and 
identify areas for further exploration in the future. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
To frame my work, I first explore the general literature on decision-making, 
which is grounded in several different disciplines, including economics, sociology, 
and psychology.  I then explore the specific literature on decision-making in public 
K-12 education. 
 
General Decision-Making Literature.  There exists in the literature a broad range 
of views about how individuals and organizations are impacted by their 
environments as they make decisions.  To explain the range of theories, I create a 
“Rationality-Chaos Spectrum” (Figure 1.1) and begin my discussion at the left of the 
spectrum and make my way to the right, taking care to explain the inherent 
assumptions of each theory, as well as the implications that each theory has for 
search and decision-making in organizations.   
  
 
Figure 1.1 
The Rationality-Chaos Spectrum
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perfectly rational individual who
behavior so that the decision itself is the best possible outcome (Simon, 1955).  
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“alternatives”), perform any necessary optimization calculations, and then arrive at 
8
 
-making – Rational Choice Theory 
se sole focus in decision-making is to optimize his 
ent, he has a set system of ordered 
ment itself, in which the 
e (his 
 
– presents a 
  
 9
the optimal solution.  Furthermore, the decision-making process follows a strict 
order (Bass, 1983; Simon, 1955):  The recognition or acknowledgement of a 
deficiency; the search for solutions; a decision point; and, finally, action.  The order 
of operations is fixed, and the improvement process always begins with the 
identification of the problem. 
The many critiques of Rational Choice Theory have been dubbed part of the 
“soft rationality” literature (Bryman, 1984) because they tweak the assumptions 
inherent in the purely rational model.  To simplify what is an extremely large body 
of literature on soft rationality, I organize the literature into two distinct categories.  
The first category presents the flaws of rational choice theory at the level of the 
decision-maker, pointing out the many ways in which human beings are incapable 
of making perfectly rational decisions due to their inherent biases and mental 
limitations.  Simon’s (1972) concept of “satisificing” or Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1974) description of decision-making heuristics would all fit into this first category.  
The second category tackles the same topic at the level of the environment, 
illustrating how the decision-making context can become constrained by various 
contextual elements.  Although both perspectives present valuable contributions to 
the decision-making literature, I focus primarily on this second category because it 
is more readily applicable to the context of decision-making in organizations, such 
as schools and school districts.  This environmental view posits that, even if 
decision-makers were perfectly rational (that is, completely unaffected by the biases 
and mental limitations discussed above), their ultimate decisions might be 
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suboptimal because the environment limits their ability to make informed decisions.  
Soft rationality theorists assert that the luxuries of information and optimization are 
rarely present in actual decision situations (Gross, Kirst, Holland & Luschei, 2005; 
March, 1994; Simon, 1972).  Very often, decision-makers are forced to do the best 
with what they have, which may involve an incomplete set of options, constraints or 
biases regarding optimality (i.e. the “politics” of organizations), or incomplete 
information about the implications or implementation of decisions (Forester, 1984).  
Simon (1972) combines the dual features of soft rationality – internal 
preconceptions and external contextual constraints – into one cohesive theory 
called Bounded Rationality, which has become a grounding theory in the search and 
decision-making context of organizations.  The fundamental assumption of Bounded 
Rationality is that decisions occur under conditions of uncertainty (March, 1994; 
Simon, 1972).  Simon (1972) identifies several ways to conceptualize the theory:  
First, the organization might not fully understand the consequences of the decision, 
which may lead to inaccurate problem identification; second, the organization might 
have imperfect or incomplete information about the potential alternatives, which 
indicates a search deficiency; and third, the complexity of the environment itself 
might obscure the organization’s ability to make a rational choice, which may lead to 
a poor decision.  Given these constraints, the organization is highly likely to satisfice 
(Guth, Levati & Ploner, 2010; Simon, 1972) and a suboptimal outcome may result.   
The theory of Bounded Rationality is intuitively appealing – it makes sense 
that contextual factors would influence behavior, preferences and, ultimately, 
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decisions.  Numerous theorists have expanded upon the theory as well, explaining 
how it might affect the decision-making process.  For example, Vanberg (2008) 
posits that a person or organization might be bounded by societal norms and rules 
in addition to the traditional bounds of information and time.  Sen (1972) goes even 
further, asserting that, even if the purely rational optimizer were to exist, he would 
be a profoundly foolish individual whose actions would most certainly land him in 
undesirable positions.  In a different application of Bounded Rationality, Forester 
(1984) presents a formal framework for determining the degree to which politics 
can affect organizational decisions, particularly for public administration and 
management organizations.  He presents four different variants of bounded 
rationality: BR I, II, III and IV, which range from a scenario with only one decision-
maker and a setting that is partially open to the environment, to a scenario with 
multiple actors in which conflict is ubiquitous and one interest group usually has 
more power over others, leading to coercion. Forester’s model shows that bounded 
rationality is not a uniform concept; rather rationality can be bounded both by 
organizations and by context, and it matters greatly who are the members of the 
decision-making group, how the problem is defined, the organization’s structure 
and hierarchy, and the politics of the decision itself.   
Unlike Bounded Rationality, organizational theory is less concerned with 
environmental bounds on behavior than it is with the internal constraints and 
norms that influence organizational behavior.  Organizational theory holds that the 
primary bound on organizational behavior is bureaucratic structure.  According to 
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Weber’s (1947) model of bureaucratic behavior, organizations are likely to turn to a 
bureaucratic structure as a means of imposing order and rationality on their 
decision-making and production processes.  Bureaucracies are organizations with 
strict hierarchies, clearly delineated worker responsibilities, formalized rules and 
regulations, and standardized training for workers.  In essence, Weber’s 
bureaucratic theory describes an organization that has placed bounds on its own 
environment so as to ensure rational outcomes.  
Bureaucratic organizations may not be aware of the degree to which their 
internal structure limits their decision-making ability.  Weick (1976) describes 
public bureaucratic organizations as “loosely coupled,” which he defines as the 
sizeable difference between the intentions and the actions of bureaucratic 
organizations.  Organizations tend to over-rationalize their actions and it therefore 
becomes very difficult to determine whether the decision-making process in a 
public organization is highly rational or, as he suspects, highly irrational and chaotic 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976).  
In his later work, Weick (1995) suggests that organizational theorists should 
adopt a “sense-making approach” to studying organizational decisions.  The goal of 
sense-making, he says, is to explain loose coupling by characterizing the entire 
process by which organizations come to a decision.  Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 
(2005) state that the sense-making process, though non-linear, usually begins with 
chaos.  In this scenario, members of an organization are faced with an issue or event 
that may be poorly understood or even ignored, then they begin to make sense out 
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of that which they do not completely understand, then they begin to take into 
account the social and cultural context in which they operate, and finally they ask 
the essential question: “what should we do next?”  With these concerns in mind, the 
organizational actor must use various forms of communication to try to bring other 
organizational actors into a shared understanding of the problem and potential 
solutions.  
Although the steps involved are not terribly different from the Rational 
Choice model of decision-making (i.e. problem identification, search for solutions, 
action, and implementation), the sense-making process is different because it is 
decidedly non-linear (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick et al., 2005). In other words, the 
decision-making process is dynamic, iterative, and fluid – just like the people 
making the decisions. 
 Finally, I arrive all the way to the right of the spectrum, where Cohen, March 
and Olsen (1972) offer a formal organizational decision-making model based on the 
premises of bounded rationality and loose coupling, which they call the “Garbage 
Can Model” of decision-making.  Their premise is similar to that of Weick and Meyer 
and Rowan, but more extreme.  They state that organizations are little more than 
organized anarchies where preferences are problematic, technology is unclear, 
participation is fluid, and, as a result, choices are fundamentally ambiguous.  In their 
model, the decision situation or “choice opportunity” is described as a garbage can 
in which both problems and solutions are dumped.  The decision – or output – 
therefore depends on what the garbage consists of at the particular moment, the 
  
 14
mix of cans available, and the speed with which garbage is collected. As the image of 
a garbage can suggests, decisions made under conditions of ambiguity represent an 
indistinguishable mix of the various different “streams” that contribute to decision-
making within an organization, which include problems, solutions, participants, and 
choice opportunities. 
Cohen et al. use the Garbage Can Model to explain how straying from the 
rational model affects decision-making in organizations.  They assert that, while 
some problems might receive full consideration by the organization and attempt to 
follow a set procedure, these resulting decisions are likely to be haphazard in 
nature, and are not necessarily aligned to organizational goals.  Another effect on 
decision-making is that the streams going into the garbage can – again, the 
problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities – may interact with one 
another.  Adding a participant or putting a new option on the table, for example, 
could drastically change the nature of the output.  This view stands in stark contrast 
to the traditional deductive model, in which the decision-making process is cyclical 
and distinctly non-interactive.  Thus it becomes clear that organizations operating 
under the garbage can model do a poor job of resolving problems, as choices are not 
made by preference-ordering or optimization, but rather by chance and pre-existing 
conditions. 
 
Decision-Making in Education.  Turning now to public education, it is clear that 
schools and school districts contain a fair amount of organizational complexity.  
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First, educational decisions usually involve multiple decision-making entities, 
including school and district administrators, school board members, PTAs, and 
teachers unions.  Additionally, public education is subject to government oversight 
at the federal, state and local levels.  Top-down mandates may conflict with local 
decisions, and there are various structures or “bounds” that shape the ways in 
which local decision-makers can act.  Federal performance-based accountability 
measures, for example, mandate a strict accountability system that sets proficiency 
minimums linked to student performance on state standardized tests, even though 
this proficiency threshold may conflict with the educational goals of school and 
district personnel.  Finally, there are numerous other bounds on the decision-
making environment in schools and school districts that lend additional complexity, 
for example the length of the school year, school budgets, and leadership structures.  
In an effort to relate the vast literature on decision-making to the educational 
sphere, it is important to begin again with Rational Choice Theory.  In the 
educational paradigm, the theory of accountability can be seen as a practical 
application of Rational Choice Theory, because it assumes that a clearly identified 
problem will cause schools and districts to optimize their behavior. The theory of 
performance-based accountability holds that public attention to student 
performance on standardized measures will motivate teachers and school leaders to 
adopt strategies that will be more successful for their students (Stecher et al., 2008; 
Hamilton, Berends & Stecher, 2005; Linn, 2005). Accountability theory’s linear 
framework describes how the inputs from performance-based accountability 
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systems lead schools and districts to select improvement strategies for their 
classrooms, all of which are intended to generate positive change in student 
performance. 
 Since performance-based accountability measures have become the norm in 
education policy, many education experts have exposed the unrealistic expectations 
and unintended consequences that these systems place on schools and school 
districts.  Among the assertions are that they limits instructional content to tested 
concepts (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006); give incomplete or confusing information 
to the implementers of new policies (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002); place too 
much attention on students in the middle of the ability spectrum while ignoring 
those students on the either ends of the spectrum (Kreig, 2008; Booher-Jennings, 
2005); and stigmatize poor, learning disabled, non-English speaking, and racial 
minority students (Kantor & Lowe, 2006).  These critiques suggest a fundamental 
misalignment between the goals of accountability theory and the realities of 
schooling.  Looking back at the Rationality-Chaos Spectrum, it is possible to identify 
various internal and external bounds on decision-making in public education that 
might compromise the decision-making process outlined in accountability theory.   
First, schools and school districts are bound by their status as a special type 
of bureaucracy.  Although they may appear to be Weberian bureaucracies, the 
hierarchical structure in schools is actually quite flat.  Efforts to make schools into 
“rational organizations” are therefore thwarted due to the very nature of the schools 
themselves.  The average school most likely has multiple conflicting goals, multiple 
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actors and constituents who have a stake in the process, a deeply entrenched social 
culture, and unclear methods for how to best meet their goals (Ingersoll, 2003; 
Bidwell, 2001; Lortie, 1975).  As a result, the school in general – and the teaching 
profession in particular – are likely to fit with the “loose coupling” scenario that 
Weick (1976) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) predict.  
Second, the specific characteristics of the school or district can shape the 
decision-making process.  Abelman and Elmore (1999) assert that the personal 
preferences, responsibilities, and relationships of school and district staff – what 
they call the “internal accountability” of an educational organization – is separate 
from externally-generated performance-based accountability.  Sense-making 
theorists echo these claims and explain that people come into new situations with 
their own understandings, values, beliefs, knowledge, and attitudes (Coburn & 
Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002).  Accordingly, the internal culture of a school or 
organization can shape the decision-making process by redefining the problem 
(Abelman & Elmore, 1999), limiting the search process to familiar solutions 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and opting for familiar solutions at the decision point 
(Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002).   
 Third, forces external to the school building can constrain the decision-
making process.  Because schools and school districts are bureaucratic 
organizations, they are subject to multiple levels of governance and oversight.  
Schools answer to districts, which answer to states, which in turn are accountable 
under NCLB to the federal Department of Education.  Furthermore, schools and 
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districts are financed almost entirely by public funds, which means that they must 
answer to taxpayers and other stakeholders.  The decision-making process is 
therefore shaped by both policymaking and politics.  In terms of policymaking, 
decisions about new programs or instructional strategies may be made at levels 
higher than that of the school or district, and then simply be handed down to the 
local level for implementation.  These decisions, which often take the form of 
mandates, may conflict with the internal culture of the district or contradict 
previous decisions about instruction made at the local level (Abelman & Elmore, 
1999).  In terms of politics, schools and districts are affected by the political agendas 
of policymakers, politicians, and other education stakeholders at all different levels 
of government.  At the local level, the personalities and leadership styles of school 
administrators, district administrators, school board members, and city employees 
may shape the problem identification, search, and decision processes regarding new 
programs or instructional strategies.  Even just one dominant personality can have a 
big impact on the direction of the organization (Coburn & Talbert, 2006), and 
political schedules (for example, election years) can also influence the degree to 
which certain stakeholders place demands on the decision-making process.  
Additionally, high-level leadership changes can drastically alter the problem 
definition of the decision-making process, as each administrator will likely have a 
different strategic plan (Hess, 1999).  The collective human capital of the district 
office has also been shown to play a role in either constraining or encouraging the 
decision-making process at the district level.  Hannaway and Kimball (1998) find 
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that larger district offices are better at promoting performance-based reform – 
including influencing school selection of improvement strategies – than are smaller 
districts.  
 Finally, a host of other external issues place demands on the decision-making 
process in schools and school districts alike.  Time, for example, is a common bound, 
as the school calendar makes it difficult for administrators to meet or for teachers to 
train on new materials (Gross et al., 2005).  Additionally, limited budgets – 
especially during times of economic hardship – hamper decision-makers’ abilities to 
select the programs they feel might be the best fit for students and teachers.  And 
finally, the opinions and attitudes of the community may impact decisions made at 
the school or school district level.  Parents, community activists, and other 
stakeholders frequently raise concerns about the delivery of instruction, leadership, 
and school organization issues, which may serve to set the agenda for future 
decisions (Kingdon, 1995).   
The various internal and external bounds on decision-making affect all four 
components (again: problem identification, search, decision point, and 
implementation) of the decision-making process in education to varying degrees.  
The literature on search, while not as plentiful as that of the other phases, suggests 
that it might be the phase most impacted by internal and decision-making 
constraints.   
First, research shows that the information available to decision-makers may 
be convoluted, inaccessible, incomplete, or even incorrect.  Gilovich (1991) explains 
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that information may be ambiguous, incomplete, or messy, leading people to make 
decisions that lack a true foundation of knowledge.  In their discussion of research-
based knowledge, Nelson, Roberts, Maederer & Johnson (1987) state that the 
meaningful impact of research on practice is limited by the poor presentation of 
information and research-based findings.  The “two communities” model of 
information utilization posits that the research community has a poor 
understanding of the practitioner community, and that practitioners would be 
better served if research were made more accessible and written more clearly 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nelson et al., 1987).  Furthermore, practitioners do not 
always have access to high quality, rigorous research conducted by impartial 
investigators – and, in some cases, the research findings may even be specious.  
Research on teacher turnover by Ingersoll (2003b), for example, contradicts 
decades of previously held “research-based” beliefs on the causes of the perceived 
teacher shortage crisis, finding that teacher turnover is the culprit for teacher 
shortages, and not inadequate teacher recruitment, as was previously believed.   
Nevertheless, the education literature focuses on evidence-based decision-
making, which is the study of how school leaders make use of data, including state 
data, school data, and student-level data to inform their decisions.  A number of 
major studies delineate the various ways that schools make use of technical 
information for decision-making (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh, Pane & Hamilton, 
2005; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002).  Along with these lists, the authors also 
name various barriers to effective data use.  Coburn and Talbert (2006), for 
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example, find that varying perceptions about the utility of data use can impact 
districts’ decisions for improvement.  Numerous authors (Doyle, 2003; O’Day, 2002; 
Stringfield, Reynolds & Schaffer, 2001) find that districts often lack the necessary 
skills to interpret data in a way that is meaningful for school improvement efforts.  
And Feldman and Tung (2001) find that school and district administrators lack the 
necessary time to use data to inform decision-making.   
Second, the education literature also suggests that social science research is 
only one source of knowledge that school and district administrators may seek 
during the decision-making process.  Although Gilovich (1991) says that second-
hand information can compromise the decision-making process, the education 
literature asserts that advice from friends and colleagues can be a valid source of 
information.  Honig and Coburn (2007) find that district administrators often look 
to trusted sources within the district – for example, principals, teachers, or fellow 
administrators – to inform their improvement decisions.  In other cases, they may 
look to external sources in the community such as neighboring districts or parents.  
Although some might discount the validity of the information provided by local 
sources, decision-makers may highly value knowledge generated from within their 
network of influence.   
Third, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) find that organizations limit their 
search process both geographically and technologically, opting for solutions that are 
both local and familiar.  These “exploiter” organizations (March, 1991) look to past 
behaviors and experiences to guide their search process rather than looking 
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outward for innovative new practices.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) warn that, in 
the long run, organizations that look inward for solutions will reach a critical mass 
of innovation and then stagnate, closing themselves off to further change.  Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) further explain that learning is a cumulative process, meaning 
that each bit of newly acquired knowledge builds off of preexisting knowledge in the 
organizational context.  Organizations possess a limited “absorptive capacity” for 
new information, and therefore information that is already internalized as part of 
the organizational culture will be prioritized over new externally generated 
information. These claims are validated in the education literature as well.  Honig 
and Coburn (2007) and Honig (2003) find that district administrators may ignore 
externally generated information if the information does not fit into their existing 
understandings.  Similarly, in their study of high school response to accountability 
demands, Gross et al. (2005) find that high schools limit their search processes due 
to a “benign neglect” of outside ideas.  They find that scheduling issues, time 
limitations, and the actions of neighboring districts are heavy determinants of the 
breadth and depth of the search process in high schools.  
Fourth, the search process is highly susceptible to variations in school and 
district context.  Elmore (2001) suggests that the search process will vary 
depending on the setting and context of the search.  In his study of high schools, 
Elmore says that the search process in “well-situated schools” follows a relatively 
stable cycle of improvement, whereas what he terms “target” schools engage in 
superficial searches to solve superficial problems.  At the district level, Honig and 
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Coburn (2007) find that the search process varies depending on who is conducting 
the search.  Administrators whose job it is to search for new information and 
knowledge are more likely to conduct thorough searches, whereas other 
administrators may undertake more haphazard and less thorough searches (Coburn 
& Talbert, 2006).  The search process may also vary depending on the goal of the 
search.  District decision-makers may use external searches only as a means to 
establish the legitimacy of an impending reform, rather than as a true search for 
new ideas (Honig & Coburn, 2007).  The social capital of the organization may also 
have an impact on the search process.  Organizational structures that support high 
levels of collaboration, mutual trust, and the free flow of ideas are more likely to 
engage in robust searches for new ideas than are organizations with low levels of 
these characteristics (Honig & Coburn, 2007; Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Honig, 2003; 
Spillane & Thompson, 1997).  Social capital external to the organization may play a 
role as well, as schools and districts with a large social network of trusted colleagues 
have access to a greater circle of ideas and knowledge (Honig & Coburn, 2007; 
Spillane & Thompson, 1997).   
 
A Conceptual Map.  The vast literature on Bounded Rationality, Organizational 
Theory, and the Garbage Can Model strongly suggests that the context of schooling 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for rationality to triumph.  The degree to which 
the decision-making process is constrained does depend, however, on the 
complexity of the school or district (its internal bounds) as well as the 
  
 24
organizational decision-making environment (its external bounds).  The conceptual 
map (Figure 1.2) depicts the complexity of the relationship between school or 
district organizations and their decision-making environments.  The map begins 
with inputs from the performance-based accountability system and moves through 
the district and school levels.   
 
Figure 1.2 
A Conceptual Map of Decision-Making Context in Education 
 
  
Within this frame, the school or district, which is bounded by internal and external 
factors, can approach the decision-making process in several different ways.  If it 
were to follow the Rational Choice Theory order of events, it would begin by 
identifying the problem, then it would search for solutions, and then it would make 
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a decision.  Alternatively, however, the school or district could follow a pattern more 
akin to the Garbage Can Model and begin with the decision itself and move 
backwards through the steps, or skip the other steps all together.  Finally, the school 
or district could fail to come to a decision at all.  In all cases, the product of this 
process will lead to some type of school response (and note that inaction is 
considered to be a valid type of response).  These decisions can take many different 
forms, including decisions about school organization, process, purchases, 
instructional focus, and other forms. 
In accordance with the sense-making approach, the map depicts an 
organization’s navigation of the problem identification, search, and decision stages 
as an iterative process.  The school or district may refine or revisit any or all of the 
three components of the decision-making process as it works its way to a final 
response.  The map also omits the fourth component of the decision-making process 
– implementation – as this component is more of an end product or outcome of the 
process rather than an intermediate component.   
The school or district’s final response can then be categorized along the 
Rationality-Chaos Spectrum on the basis of the following factors: the boundedness 
of the organizational structure, the boundedness of the external environment, and 
the manner in which the organization approaches the problem identification, 
search, and decision process.   
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CHAPTER 2:  DATA AND METHODS 
 
Research Questions 
 
Although the literature on decision-making in education is vast, there exist 
contradictions and evidence gaps in two specific areas.  First, authors disagree about 
whether the special bureaucratic structure of schooling is a positive or negative 
influence on decision-making in education.  Some authors (Bidwell, 2001; Weick, 
1976) claim that the loosely coupled nature of schools encourages stability, allowing 
some changes to occur without toppling the entire organizational structure.  March 
(1978), on the other hand, states that the flat bureaucratic structure of schools is a 
negative force on decision-making because it makes the objectives of the decision-
making process fundamentally ambiguous.  When administrators act independently 
from one another, they fail to learn from shared experiences, fail to understand the 
technology of schooling, and misconstrue the goals of new improvement efforts.  
Along these same lines, there is a lack of empirical evidence about the 
relationship between the organizational characteristics of the school or district and 
the decision-making environment.  Although some authors (e.g., Honig & Coburn, 
2007; Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Elmore, 2001) begin to parse apart school or district 
characteristics that may lead the organization to make more informed decisions, 
more specific work is needed that compares and contrasts the decision-making 
behaviors in a wide variety of educational environments.  And because most of the 
literature on decision-making in education is conducted at either the school level or 
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the district level (but rarely examined in conjunction), it would be helpful to study 
schools and districts as nested organizations.   
Second, the search component of decision-making is under-explored in the 
field of education.  Although the search process receives some attention at the 
school level by Gross et al. (2005) and at the district level by Farley-Ripple (2008) 
and Honig and Coburn (2007), existing research leaves some important questions 
unanswered.  It would be helpful to know, for example, what administrators and 
teachers consider to be valid information, whom they rely upon for local 
information, who is responsible for the search process, and how much 
accountability pressure changes that process.   
Furthermore, there is a critical disagreement in the literature as to whether 
local information can be trusted.  Although some theorists believe that local 
information is faulty (Gilovich, 1991) and stymies innovation (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 
2003; March, 1991), others believe that local information can be a valid source of 
new ideas.  Honig and Coburn (2007) find that districts often lean on information 
from colleagues both internal and external to the district office when they make 
decisions for improvement.  In some cases, advice and information from these 
trusted sources may be viewed as even more valid than some research-based 
findings, because practitioners value face-to-face interactions and easily understood 
explanations of new ideas (Honig, 2003; Nelson et al., 1987).  Research on the 
applicability of locally generated knowledge is sparse, however, and this area should 
be explored more fully. 
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To address these gaps, I propose the following research questions for my 
dissertation: 
RQ1:  How do schools approach each phase of the decision-making process 
(including problem identification, search, and the decision point)?  
RQ2:  How chaotic is decision-making in education? 
a. What internal and external factors constrain the decision-making process in 
schools and districts, and to what degree do they affect the ultimate decision 
outcome? 
b. Is the decision-making process linear, circular, chaotic, or does it follow a 
different pattern? At what point during the decision-making process does 
search come in, if at all?  
c. Where do schools and districts fall on the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum? 
RQ3:  Can a new framework be created that adequately and appropriately fits 
schools and school district decision-making processes?  If so, what organizational 
characteristics (size, demographics, etc.) are associated with certain types of 
processes? 
Methodology 
 
This study is a project nested within a larger research study, which was 
funded by a grant from the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) at the U.S. 
Department of Education, and ran from June 2008 to August 2011.  The study was 
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run out of the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) at the University 
of Pennsylvania and the Principal Investigator was Dr. Elliot Weinbaum.  I was a 
Research Assistant on that project for its duration.  The goal of the larger study was 
to examine schools’ responses to No Child Left Behind, particularly which strategies 
and programs they select when called upon by the law to improve student academic 
achievement.  The larger study had three components.  First, we administered a 
survey to all principals in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding their 
accountability status under the law and the various strategies they employ in their 
schools to improve scores on the state test.  Second, in cooperation with the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE), we used school-level achievement 
data to link schools’ selected strategies to their achievement outcomes.  Finally, we 
conducted two consecutive years of case study site visits to 11 schools around the 
state.  As part of these visits, we asked school administrators and teachers how the 
school addressed its shortcomings in particular areas and student subgroups, what 
strategies it had selected for improvement, and how those strategies were working. 
For my dissertation study, I narrow the scope of the original study from the 
broad question of “what strategies do schools select for improvement?” to the more 
focused question of “how do schools come to select a particular strategy for 
improvement over others?”  In a sense, however, I also expand the scope of the 
original study.  Although I use the data from the statewide survey and the two years 
of case study site visits, I expand the case studies to encompass not just schools but 
  
 30
also the districts in which they reside, since many decisions for improvement are 
made in conjunction with administrators at the district level.    
I employ a comparative case study approach to studying the decision-making 
processes of schools and school districts.  This design is ideal because it allows the 
researcher to explore a complex social phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984), 
in this case the decision-making processes of educational organizations.  Yin (1984) 
writes that the case study approach “investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13).  This is especially fitting for my 
research, as my goal is to understand the specific dynamics surrounding decision-
making that exist within a school and its district, and then widening the scope to 
compare schools and districts to one another based on their defining characteristics.  
Although the study is primarily qualitative in nature, I also use descriptive data 
gleaned from the 2009 survey of principals, which asked principals to identify the 
major areas where they are focusing their improvement efforts in light of the 
performance-based accountability system set forth in NCLB.  
The combination of the descriptive survey data and the in-depth case studies 
– including both interview data and document analysis – helps to triangulate data, 
which in turn will increase the internal validity of findings (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Furthermore, I approach the case study component of the study design with a 
strong grounding in the literature, but without preconceived notions of how 
decision-making can or should occur in the public education setting.  As detailed in 
  
 31
the literature review section, there exists a wide range of views about the degree to 
which decision-making in education is either rational or chaotic.  Following the 
advice of Eisenhardt (1989), my goal is to not take sides, but rather to build theory 
based on my interactions with my case study interviewees and my review of 
internal school and district documents.  
 
Sampling Strategy.  The eight schools (and their corresponding districts) are all 
located in Pennsylvania.  Focusing on one state has several advantages.  First, 
Pennsylvania is a large state, which makes it relatively easy to select a sample of 
schools with a diverse set of economic, demographic, and geographic conditions.  
The stratified random sample consists of a heterogeneous set of schools and their 
corresponding districts, all with different defining characteristics.  Second, hearing 
from schools and districts in just one state makes it somewhat easier to compare 
improvement strategies and search processes, because administrators and teachers 
use a common language that is specific to Pennsylvania.  Similarly, schools' 
experiences with popular programs (for example, test preparation booklets, 
remediation programs, university affiliations, etc.) make it easier to assess the 
relative reach of these outside resources to the schools.  Finally, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education officially expressed its support for the original IES-funded 
study, specifically the administration of a statewide principal survey, use of school 
achievement data, and two consecutive years of case study visits to schools.    
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Beyond these clear advantages, Pennsylvania also provides a fascinating 
context for studying search and decision-making processes.  As outlined in NCLB, 
states are allowed to determine the pace at which they ratchet up the proficiency 
requirements for schools, as long as that number reaches 100% by the 2013-14 
school year.  In the 2007-08 school year – just before the study began -- the 
proficiency requirement was increased from 45% to 56% in math and from 54% to 
63% in reading.  Accordingly, many schools found themselves failing to meet the 
proficiency requirements for the first time, and were declared to be in “warning 
status” under the law.  This provided an excellent opportunity to study how schools 
react to top-down calls for improvement.   
The original school sample for the site visits was designed as a stratified 
random sample of 48 schools, in which the strata were defined by schools’ failure to 
make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under NCLB in one of the six possible 
disaggregated student subgroups that are outlined in the law (see Table 1).  The 
subgroups were:  1) making AYP in all subgroups; 2) failing for Special Education 
students; 3) failing for Limited English Proficient students; 4) failing in a particular 
race category of students; 5) failing for economically disadvantaged students; and 6) 
failing in multiple subgroups.  Both elementary schools and high schools were 
included, which allowed for eight schools in each group/category – four elementary 
and four high schools – to be included in the sample. 
Following the selection of the sample in the fall of 2008, the research team 
conducted in-depth phone interviews with principals in each of the 48 schools so 
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that we could determine which of the 48 schools would be appropriate for in-depth 
case study research, and also to develop a comprehensive protocol for the case 
study interviews.  Accordingly, we asked principals about the activities underway in 
their schools in response to their new “warning status” as well as their general 
feelings about performance-based accountability.  We did ask some general 
decision-making questions during the initial interviews, although generally these 
questions didn’t go into the specifics of principals’ search processes.   
 
Table 2.1 
Stratified random sample: Number of schools sampled by school type 
 
From this set of 48 schools, we identified 11 schools for in-depth case study 
visits.  We chose one elementary school and one high school in each of the six 
categories.  There was no high school in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that 
failed to make AYP for the first time that year in the Limited English Proficient 
subgroup, which is why the final tally of schools was 11 and not 12.  We selected 
schools from the original stratified random sample based primarily on the 
relationships established with the principals during the phone interviews, but the 
AYP Status
Elementary High School
Made AYP 4 4 8
Failed to make AYP - Whole School (Total) 4 4 8
Failed to make AYP - Special Education 4 4 8
Failed to make AYP - Economically Disadvantaged 4 4 8
Failed to make AYP - Racial subgroup 4 4 8
Failed to make AYP - Limited English Proficiency 4 4 8
TOTAL 24 24 48
School Level Total
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selection process also took into account demographic, economic, and geographic 
factors as well.  The goal was to create an overall case study sample that was as 
diverse as possible, representing many different school environments and student 
populations throughout the state.  Principals who granted access to their schools 
were promised $200 as compensation for the visit, as well as reimbursement for any 
substitute teachers they might use while researchers were interviewing classroom 
teachers.  I attempted to gain access to each of the 10 districts that were associated 
with the 11 schools in the original case study sample.  Two districts declined to 
participate in my study, which left me with eight districts in my final sample. The 
declining districts were at the extremes of the spectrum in terms of urbanicity – one 
declining district was a very urban district, and the other was a very rural district.   
Table 2.2 
Range of School Characteristics across the Study Sample 
 
School 
% 
FRPL 
District 
Size 
Location 
District Per-
Pupil 
Expenditure 
% 
Non-
White 
% Prof. 
Math* 
% Prof. 
Reading* 
HS 1 6.8 Large Suburban $10,103 11.8 70 88.5 
HS 2 19.4 Small Suburban $9,687 6.1 52.6 63.5 
HS 3 18.0 Large Suburban $9,075 19.3 64.1 74.7 
HS 4 34.0 Large Rural $12,057 0 49.2 70.1 
HS 5 27.0 Small Rural $9,859 9.1 83.6 85.3 
ELEM 1 74.6 Small Urban $10,426 40.7 56.3 51.6 
ELEM 2 10.6 Large Suburban $9,237 4.8 80.3 74.2 
ELEM 3 78.2 Large Urban $9,399 95.0 42.3 39.9 
ELEM 4 42.3 Small Suburban $8,810 2.1 73.9 73.3 
ELEM 5 11.7 Large Suburban $12,836 19.9 90 84.9 
ELEM 6 82.6 Large Urban $9,399 86.1 58.4 46.9 
* Scores taken from the Pennsylvania state standardized test, the PSSA, from the 2007-2008 school 
year.  Scores represent the percentage of students in the school scoring at “proficient” or “advanced” 
on the PSSA.  In that school year, the school cutoff for making Adequate Yearly Progress, safe harbor 
and confidence interval measures notwithstanding, was 63% in reading and 56% in math.   
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While the exclusion of these two districts is clearly a limitation of my study, 
the eight districts included in the dissertation study are a fair representation of the 
most common district environments in the state, both in terms of size and 
urbanicity.  Yin (2003) asserts that, when using a multiple case study design, it is 
important to carefully select cases that can identify contrasting results, but for 
predictable reasons.  My final sample accomplishes this goal, which makes the 
multiple case study design a robust approach to studying the phenomenon of search 
and decision-making in the school and district context.  
 
Data Collection Methods.  The primary data source of data for my dissertation 
study is in-depth interviews with school-level and district-level personnel.  During 
the first two years of interviews (spring 2009 and spring 2010), interviews were 
with school personnel, including teachers, guidance counselors, support staff, and 
school administrators.  The goal was to interview approximately 8-10 individuals at 
each school, although these numbers varied somewhat depending on school size 
and interviewee availability.  Whenever possible, we attempted to interview the 
same individuals in Year 2 as in Year 1.  In total, the numbers for the first two years 
of interviews were 119 individuals and 185 total interviews.  In contrast, the Year 3 
interviews were almost entirely with district-level personnel, and most often 
included curriculum coordinators, business managers, assistant superintendents, 
and superintendents.  The number of individuals interviewed in each district during 
  
 36
Year 3 varied greatly depending on the size of the district, but usually was between 
two and six individuals in total.  In total, I interviewed 27 individuals in Year 3. 
According to Patton (1987), “Depth interviewing involves asking open-ended 
questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then following up with 
additional relevant questions” (p. 108).  I used a different protocol for each year of 
interviews. We piloted all protocols with school and district administrators before 
using them in actual case study settings, which yielded a final product that was clear 
and comprehensive.  The resulting protocols were also grounded in the research 
and the research questions but were not overly structured – interviewees could 
guide the conversation in a particular direction if they wished.  We ensured the 
confidentiality of all interviewees to help ensure that interviewees felt comfortable 
being candid about the decision-making processes (or lack thereof) in their schools 
or districts – I use neither interviewee names nor the names of their schools or 
districts in this dissertation.  We gave interviewees detailed consent forms (which 
were approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board).  
Following the collection of interview data, I password protected all data files, 
including recordings and transcripts, and removed identifiers from all analysis 
documents.  As a result the schools in this dissertation are labeled as “ELEM 1,” 
“ELEM 2,” etc. and “HS 1,” “HS 2,” etc. 
I built three sources of data from the interviews.  First, I drafted field memos 
following each visit, which included initial impressions and observations from the 
interviews regarding such things as the school or district culture, the organization’s 
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search efforts, and/or interactions with staff.  Second, the research team took notes 
during interviews, which were objective recordings of interviewee statements 
(mainly in case there were technical problems with the digital recordings).  Finally, 
we made digital recordings of most all of the interviews (save those cases in which 
the interviewee declined to be recorded) and created transcripts from these 
recordings. 
Aside from the interviews, I also review relevant documents pertaining to the 
schools or districts in my sample.  One example is the “Getting Results” document 
that the state required each school in “warning” status to complete, detailing its 
plans for improvement over one year’s time.  Comparing the schools’ stated plans to 
the processes that actually occurred in schools (as gleaned from the interviews) 
gave some insight into the degree to which schools have formal improvement plans 
in place that guide search and decision-making processes.  The Getting Results 
document is a publicly available resource on the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education website, although it is no longer in wide use statewide.  Other examples of 
relevant documents include any frameworks, protocols, or guidelines that existed at 
the district or school levels to guide decision-making practices.  For example, a 
school might have a formal curriculum review process that guides their search for 
new curriculum materials.  Whenever possible, I asked for access to these 
documents during the interviews, and was given permission to use them as part of 
my dissertation research.   
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Finally, I use data collected from the 2009 statewide survey of principals.  
The survey was administered to the over 3,000 principals throughout the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with response rate of 65%.  Questions on the 
survey were about the different types of activities underway in schools in response 
to performance-based accountability measures at the state and federal levels.   
 
Limitations.  There are several limitations inherent in my data collection methods.  
First, due to timing, budget, and travel limitations, my dissertation research does 
not contain any direct observations of schools or school district decision-making 
processes.  Observing school board meetings, staff meetings, or vendor 
presentations would likely have strengthened the internal validity of my findings, 
since it would have provided a data source not based on self-report.  Even if I had 
conducted observations, however, it would have been difficult to determine what 
would constitute a “decision-making moment.”  Search processes, for example, often 
occur through phone calls or casual encounters with friends or colleagues, or 
through individual research conducted at unpredictable times.   
The timing of my data collection is potentially another limitation of my 
research.  Although I was able to build in search and decision-making questions to 
the protocols for all three years of data collection, it is possible that interviewees’ 
memories had faded by the third year of data collection.  Ideally, I would have 
collected my district data concurrently with the school data, providing a more 
complete picture of the decision-making process occurring at a particular moment 
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in time.  By the time I had finalized the topic for my dissertation, however, it was 
past the second year of data collection.  I therefore decided to conduct the district 
research as a third consecutive year, and ask my interviewees to think back to when 
the school in question was first placed in “warning” following the 2007-2008 school 
year.  In some cases, district administrators were not on staff at that time, which 
caused me to modify slightly the nature of the protocol to reflect more current 
search and decision-making activities within the district.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, my inability to recruit two of the ten target 
districts is a limitation of my study.  Although I believe the final distribution of my 
sample is representative of the “average” set of districts and schools throughout the 
state (see Table 2), I would have preferred to see these three additional schools and 
two additional districts included in the final sample. 
 
Analysis.  The first step in my analysis plan was to create a detailed case study of 
each school district in my study.  I present these case studies in Chapter 3.  For each 
case study, I use data from the site visits, which includes the field memos, interview 
notes, complete interview transcripts, and document analysis. To aggregate within-
case information, I created a common coding scheme for interviews transcripts from 
all three years that includes both deductive and inductive codes.  Maintaining the 
same codes from year to year allowed me to aggregate responses within the school 
or district from one year to the next.  I used the Atlas.ti qualitative software program 
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to assist in this process of aggregation, with each school or district becoming its own 
“family” for analysis purposes.   
The individual case studies lay the groundwork for the comparative study of 
the districts and schools (Eisenhardt, 1989), which I discuss in chapters 4 and 5.  
For my cross-case analysis, I used a series of case-ordered descriptive matrices.  As 
described by Miles and Huberman (1994), case-ordered descriptive matrices list the 
cases in a certain order according to a particular variable of interest.  The authors 
suggest that ordering cases in this way can become a powerful way to detect 
differences both across cases and among high, medium, and low cases.  The 
variables and meta-variables correspond to points of interest relating to my 
research questions.  
 To adequately capture the various cross-case differences, I employed several 
techniques, depending on the variable of interest.  If the variable was, for example, 
the constraints on decision-making, I organized the cases by the type of constraint 
and then created a meta-variable that described a particular force putting pressure 
on schools and districts. If, on the other hand, the variable of interest was the people 
who made decisions for the school or district, I instead created a meta-variable that 
measured the degree of dispersion of the decision-making process or a bivariate 
measure of whether the decision-making process can be considered “top-down” or 
“bottom-up” in nature.  The meta-variables varied in each manipulation of the case-
ordered descriptive matrix.   Although the vast majority of the data for this 
dissertation study come from the interviews and document analysis, wherever 
  
 41
possible I triangulated my data with information from the document analysis or the 
2009 survey of principals.   
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CHAPTER 3:  INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES 
 
Study Sample 
 
This study employs a comparative case study design of eight different 
schools throughout Pennsylvania.  The sample includes six schools that failed to 
make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) following the 2007-2008 school year and two 
that successfully made AYP that year.  The schools are also representative across 
geography, urbanicity, student demographics, and student socioeconomic status 
(with the possible exception that the sample does not contain any extremely large 
urban districts).  Table 3.1 depicts some key characteristics of the sample.     
 
Table 3.1 
Study Sample 
 
School 
% 
FRPL 
District 
Size 
Geography District PPE 
% 
Non-
White 
%  
Prof. 
Math 
%  
Prof. 
Reading 
ELEM 1 74.6 Small Urban $10,426 40.7 56.3 51.6 
ELEM 2 10.6 Large Suburban $9,237 4.8 80.3 74.2 
ELEM 3 42.3 Small Suburban $8,810 2.1 73.9 73.3 
ELEM 4 11.7 Large Suburban $12,836 19.9 90 84.9 
HS 1 6.8 Large Suburban $10,103 11.8 70 88.5 
HS 2 19.4 Small Suburban $9,687 6.1 52.6 63.5 
HS 3 18.0 Large Suburban $9,075 19.3 64.1 74.7 
HS 4 27.0 Small Rural $9,859 9.1 83.6 85.3 
*Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2008 
 
This table, while helpful, cannot adequately convey the complexity inherent 
in the specific settings of the eight schools listed above.  To this end, I provide short 
individual case study write-ups for each of the eight schools in the sample.  I used 
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three separate sources of information to develop each write-up.  First, I wrote field 
memos following each school or district site visit over the three years.  These field 
memos included my initial impressions of the school building, the school culture, 
and the main themes that emerged from the interviews.  Second, I read through the 
entire three years of interview transcripts school by school to get an in-depth idea of 
the school’s context, decision-making approach, and relevant constraining factors.  I 
took detailed notes on each school during this process.  Finally, I analyzed any 
relevant documents that school leaders made available to me during my visits, for 
example curriculum review cycles or the state-mandated Getting Results document.  
Since we promised confidentiality, I use codes for each school.  High schools 
are labeled “HS 1,” “HS 2,” etc. and elementary schools – defined as any school 
serving students Kindergarten to eighth grade – are labeled “ELEM 1,” “ELEM 2,” etc.  
In each case, I interviewed individuals both in the school setting and in the district 
offices. 
ELEM 1 
 
ELEM 1 is a medium-sized school located in a depressed urban area.  The 
surrounding houses in the neighborhood are mainly dilapidated two-family homes, 
and I could tell by the number of people outside on a weekday that unemployment 
in the area was likely high.  During our visit, the school staff spoke often of the 
“home problem” that plagues students.  They said that students come from broken 
homes and have disinterested parents and guardians, which made their jobs as 
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teachers and administrators very difficult.  When asked what factors were hindering 
the school’s ability to make AYP, one teacher put it succinctly and brashly:  “We have 
a lot of crack babies,” she said.  This negativity and blame-placing attitude pervaded 
our experience over the two years that we visited the school.  Administrators were 
more forward thinking and positive, but admitted that the district did have a 
problem with parental engagement.   
In terms of decision-making, the district pursued a two-pronged approach.  It 
tightly controlled the decision-making process around major instructional decisions, 
such as selecting new curriculum materials, aligning curriculum to the standards, 
and reorganizing grades by department.  The superintendent, assistant 
superintendent, and high school principal seemed to be the major decision-makers 
in these areas.  The elementary principal was rarely included in the search and 
decision-making process, and the district overlooked teacher input all together.  On 
the other hand, however, the district let the elementary school principal make the 
“less important” decisions, such as how to handle PSSA remediation, school-wide 
action planning, setting incentives for PSSA performance, and other improvement 
activities.  When I asked the elementary principal directly about whether decisions 
were “top-down” or “bottom-up” in nature, he said that about 70% of decisions 
were top-down and 30% were bottom-up.   
A good example of the mostly top-down decision-making process in the 
district was the district’s decision to change the elementary math curriculum.  In the 
first year of our visits, the assistant principal had grown worried that the existing 
  
 45
curriculum was not research-based.  The district administrators evaluated a number 
of different programs, and ended up selecting Everyday Math for three reasons.  
First, neighboring schools were using it with success.  Second, it had a research base 
on the What Works Clearinghouse.  And third, the middle school and high school 
principals thought it would synch well with their math curricula.  The elementary 
principal was later informed of the decision and allowed to try out the new 
materials.  Teachers were left out of the process completely.  Said one teacher, 
“Everything seems to be very quiet and then they announce, so we were hearing in 
the background this is going to happen, but nothing definite until our last Act 80 
meeting it was in March they said this is going to be our new curriculum, look at it 
and see what you think, we are going to try and use the new power teaching model, 
which none of us have been trained in yet” (Teacher, ELEM 1).  Another teacher said 
simply, “We are not real sure on who chose it and why” (Teacher, ELEM 1). 
As far as search at the district level, the district followed strict protocols for 
its top-down decision-making process, but engaged in a very limited search process. 
The assistant superintendent used a framework that he adapted from his previous 
district that asked the decision-maker to evaluate new programs and strategies 
based on cost, timing, and other factors.  District administrators also reported that 
they leaned heavily on the Pennsylvania Department of Education website when 
trying to align their curriculum to the state standardized test or engage in K-12 
curriculum alignment.  Finally, district administrators reported that they routinely 
looked to neighboring districts to see what had worked for others in the past, asking 
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these districts for specific evidence of programs’ success as shown on benchmark 
tests and other measures.  That said, the options under consideration at the district 
level were usually determined not by the administrators themselves, but rather by 
the vendors who happened to knock on the door.  Said the assistant superintendent, 
“The vendors basically find you. You really don’t have to search them out too much, 
because they’re for profit. So they find you pretty easily. There’s a lot of good stuff 
out there. The thing is, you’ve got to sift through it and find what’s right for your 
district. And make sure that you’re not duplicating, and it’s meeting your needs.” 
(District Administrator, ELEM 1)  
In contrast to the more formal (albeit limited) district-level efforts, the 
search process at the school level was focused almost entirely on informal 
networking.  Said the principal at ELEM 1, “Education is all about stealing whatever 
works, see if it works for you, if not, steal from someone else”  (Principal, ELEM 1).  
The principal also looked to data from neighboring districts, but admitted that he 
mainly called his friends to see what was working for them.  Other networking 
efforts happened organically within the school building itself.  Several teachers 
mentioned that they got together during their planning periods or lunch breaks to 
compare what was working in their classrooms, and how best to prepare their 
students for the PSSAs.  In some cases, these informal meetings resulted in tweaks 
to the reading and math curriculum so that it was better aligned to tested content.  
Teachers said that the school principal didn’t really get involved in these micro-level 
decisions.   As one teacher put it, “We have team meetings, we meet as a team once a 
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month and usually at those times we discuss any challenges or things we would like 
to try and [the principal] lets us try it because we’ve been very consistent 
throughout the years with scores so in his eyes he thinks we are the ones teaching it 
everyday, we are the ones implementing it in our classrooms he trusts us and lets us 
try it” (Teacher, ELEM 1).   
The order of decision-making at the district level was fairly linear, with 
problem identification as the first step, then the search for solutions, and finally the 
decision itself.  Administrators did not agree on which of those steps was the most 
difficult – some said that problem identification was the most difficult, whereas 
others said it was the easiest.  Decision-making, while linear, was limited by two 
important factors.  The first factor was a district culture that did not encourage 
collaboration – teachers and school-level administrators alike simply waited for 
options to land at their feet instead of actively searching for potential new programs 
and strategies.  The second limiting factor was time.  Nearly all interviewees 
mentioned that there simply wasn’t enough time to meet and collaborate about 
programming and improvement strategies for the school or the district, which in 
turn constrained their ability to make informed decisions.   
ELEM 2 
 
In contrast to ELEM 1’s low wealth surroundings, ELEM 2 is a small school in 
a high-wealth district.  During the first year of visits, the school served students in 
Kindergarten through fifth grade, but in the second and third year of visits, the 
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district added an “intermediate school” and restructured its elementary schools to 
serve only grades K-3.  Thus, while ELEM 2 was in warning in our first year, the 
teachers and administrators had only one tested grade (third grade) in the 
subsequent years of research visits.  
In our first visit to the school, we were invited into the “War Room,” which is 
the name that the principal gave to his Response-to-Intervention (RTI) and data 
review team.  The team consisted of the principal, a math specialist, a reading 
specialist, the guidance counselor, and the RTI coordinator.  This was the first 
indication that the staff at this elementary school – and, as I would later discover, 
the district as a whole – were extremely data-driven in their decision-making 
approach.  In this meeting, the War Room team presented a wealth of school-level 
data and reviewed the many different interventions and curriculum supplement 
programs they had in place to serve the diverse educational needs of their student 
body.  ELEM 2 took a proactive approach to school improvement – whereas other 
schools and districts in the sample would name about 10-15 strategies for 
improvement, the administrators at this district named over 30 different programs 
or strategies that they were in the process of adopting and implementing either 
district or school-wide.  By the third year of interviews, administrators 
acknowledged that their main challenge was to begin to look at what types of 
programs they could eliminate from this list.  The assistant superintendent 
explained this dilemma:  
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“We need to get a little bit better at looking at what becomes the litmus test 
for what we take in as the new thing we take in from down the pike.  Or 
rather, what becomes a litmus test for saying that they are going to adopt 
something or pull something in to solve those problems.  We’ve had the 
luxury of being able to do WalMart shopping – go in and, “oh, here’s 
everything.  We need this for this, and this for this.”  And so you have a 
multitude of things out there and now we’ve gotta kind of move toward 
Target and eventually back to the mom-and-pop hardware store where we 
go in and we have limited choices and limited funds.” (District Administrator, 
ELEM 2) 
 
The decision-making process in the district was neither top-down nor 
bottom-up, but rather was a truly collaborative process. The district proactively 
used its school-level personnel as informants and participants in the decision-
making process.  This process took shape in three ways: First, the district had in 
place a Response-to-Intervention (RTI) program that used data to target 
remediation to the specific areas in which students struggle; second, the district 
used a formal curriculum review protocol to provide supplemental support for non-
covered content or skill areas; and third, the district actively “pre-implemented” all 
new potential programs in classrooms before formally introducing new programs to 
a broader audience. 
The goal of the district’s RTI program was to use student-level data to craft a 
remediation or enrichment program that fit each child’s unique educational needs.  
Data collection was therefore a major effort in the district, and the schools had in 
place multiple data collection methods, including regular benchmark tests, fluency 
screeners, and computer-based programs.  The district’s math and reading 
coordinators were in constant contact with the school RTI teams, particularly the 
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math and reading specialists.  School teams shared information about emerging 
needs to district personnel, who then gauged how pervasive the need was district-
wide.  In this way, student needs were aggregated to the school level, and then 
further aggregated to the district level, creating a bottom-up feedback system that 
was guided by top-down RTI processes.   
The second tool in the district’s decision-making toolbox was curriculum 
review protocols.  The district administrators in charge of math, reading, and special 
education each used a highly detailed framework to review all potential new 
programs or strategies.  This framework contained six separate “stages”: 1) program 
evaluation/philosophy/framework generation; 2) resource review and piloting; 3) 
product purchase and pre-implementation; 4) full implementation; 5) monitoring 
and evaluation; and 6) refinement.  The timeline for this process went out five years 
and was for all subject areas in all grades throughout the district.  
Finally, the district used a “pre-implementation” strategy, which was also the 
third stage of the curriculum review process explained above.  The pre-
implementation process allowed teachers to use new programs in their classrooms 
for up to a year before fully rolling them out school or district-wide.  Two or three 
teachers would use a program in their classrooms for several months, and then 
would serve on a “pre-implementation committee” at the district offices.  As 
committee members, they would present their successes and challenges using the 
program in their classroom.  The literacy or math specialist at the school would 
always be present for these meetings, as would the district administrators for 
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reading or math and the assistant superintendent.  We spoke to several teachers in 
the elementary school who were pre-implementers and all spoke highly of the 
practice, saying that it allowed them to proactive participants in the decision-
making process. Following pre-implementation, the district then made the decision 
about whether to fully roll out the program, and how to best support the new 
program with professional development and training.   
Although the district was heavily reliant on protocols and frameworks as 
part of its information gathering system, the district made a conscious effort not to 
copy other districts.  Several administrators asserted that they saw themselves as 
innovators, not copiers.  Said the district’s reading curriculum coordinator, “I don’t 
want this district to be ‘what is’; I want it to be prepared so that other districts are 
looking to us” (District Administrator, ELEM 2).  This means that they did not look 
for strategies or curriculum materials that had been used in other districts, they did 
not rely on the recommendations of the state or the Intermediate Units, and they did 
not take the word of vendors that they had worked with in the past.  Instead, the 
district constantly looked for new and innovative programs on the horizon, scanning 
the research journals and clearinghouses to inform their evidence-based processes.  
As an example, the reading director explained that when she selected a program to 
collect data on a students’ reading fluency (or “Lexile” scores), she visited the Lexile 
website and looked at each and every vendor that the site recommended.  Then she 
cross-referenced each vendor’s product by reviewing the relevant research on 
Lexile scoring, relying mainly on her professional journals.  Finally, she called in a 
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short-list of vendors and interviewed them about how they would add value to the 
district’s data-driven decision-making agenda in relation to the others.  She selected 
Scholastic’s program because that vendor was able to link Lexile scores to parent 
resources, including lists of library books in each child’s area of fluency.   
Finally, the process by which the district makes decisions was linear.  The 
purpose of the “War Room” was mainly to use student-level data to identify 
problems, such as gaps in the curriculum or instruction.  Then, the district 
administrators collaborated with school-level personnel (mainly the math and 
reading specialists, although they were open to teacher input as well) to find the 
right programs that would fit the unique needs of struggling students.  The search 
process itself involved queries of vendors, technical research, and – to a limited 
extent – outreach to trusted sources at the state or regional levels.  Once the district 
or school made a preliminary decision, it then activated the pre-implementation 
process, making sure to gather feedback from the pre-implementers along the way.  
Only then did the district finalize its decision and fully adopt the new program or 
strategy.  Given the deliberate nature of this process, the main constraint on search 
and decision-making was time – decisions often took a year or more to reach full 
implementation.     
 
ELEM 3 
 
Whereas ELEM 2 exhibited high levels of administrative and teacher 
collaboration for improvement, these levels were dismally low in ELEM 3.  Although 
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there was only one other elementary school in the school district, the administrators 
and teachers at ELEM 3 frequently referred to their school as the “red-headed 
stepchild of the district.”  Their students, they said, came from more impoverished 
backgrounds, their PTA was less robust, their programming was not well supported, 
and the district looked down on them.  Most interesting, however, was their claim 
that the school as a whole was less involved in the decision-making process than 
was the other elementary school.   
For her part, the superintendent recognized the competition between her 
two elementary buildings, but said there was little she could do to change the 
dynamic because she – and the district – lacked the capacity to do so.  The district 
was small and her entire administrative staff, from the facilities managers to the 
maintenance staff, was only ten people strong.  There was no assistant 
superintendent and no curriculum coordinator for her to lean on.  As the principal of 
ELEM 3 put it, “The superintendent in this district does more things than the 
superintendent should do. And it’s- I don’t want to say that it’s micromanagement. I 
believe it’s high degree of forced management, in that degree…She’s involved in 
personnel. She’s involved in curriculum. She’s involved in so many other areas, as 
well as that’s a political role” (Principal, ELEM 3).   
These two issues – the district’s low level of capacity and the elementary 
school’s inferiority complex – made the decision-making process fraught with 
tension.  The low levels of human capital and scarce resources meant that the 
district didn’t consider many new programs or strategies.  In the first year after 
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ELEM 3 was put on the state’s “warning list,” the principal himself admitted that the 
school wasn’t really doing anything different than it had before.  The only change 
was an afterschool tutoring program for Title I students, which was a program 
enabled by formula funding from the state and was not a district or school decision.  
But even in situations when the superintendent asked the staff at ELEM 3 for their 
opinions on new strategies or materials, the staff felt resentful and claimed that the 
programs were really intended more for the other elementary building.  
In the three years of my visits to the school, there was only one example of a 
decision that followed a linear decision-making process: the selection of a new math 
curriculum.  Teachers had for years been complaining that their math textbooks 
were old, poorly aligned to the state standards, and filled with “fluff” (Teacher, 
ELEM 3).  When the district received funds from the 2008 stimulus bill, the district 
was able to search out new curriculum materials.  The process was fairly linear and 
top-down in nature – the superintendent solicited vendors to submit sample 
textbooks, then she met with her two elementary principals to discuss, then she 
called together a committee of teachers at the two elementary schools to discuss the 
various options on the table, and then she made a decision based on their input.  
Despite this fairly inclusive top-down strategy, teachers at ELEM 3 claimed that they 
were very wary of the new math curriculum because they felt they had been left out 
of the process, and they suspected the choice was really made because teachers at 
the other elementary building had wanted it.   
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In the two years while teachers waited for this new math curriculum, 
however, they actively sought out new ways to align their instruction to the state 
standards, albeit without any coordination or supervision at the school level.  
Teachers reported that they took it upon themselves to find solutions to the 
outdated curriculum.  When asked what resources she used to help her implement 
the state standards, one teacher said, “We get some stuff from the Internet. Not 
much. I have other books that the previous teacher left. My father was a math 
teacher for thirty-some years, and he gave me some stuff, too. I was pretty much 
given a lot of things from previous years” (Teacher, ELEM 3).   
Although one might think that the school’s self-described second-class citizen 
status would cause them to rally around one another, this was not the case – in their 
search for solutions in their own classrooms, teachers rarely leaned on one another 
as resources.  Low levels of social capital in the school prevented teachers from 
sharing ideas and helping one another.  As a result, efforts at aligning curriculum to 
the standards (before the new math curriculum was adopted) were fractured.  The 
4th grade’s strategy for alignment, for example, was to replace its Pennsylvania 
History class with more geometry preparation before the PSSAs.  The 5th grade was 
trying to ramp up its use of the PSSA coach booklets, while the 6th grade opted to 
replace recess periods with more test preparation.  In all cases, the elementary 
principal seemed to have simply signed off on whatever teachers wanted to try, 
resulting in an uncoordinated bottom-up approach to decision-making. 
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In general, the story of ELEM 3 is very few decisions were made according to 
a true “process.”  The lack of capacity, specifically the lack of social and human 
capital, undermined efforts to make decisions for improvement in a thoughtful, 
deliberate, and inclusive manner. 
ELEM 4 
 
Whereas ELEM 3 lacked staff capacity and suffered from a negative school 
culture, ELEM 4 enjoyed a surplus of support staff and prioritized efforts to 
constantly improve social capital.  ELEM 4 is located in a well-to-do area with a 
highly motivated parent community.  The building principal was a woman whose 
leadership style was not unlike that of a military officer – she was driven, decisive, 
focused, and blunt.  She was also very well liked in her school and, by the third year 
of interviews, she had been promoted to an administrative position in the district 
office.  Despite the regimented personal leadership style of the principal, however, 
the district did not follow any specific set of guidelines for decision-making in 
general or search procedures in particular.  Instead, the district operated on a 
general philosophy that information for decision-making could come from 
anywhere – from sources internal or external to the district, from research journals 
or word-of-mouth recommendations, and from the school custodian up to the 
superintendent.  While some might view this as a fragmented approach to decision-
making, perhaps a more appropriate term would be “organic,” because 
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administrators were constantly encouraging personnel to collaborate and 
brainstorm about new potential programs.   
As a result, the district was highly attuned to the social needs of employees, 
and spent a great deal of effort on increasing social interaction among employees in 
different buildings.  The Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Education said 
that her primary goal for the academic year was to conduct meetings with building 
leaders, rotating the venue each week so that personnel could see what other 
peoples’ “worlds were like.”  The goals of these meetings were to share best 
practices, as well as communicate emerging issues or instructional challenges.  
Mostly, however, the goal was to get people to feel that they were part of a 
functional team.  
The district actively called upon principals, teachers, specialists, and 
paraprofessionals to participate in the decision-making process – they were asked 
to present data, generate new ideas for improvement, and even vote on new 
potential programs and strategies. The assistant superintendent for curriculum and 
instruction said that he liked to call general meetings and be very upfront about his 
own preferences for new programs or strategies; but he admits that he openly 
encourages employees to disagree with him, as long as they can express their 
reasoning in a coherent and convincing way. When we spoke to the building 
principal and her staff, they were extremely proud of their abilities, and felt that 
they were trusted and valued members of the district’s decision-making team.  As 
the principal explained, “I think journals and all those are great, but the process of 
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finding a program, working through the program, and then implementing it is a 
person-to-person thing.  The team is more important to me than the theoretical 
jargon. It’s great to start from and to take from, but the practicality of doing it in the 
building is the everyday business” (Principal, ELEM 4).     
The district and the school relied mostly on internal achievement data to 
inform decision-making.  At the building principal’s request, the school started a 
Response to Intervention (RTI) initiative that focused on progress monitoring and 
automatic targeted remediation for minority students, regardless of their academic 
performance.  Although this latter focus was controversial within the school, the 
principal explained that she implemented it because “research shows that 
eventually those scores will struggle” (Principal, ELEM 4).  The school’s RTI 
program eventually became a model district-wide, which once again shows how 
ideas in the district often are generated at the school level and then filter up to the 
district level.   
Although the district appeared to be highly functioning, district 
administrators were quick to caution that the lack of formal decision-making 
frameworks (aside from the RTI model itself) had some downsides.  The first was 
that the district was highly susceptible to political influences, namely from a 
contentious school board and a demanding parent community. The school board put 
pressure on the district to copy successful techniques by asking which other 
districts were using certain curriculum materials before sanctioning their purchase 
for ELEM 4.  An example was the district’s search for a new bullying program.  Two 
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of the middle schools had in place a particular anti-bullying program, which was 
also used in a neighboring district. Other programs were considered, but the school 
board pushed hard for that one because there was “evidence of success.”  As far as 
parents are concerned, teachers were quick to say that any new program must pass 
muster with parents if it is to be fully implemented.  For example, the school 
attempted to implement a standards-based report card one year, but that decision 
was eventually scrapped when parents rejected the new report cards.   
Another potential downside to the district’s search procedures is that it was 
highly dependent on the individual leadership styles of the school and district 
administrators.  While one administrator might prioritize teacher input, another 
might value principal-led brainstorming initiatives, and yet another might be 
personally going to conferences in the area to find new programs.  While these 
differing tactics did not produce any specific problems during the three years of 
interviews, three separate district administrators said that they would like to see 
more cohesion in their search and decision-making approaches in the future.  Said 
one administrator: “We have sixteen principals, and of those sixteen principals, you 
probably have ten, eleven, twelve different philosophies, and that’s hard when 
you’re trying to do things consistently as a district. That’s hard. I mean, not in terms 
of what people want, but philosophy-wise. People are all over the place with that, 
and that drives some of us nuts” (District Administrator, ELEM 4).  
 Regardless of whether one calls the district’s approach to search and 
decision-making “fragmented” or “organic,” the process was still fairly linear in 
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nature.  The district invested a fair amount of effort into diagnosing the problems 
(specifically by using a “Response to Intervention” program), then actively searched 
for solutions to fit those identified problems, and then made the decision itself, 
which administrators at the district level said was the most difficult part of the 
process, given the political climate district-wide.   
 
HS 1 
 
From afar, HS 1 could easily be mistaken for a small liberal-arts college 
campus or an elite private school.  The athletic fields are immaculate, and the high 
school is enormous, brand new, and laid out in a U-shape with different sections of 
the building proclaiming their unique focus (“Academics” or “Athletics” or “Arts”).  
Inside, the building looks a bit more like a traditional public high school with 
students rushing to class and hall monitors trying to control the chaos, but the 
impression remained that this is a wealthy district and a well-maintained building.    
Most of the decisions for improvement at HS 1 came from within the school 
walls, and many originated at the teacher level.  This may have be due to the fact 
that the school is simply so big (the school has over 3,000 students), but it also 
belied the district’s general philosophy around decision-making that bottom-up is 
best.  Said a district administrator, “I’ve been with the district for 35 years and I can 
tell that during my time in the district that has always been the philosophy.  To have 
those people that are going to be ultimately using the resources and will be the 
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people who can make those resources successful with students, that they’re a part of 
the selection of those resources.”  To support this approach, the high school leaned 
heavily on department chairs through a Professional Learning Communities (PLC) 
structure.  Department chairs would meet regularly with teachers to brainstorm 
around new instructional strategies and determine gaps in curriculum and/or 
instruction.  When an individual teacher or a PLC identified a need, they took it to 
the department chair, who then took it to the principal, who then networked with 
district administrators and the school board to turn the idea into reality.   
  This collaborative approach to decision-making presented both benefits and 
challenges for the district.  In terms of the benefits, teachers felt as though they were 
included in the process and reported high levels of buy-in once a new resource or 
strategy was selected.  And because the district employed several decision-making 
frameworks, such as the PLCs and curriculum committees, each decision was 
thoroughly vetted before the ultimate strategy was selected.  An example of a 
teacher-led idea was the “math study lab” at the high school, which essentially used 
benchmark tests to identify students for voluntary small-group remediation in the 
school library during study hall periods.  The idea came from a teacher who was 
working on her Masters Degree and decided to implement the lab as part of her 
thesis for her degree.  She took the idea to her department chair, who worked with 
her to iron out the details of the intervention, and she then spent her summer 
coming up with the data markers to identify the right students for this lab.  By the 
second year of our visits to the high school, the program had expanded and the 
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principal had become intimately involved in the scheduling aspect of the study lab, 
working to make it a mandatory requirement for identified struggling students.  By 
the third year of interviews, district administrators said that the idea was so 
successful that they had begun to use it at the middle school level, and that several 
neighboring districts were interested in using the model in their own schools as 
well.   
A challenge, however, of this departmentalized approach was that there were 
so many decisions coming up through the pipeline at one time that they could 
become disjointed from one another.  In other words, what may have seemed like 
the next great idea could soon become a passing fad.  Although the district generally 
liked to pilot new programs before they were fully implemented, this piecemeal 
approach drained financial resources, as licenses were purchased and then 
abandoned in the search for the perfect set of resources.  An example here is the HS 
1’s search for a program to identify students for remediation.  The school had 
purchased one benchmarking program, but it didn’t have all the tools they needed, 
so they purchased another one that better fit their needs.  But a few years later, they 
realized that teachers weren’t using that new resource fully and so they set about 
finding yet another program that would work.  They finally settled on a product that 
was already being used in the middle school, but even that program did not seem 
like it would last for long.  Said one teacher: 
“It is hard to find a good tool for that, where you can just go from one grade 
and just dump it into the next and track it from year to year.  We don't even 
think [the program we have now] is the answer to that but it is the best that 
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we have right now.  We can convert their data into an Excel file and we can 
manage it.  We are still looking for a good longitudinal way to track them 
from one grade to the next and to turn that data around….We are still 
searching, if I come up with something in the next three months I will throw 
it out to the group again and say hey let's look at this,” (Teacher, HS 1) 
 
As one might expect, the district’s collaborative approach to decision-making 
relied heavily on networking and word-of-mouth recommendations of new 
resources.  Most of this “human resources” work occurred within the school, but 
teachers and administrators also reported that they actively worked with principals 
in neighboring districts and the state technical assistance agencies.  They did not 
rely heavily on technical resources such as research journals, conferences, or 
professional associations.  A district administrator summed up their general 
strategy for search: 
 
“I think we want to make sure that we look at everything that’s available.  We 
want to take the time to evaluate those resources very carefully.  And that 
involves a number of steps, from vendors or publishers coming in to present 
materials, the teachers having time to look at those materials in depth – that 
takes a considerable amount of time.  Certainly it’s easy for us using data and 
using feedback from teachers to identify the issues that we want to resolve.  
But then when we look at resources, that process is the most time 
consuming.”  (District Administrator, HS 1) 
 
The district did not have many constraints on its search process, which 
allowed them to network extensively, spending the time and the resources they 
needed to find what worked best for them.  Although interviewees mentioned that 
the budget was starting to get tighter, they still admitted that they generally had 
sufficient staff and money to choose whatever resources they thought would best fit 
their students’ needs.  It is highly probable, therefore, that the district’s search 
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strategy was workable in large part because the district itself was wealthy and had a 
strong team of administrators that were committed to spending the time and effort 
to enable a truly collaborative search and decision-making process.   
HS 2 
 
In contrast to the college campus appearance of HS1, HS 2 is a traditional 
looking small rural high school located in a similarly small district in the “slate belt” 
of Pennsylvania.  Its students came mainly from white, middle-class families, and the 
percentage of its students on the Free and Reduced Price Lunch program hovered 
around 19%.  On the research team’s first visit in 2009, the school had just been 
placed on the states “warning” list for failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) in several areas.  By 2010, the school had failed again to meet state targets 
and was in School Improvement I, which meant that the Pennsylvania State 
Department of Education (PDE) exercised its right to send in a team of professionals 
called “Distinguished Educators” to help the school to improve.  In the final visit 
with district administrators in 2011, the school had made some progress, and was 
back on the “warning” list, but still failing for its special education students in 
reading.   
The district relied heavily on the school principal and his two assistant 
principals to make decisions, generally asking for teacher input only after school-
level administrators had already chosen a new program or strategy for 
improvement.  While some members of the school staff reported that they didn’t 
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care if they were involved in the decision-making process, others reported that their 
exclusion from the process led to feelings of resentment of school and district 
administrators.  When asked about his involvement in the decision-making process, 
a special education teacher said: 
“A lot of times, we feel like decisions are made without any of our input, and 
then we’re told, you have to do this. And it’s frustrating on our end…. And 
that seems to be the pattern that’s been going on a lot this year, where new 
things are coming down the pike, and it’s like, okay, you guys have to 
implement it. This is what we want to do. Here, make it happen. And we don’t 
really meet as a faculty or as a department first to try to come up with ideas 
of how to implement it or get our input on things.” (Teacher, HS 2)   
 
Similarly, a Distinguished Educator at the high school said, “There’s, I think, a 
lack of trust that the central office doesn’t trust that the administrators are going to 
make the right decision. Therefore, the central office will make it for them. They do 
have faculty input, the administration here at the high school, but it’s predominantly 
the good old boys club that makes the decision” (Distinguished Educator, HS 2). 
  The problems identified by the school and district staff were threefold:  
First, nearly all respondents reported that there had been an immense amount of 
district and school administrator turnover, which resulted in low staff morale and a 
mistrust of new initiatives.  The high school principal, for example, was the third 
individual to serve in his position in only a two-year period.  The second issue 
perhaps stemmed from the first, which was that there was a general lack of 
communication among staff, which made it difficult for administrators to stress to 
teachers and students alike the importance of the state standardized tests.  Finally, 
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respondents reported that the school was not adequately meeting the challenges of 
serving an increasingly impoverished student body. 
In response to these identified issues, interview respondents identified 15 
separate decisions that they had made for improvement, ranging from minor or 
superficial strategies (such as incentivizing student performance on the 
standardized tests with small rewards like free prom tickets) to major strategies 
(such as the total realignment of the curriculum to the state standards).  Although 
the specific search strategies varied depending on the decision in question, in 
general, searches for new programs or strategies were limited to familiar channels, 
such as networking with neighboring districts or contacting potential vendors.  
Although most of the networking activity occurred at the district level, there was 
one trusted individual at the high school – with the title of Instructional Coach – who 
district administrators trusted to network with friends in neighboring districts 
about new potential programs.  When asked about why she prefers these types of 
personal contacts instead of more technical research, the district superintendent 
said, “Because you can get feedback. You really can. You can get feedback. You can 
look in somebody’s eyes and tell if they’re selling you a line of bull. I can tell a guy 
who’s trying to sell a product” (Superintendent, HS 2). 
The search process, though constrained by geography and familiarity, was 
fairly linear in nature.  District administrators usually surveyed some of the school 
data, did a few Internet searches, and then contacted potential vendors to have them 
come into the district and pitch their products.  Once the options were on the table, 
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the district administrators weighed their options, and called in the school principals 
to take a look.  The principals sometimes would network with a trusted group of 
school staff, but sometimes would not, depending on the decision at hand.  Then the 
decision would be adopted at the district level and handed down to the teachers to 
implement.  The only exceptions to this pattern were decisions that were made by 
the Distinguished Educators, who answered to the state and not to the district or to 
the school.   
When I asked the district administrators to reflect on the district’s search 
and decision-making process, the Assistant Superintendent said that, while the 
district was usually open-minded when it came to new potential programs, she 
believed the district could do a better job at including more people in the decision-
making process, particularly during the “brainstorming” part of the process.  The 
superintendent agreed with this statement, but cited – as did many others – that the 
lack of stability in the administrator position had undermined the district’s ability to 
make decisions in an ideal manner.  She and other interview respondents 
mentioned that they hoped the level of trust and communication within the district 
would improve over time, thus facilitating greater collaboration and joint decision-
making.  By the next year, however, the high school principal left the district, and the 
school was faced with yet another absence in the administrative team.   
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HS 3 
 
Although the surrounding countryside makes HS 3 look somewhat similar to 
HS 2, its relative proximity to an urban area qualifies HS 3 as a suburban school.  It is 
housed in a modern building and beautiful surrounding campus.  When we first 
went to visit the high school, the school had recently witnessed an enormous 
turnover of the administrative staff at both the school and district levels: the 
principal, assistant principals, superintendent, and assistant superintendent were 
all new.  This massive turnover coincided with the school’s low scores on the PSSAs, 
but in fact the interviews with staff revealed that the administrative changes were 
long overdue and actually produced positive change in the school and district over 
the three years of our visits.   
Perhaps the most influential change was the arrival of the new principal, who 
was the son of a much-loved principal from many years back.  This principal made it 
his business to revitalize certain programs, analyze the data coming from the PSSAs 
and other sources, and fill curriculum gaps.  The staff responded well to his 
enthusiasm, shedding some of the complacency about test scores that had 
previously hampered the school’s ability to improve.  
The principal, along with his administrative team, instituted a collaborative 
strategy for decision-making.  In essence, he would call together his trusted advisors 
(consisting of his assistant principals and the two reading specialists in the school) 
to come up with new ideas for curriculum interventions and other new 
improvement strategies.  Then, they would run their ideas by the rest of the school 
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staff, including classroom teachers, special education teachers, and others.  Then, 
once there appeared to be support and consensus around a particular program, they 
would present their ideas to the district office staff, who would approve the 
decision, and together they would make a presentation to the school board for 
financial approval.  In this way, ideas for improvement almost always started with 
the principal and his team at the school level. 
An excellent example of this decision-making strategy in action was the 
school’s selection of the Read 180 intervention program.  After reviewing the data 
gleaned from benchmark tests, the two new reading specialists in the school 
decided that there were gaps in the reading curriculum that required a new 
intervention program.  They had both used Read 180 in previous positions in 
different districts, and highly recommended that HS 3 use it as well.  The principal 
was worried about the cost of the licenses for the program, however, so he asked 
them to present him with three or four options for a new intervention program. 
   
“Of course we are pushy about it so we were like, we need this now, and 
because of those subgroups not making it they were like, ok, if you say it is 
the best, it’s the best.  We even had somebody challenge us and say this is the 
Mercedes of all reading programs, why can’t you find something less 
expensive?  I said, we can pay all this money and we would still have all this 
stuff to do and it still wouldn’t meet every single kid at their level and it 
would not have all the things we know needs to happen for kids to catch up 
or close the gap.   I said these people at Scholastic have done their 
homework; everything is embedded in, from small group to independent 
reading and the software.  So why wouldn’t you get everything if you are 
going to pay something, do it all” (Reading Specialist, HS 3) 
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The principal reported that they completely convinced him of the need for 
Read 180, however.  He subsequently set up appointments with the vendor to visit 
neighboring districts that were using this program, and then took all of this 
information to the district office to make his pitch.  From the district’s perspective, 
administrators were interested in two things:  First, how much would the new 
program cost; and second, did it fit with their overall strategy of following Bill 
Dagget’s (2005) “rigor-relevance” framework.  When the superintendent found that 
Read 180 met these two criteria, he reported that he was happy to take the 
recommendation to the school board.  Once the board approved the purchase of 
some licenses, the principal piloted the program for a year, and then went back the 
next year to make the case for expanded use of the program with the purchase of 
additional licenses.  The board approved his request because they believed that the 
program had demonstrated positive results, as reflected in rising PSSA and Lexile 
scores.   
The overall decision-making process at HS 3 can be described as “nearly 
linear.”  The district, specifically the superintendent and assistant superintendent, 
were very focused on data analysis to help identify the problems that needed to be 
fixed in order for student achievement to improve.  Then, they tasked the school 
with searching for solutions to identified problems.  Then came the decision point, 
followed by implementation.  The only hitch in this linear process was that the 
search itself, though highly structured (i.e. involving piloting, multiple options on 
the table, human and technical sources to inform the process, etc.) served mainly to 
  
 71
justify decisions that administrators had already made in their heads.  With the 
Read 180 decision, for example, the reading specialists were already set on using 
that program before they made their presentation to the principal.  Said the 
principal, “I trust them implicitly, but I knew already that they were Read 180 
fanatics” (Principal, HS 3).  Later, when the school was tasked with coming up with a 
similar intervention program for math, the process unfolded in much the same way.  
The principal, whose background is in math instruction, came across an 
intervention program at a conference in Washington, DC, and liked it.  When he 
arrived back home, he thought he’d like to buy this new program, but researched a 
few others just to brainstorm or play Devil’s Advocate.   
In general, the school – and the district in general – seemed to be making big 
leaps in terms of new programming and strategies for improvement over the three 
years that we visited.  In Year 1, the school was mainly trying to look at data and 
figure out where the gaps existed – accordingly, their major efforts were to institute 
benchmark exams, revitalize existing programs in the school, and pilot the Read 180 
program.  In Year 2, they expanded Read 180, re-sequenced the science curriculum, 
and searched for a new intervention program for math.  And by Year 3, the district 
was working to create greater alignment between the efforts at the high school and 
middle school levels so that improvement strategies might build off of one another 
and enhance academic achievement district-wide.   
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HS 4 
 
Similar to HS 3, HS 4 experienced a high percentage of staff turnover over the 
three-year study period.  In the first year, the high school principal and the district 
superintendent – both of whom had served for over a decade respectively in their 
positions – were about to retire.  Furthermore, the teachers had been out of contract 
for over a year, which had created tension between the school staff and the district 
administrators. In short, it was a district on the brink of transition.  The outgoing 
high school principal described the decision-making process as a completely top-
down approach, primarily because he did not trust teachers to be proactive enough 
to come up with ideas on their own.  For their part, teachers said that they were left 
out of the decision-making process, and would have liked to be more involved. 
By the second year of our visits, it was evident that the contract negotiations 
and the administrative turnover had significantly depleted social capital within the 
district.  Although the contract dispute was finally resolved in Year 2, teachers 
mistrusted the motives of administrators, and this mistrust was only amplified by 
the fact that the district was unable to hire a new superintendent to replace the 
outgoing individual.  The new high school principal faced similar challenges.  
Although he had previously served as the assistant principal at the school, he felt 
uncomfortable in his new leadership role and admitted that he let teachers dictate 
most of the new school policies.  A district administrator described his decision-
making approach as haphazard and too rushed:  
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“[He] doesn't know what to do with all this unleashed ability.  I think he is 
extremely bright; I think he is willing to make a decision but unfortunately he 
is a little premature in his decision making because he hasn't thought 
through all the pieces.  It always sounds good and he always goes in that 
direction and I will go, ‘did you think about this and if you did this with Sheila 
and the ESL and pull her here, what does that mean for the kids who have it 
next year?’ He doesn’t' think through that next step, he is not the big picture 
thinker.” (District Administrator, HS 4) 
 
By the third year of our visits, the district had finally hired a permanent 
replacement superintendent, a man who stated that his primary goal was to restore 
some semblance of mutual respect and trust among administrators and staff alike.  
He described his district staff as, “a bright group of people.” But, he cautioned, “they 
don’t play well together” (Superintendent, HS 4).  At the high school level, the 
principal remained in his position and was gradually getting to the point where he 
felt he could assume a true leadership role and guide the decision-making process 
accordingly. 
To support the decision-making process, district and high school 
administrators alike tried to institute a more collaborative process, using focus 
groups, surveys, and committee structures as mechanisms for gathering teacher and 
staff input.  Teachers reported that they liked this new level of involvement, but it 
also led to some problems.  For example, a district administrator described the new 
high school principal as a “whipped puppy” when it came to new staff proposals 
because he would always agree to whatever they asked (Teacher, HS 4).   
In terms of the broader decision-making approach, the district’s processes 
were scattered and generally followed the Garbage Can Model of decision-making.  
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Although there were some examples of linear decision-making (for example, the 
decision to implement Professional Learning Communities district-wide), many 
other decisions were brought to light in a haphazard manner, with solutions 
preceding identified problems, narrow or non-existent search processes, and 
hurried decision-making time frames.  An example of such an initiative was the 
institution of more Advanced Placement classes, which the high school principal 
spearheaded primarily because his teachers were telling him that the gifted 
students in the school were under-challenged.  Although he says he also briefly 
considered the International Baccalaureate (IB) program, he and his assistant 
principal decided against doing so, and instead invested money in online portals to 
access a range of AP courses.  Once school was back in session, he instituted a 
committee for teachers on the new AP classes, but in truth the decision had already 
been made.  In short, the decision-making process amounted to throwing a bunch of 
problems (inadequately challenged gifted students, small district size to support 
classes for gifted students), a bunch of solutions (IB courses, AP courses), a 
truncated timeframe (the summer months before school began in the fall), limited 
collaborative input, and mixed it all around.  When the trash was taken out in 
September, online AP courses were the garbage concoction du jour.   
It is possible to attribute this chaotic process to the simple fact that the 
district was in the midst of a major administrative transition – perhaps if I had 
visited the high school for a fourth year, I would have seen a confident principal who 
was able to better harness the potential of teacher committees to make truly 
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collaborative bottom-up decisions with district support.  Without that insight, 
however, I can only guess at the trajectory of the decision-making processes in the 
district.   
In terms of the search process in particular, the specificity and thoroughness 
of the search varied from decision to decision.  In some cases, the search was 
thorough, with several formal options on the table and utilization of both technical 
and informal word-of-mouth recommendations from like-minded schools and 
districts.  In other cases, however, the search process was truncated or non-existent, 
as time, budget, and human capital constraints limited decision-makers’ ability to 
reach out for a range of possible solutions.  The inconsistency of search at HS 4 
meant there could not truly be a unified “search process” for the district, although 
generally speaking, the district curriculum coordinator and the high school principal 
leaned on technical resources, whereas the superintendent and the high school 
assistant principal leaned on word-of-mouth recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ON DECISION-MAKING PHASES 
 
 
The decision-making environment in education is often characterized as a 
four-step process.  First, the decision-maker (or group of decision-makers) 
identifies the problem at hand, finding the area of deficiency that is in need of a 
solution.  Next, the decision-maker searches for a solution, identifying a range of 
potential solutions to the problem.  Next, the decision-maker selects a solution, and 
finally implements the decision.  If we accept the assumptions of Rational Choice 
Theory, we assume that these steps occur in a strictly linear fashion:  problem 
identification; search; decision; and implementation (Bass, 1983; Simon, 1955).  If 
we accept the assumptions of the Garbage Can Model of decision-making, however, 
steps in this process might be ignored, occur out of order, and the resulting decision 
would be far from optimal (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).   
 I address the degree to which decision-making in education is rational or 
chaotic in the next chapter.  Here, however, I provide a description of the first three 
steps – problem identification, search, and decisions – in the schools in my sample.  I 
pay particular attention to the search phase, because this is an area that has not yet 
been adequately studied in the public education setting.  I omit the implementation 
phase because the converse is true; a wealth of literature exists on how schools 
implement selected programs for improvement (e.g. Cohen, Moffit & Golden, 2007; 
Honig, 2006; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Spillane, 2000).   
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Problem Identification 
 
 One of the key assumptions of performance-based accountability systems is 
that providing information about student performance will start schools on the path 
to improvement.  No Child Left Behind (NCLB) disaggregates student performance 
on the state standardized tests along various subgroups – including race, 
socioeconomic status, English proficiency, special education status – and it is 
assumed that this level of detail will help schools to solve their most glaring 
problems, some of which may have been hiding in plain view from school and 
district administrators.  The larger IES study on which this dissertation is based 
designed the sample with the specific goal of teasing out and testing this 
assumption.  Six of the eight schools in my sample failed to make Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) on the state test (the PSSAs) following the 2007-2008 school year, 
with one school failing in each of the disaggregated subgroups.  In this way, the state 
had officially notified the majority of the schools in the sample that they were 
underperforming and should take action to improve.   
 In an article from the larger IES study, Beaver and Weinbaum (In Press) 
found that schools used state assessment data for three purposes.  First, they used 
state data as launching pad to collect or analyze their own data, for example by 
instituting new benchmark exams or purchasing new data management tools.  
Second, they used state data to guide and prioritize their school-wide improvement 
efforts, for example by aligning their curriculum to the standards or investing in 
professional development for teachers across all grade levels.  Finally, they used 
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state data to focus on specific student needs, for example by instituting new 
individualized remediation or differentiated instruction strategies.  That said, the 
authors also found that school personnel did not usually treat the state assessment 
data as groundbreaking information.  Most school-level personnel reported that 
they were already well aware of the many problems with specific subgroups in their 
school, and that the test data merely highlighted what they already knew.  School 
personnel also believed that the test did not yield useful information because it 
provided a static measure of student performance as opposed to a dynamic view of 
student performance over time.  This finding is in line with the literature, which 
suggests that school and district personnel’s perceptions of data use have 
implications for school improvement efforts (Coburn & Talbert, 2006). 
 My findings suggest that schools dutifully use state data as a key indicator of 
the “problem” in their schools, but treat this information as merely a starting point 
for them to delve deeper into the problems that they face.  In this dissertation study, 
I cast a wider net, asking school and district personnel to talk broadly about the 
various problems they face, how they identified those problems, and what they are 
doing to fix them.  Although many respondents mentioned the role of performance-
based accountability systems in identifying problems, they also spoke about the 
importance of relying on two types of school-level indicators – internal data and 
observations.   
 Internal data for problem identification includes the active collection, 
management, and dissemination of student-level data for decision-making purposes.  
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During the first year of data collection for this study, five of the eight schools in my 
sample had put in place interim assessments or “benchmark exams” to monitor 
student progress on key academic indicators throughout the year.  By the third year 
of the study, all eight schools had some sort of benchmarking tool in place school-
wide.  Schools and districts used their internal data to identify gaps in the 
curriculum (i.e. poor alignment to the standards), identify individual students or 
groups of students for remediation, and provide teachers with targeted professional 
development opportunities.  Some schools in the sample had become powerful 
producers and consumers of internal data.  ELEM 2, for example, regularly ran a 
“War Room” in which a set of mid-level school managers met to discuss the data and 
identify any remaining areas of weakness in their programs or strategies.  And a 
school-level administrator in ELEM 4 explained: 
 
“Needs are really determined first and foremost through data... So everything 
that we do is built around that, and everything we do is sort of built with the 
end in mind and backwards map and backwards plan all that, to say the very 
first step is what are our needs? What does the data tell us are our needs? 
And then what is it that we want to achieve? What are those goals, those 
smart goals, that are very measureable, time-bound, not qualitative. We want 
to make it as black-and-white as possible, where we know at that point in 
time whether we hit that goal or we didn’t hit that goal, and that typically is 
tied to whatever achievement results we want to ultimately achieve, short-
term and long-term.” (Administrator, ELEM 4) 
 
Other schools, however, struggled to make sense of the data.  When HS 3 first 
instituted 4Sight benchmark exams they didn’t know if they could trust the data, 
because they saw a wide discrepancy between the scores on this test and the PSSA 
exams, even though the two exams were supposedly aligned.  Other schools 
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reported that they collected massive amounts data but then were unsure what to do 
with all the information they had collected.  One principal explained that his school 
started using a benchmark exam but was reluctant to collect more data. “It would be 
nice to have the information,” he said, “but we’re not utilizing all the data we have 
today to its fullest. Why bring in any more not to be used as it possibly could be?” 
(Principal, ELEM 3).   
 In an effort to make sense of internal data, some schools purchased 
expensive data warehousing products that promised to help decision-makers 
identify trends and identify problem areas for their schools.  In some cases, these 
products sometimes helped decision-makers to identify problem areas.  HS 2 was 
one such example.  They instituted a data-warehousing tool that helped them to look 
critically at areas of need in their school.  Explained one district administrator:  
 
“We were assessing students, but we weren’t doing anything with that data. 
So we had above average, we had our below basic, but that information was 
just sitting, kind of, in somebody’s desk or whatever. We didn’t do anything 
with it, so we started to take that out, take a greater look at it, find some 
targeted interventions for those different students" (District Administrator, 
HS 2)  
 
In ELEM 4, administrators had purchased a data management tool but teachers 
were having trouble finding the time to use it as administrators intended. Said one 
teacher, “I’m trying to use AimsWeb. I don’t know if you’re familiar with that. But the 
amount of time it takes for the volume of kids I have right now is difficult to be able 
to get the data in. I’ll do the assessments and then can’t get it in, or I’ll skip a week, 
and then I’m off a week, and so to get all of that in is a challenge” (Teacher, ELEM 4).  
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The school eventually remedied this problem by instituting “data discourse teams” 
that analyzed and interpreted the data in a team setting to help come to a common 
understanding about the meaning of the data.   
 Despite some of the setbacks associated with internal data collection and 
analysis, schools widely reported that they trusted these sources of data far more 
than they did the state generated PSSA data.  The consensus among all respondents 
in all the schools in the sample was that internal data, while time consuming to 
collect and interpret, helped schools pinpoint the problems they faced and put them 
on a path to finding appropriate solutions. 
 The final way that schools and district identified problems was also perhaps 
the simplest way:  they simply made observations about the various issues that they 
saw in their school from day to day.  Perhaps the most obvious observations of 
school problems were the ones that respondents felt were outside of their control, 
namely changing student and community demographics.  In fact, this was the most 
oft-mentioned problem facing schools in my sample – school personnel said that the 
2008 recession had led to greater numbers of students growing up in homes under 
economic stress, which led to problems in the classroom as well.  To be sure, the 
tone of these comments varied widely.  While some respondents spoke with great 
reverence for the difficulties their students faced on a daily basis, others were quick 
to blame parents for becoming complacent about their children’s academic 
achievement.  In one particularly flippant comment, a teacher from ELEM 1 
explained her school’s main issue as follows:  
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“We have poverty.  We have parents who have such limited ability they can't 
possibly help those students.  We have parents who feed their children on 
the idea if you don't succeed you can get some kind of compensation, like 
social security.  Our parents want their kids labeled as “learning disabled” so 
they could get checks in the mail.  It's a way of life – this is an inter city school 
and it's a way of life to not do well or it's not important to do well, somebody 
will come along and give you what you don't have and I don't think kids are 
motivated.” (Teacher, ELEM 1) 
 
In addition to student demographics, respondents were also keen observers 
of social capital issues within the district, recognizing a lack of communication or 
low levels of collaboration among teachers and administrators. Respondents 
sometimes described social capital problems as issues endemic to the school 
environment and likely would not be changed in the near future.  For example, 
teachers in ELEM 3 said they felt their school was treated as a pariah in the school 
district, and that the superintendent funneled more money to the other elementary 
school where the students came from families that were wealthier and more 
involved in the education system.  This situation, they said, was not likely to change.  
On the other hand, HS 4 and HS 3 both recognized that there was a lack of trust 
between teachers and administrators in the school and, by Year 3, both schools had 
started to foster greater levels of collaboration to fix this problem.  The difference in 
these two approaches is that, in the first case, teachers identified with the social 
capital problem but were passive about it; whereas in second instance with the high 
schools, the schools identified the problem and took an active role in fixing it. 
In general, many respondents reported that they believed that problem 
identification was the easiest of the four decision-making steps.  This is perhaps due 
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in part to the fact that respondents relied heavily on observation as a problem 
identification tool.  An building administrator in ELEM 3 described the problem 
identification phase as “pretty easy” because they simply observe whether they have 
the right materials or whether they need new ones.  And a building administrator in 
ELEM 1 said, “You’d have to be pretty stupid not to know there are problems, 
wouldn’t you?”  When pressed about how he might use internal data to help inform 
the problem identification phase of his decision-making process, he responded, “See, 
I think a lot of things are transparent” (Building Administrator, ELEM 1).  In other 
schools, administrators used all three of the tools at their disposal – state data, 
internal data, and observations – to identify problems.  A district administrator at 
ELEM 2 said that she puts a lot of time into combining these sources of information 
into identifying the problems her schools face, explaining, “I think you have to 
clearly identify the problem before you can do anything else.  And whatever time it 
takes to identify that problem, you need to put into it.  Sometimes the problems are 
very clear, and sometimes they are masked and if you go with the first vision you 
are totally on the wrong track” (District Administrator, ELEM 2).   
 Overall, schools identified on average seven problems in their school that 
needed fixing.  In Figure 4.1, I display the problems that schools identified, along 
with their frequency of mention.  I do not include “Failure to Make AYP” as a 
problem, although this was the case in six of the eight schools due to the nature of 
the sample.   
 
  
 
Figure 4.1 
Problems Identified in Sample Schools and Districts
Source: Field notes and memos
As shown above, social capital problems, which included
among personnel or a culture of mistrust in the district, affected all eight schools in 
the sample.  Another problem mentioned in all eight schools was that stu
teachers alike did not take the state standardized test seriously, leading to a feeling 
of complacency about student performance on this outcome measure across the 
district.   Economic hardship among students was a commonly mentioned problem, 
as were high degrees of staff turnover and the misalignment of curriculum materials 
to state school goals or state standards.  Finally, discipline issues (including 
attendance, classroom behavior, gangs, and dropouts) ranked high among the 
problems in schools.  
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Search 
 
Although schools are supposedly transparent, public institutions, it is 
surprising how little we know about how they search for ways to raise student 
achievement levels.  We assume, for example, that school actors have a method for 
searching for potential solutions.  Although there may be some schools with clearly 
defined processes around search, other schools alter their processes based on the 
decision at hand, and still others lack processes all together.  It is tempting to simply 
assert, therefore, that making generalizations about search is an exercise in futility 
because such processes vary from school to school.  The data from this study show, 
however, that a descriptive analysis of school and district search strategies is a 
worthwhile endeavor.  In this chapter, I describe how schools search for new 
programs and strategies for improvement.  Included in these descriptive analyses 
are examinations of the factors that schools consider during the search phase of the 
decision-making process, the locus of control for search in districts and schools, and 
the sources of information (either familiar or technical) that school actors use to 
support their decision-making process. 
 The descriptive analyses paint a picture of how schools approach the search 
phase of the decision-making process, especially when they have been called upon 
by the state to improve student achievement (as measured on the state 
standardized tests).  To fully examine these various aspects of the search process, I 
employed case-ordered descriptive matrices, which are specialized qualitative 
databases designed to allow cross cutting themes to emerge from the data in a 
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controlled way (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  The first step was to code the interview 
data with codes that were aligned to both my research questions and emergent 
findings.  Table 4.1 contains the list of codes that align to each research question 
pertaining to search, as well as the definitions that I created for each code.   
Table 4.1 
Search Code and Research Question Alignment 
 
RQ2: How do schools and school districts search for solutions to perceived or formally identified 
needs for improvement? 
(a): What factors do schools consider when searching for potential alternatives? 
Code Definition 
FACTOR Description of the factors that went into the consideration of a 
particular decision.  May include data.    
(b): Who are the decision-makers?  To what extent is search tightly controlled and to what extent 
is it dispersed among many actors? How do districts guide the search process for schools? 
Code Definition 
SEARCH: WHO Who conducts the search process at the school or district levels. 
SEARCH: INCLU Search process is guided by a large and diverse team of individuals in 
the school or district 
SEARCH: EXCLU Search process is exclusive to a small group of decision-makers 
SEARCH: DISTRICT Search process originates at district, or is mandated by the district 
SEARCH: SCHOOL Search process originates at the school level 
LEAD: STYLE Description of leadership style and relationships with staff 
(c): What sources do schools and districts use (human, technical, or other) when searching for 
potential alternatives and making decisions?  What is the perceived validity and applicability of 
information coming from these sources? 
Code Definition 
SEARCH: TECHN Description of technical sources used to gather information about 
available alternatives.  May include using professional associations, 
conferences, research literature, and vendors. 
SEARCH: HUMAN Description of the individuals or groups who help to inform/guide the 
search and decision-making process.  May include copying a strategy 
from another school or district or the IU. 
SEARCH: VALID Description of the degree to which people trust the information they 
receive during the search process.   
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Next, I created output reports for each group of questions, containing the list 
of quotations that pertained to each set of codes.  After reviewing each quotation, I 
input the information into an Excel spreadsheet containing columns of analysis 
variables and metavariables that formed the basis of the case-ordered descriptive 
matrices.  Once the information was in the case-ordered descriptive matrices and 
aggregated to the district level, I looked across cases at all aspects of the search 
process.  In total, I created three sets of matrices, one for each of the components of 
Research Question #2.   I detail my findings in each of the three areas below. 
 
Factors Schools and Districts Consider During Search.  When decision-makers 
initiate a search for a new strategy, it is assumed that they have in mind certain 
factors that will guide their search process.  Although this is not always the case – a 
school administrator could, for example, explain her school’s search for a new 
curriculum supplement by simply saying, “we needed something that would raise 
student scores on the state test” without going into detail about the reasoning 
behind her search for a new strategy – the majority of schools in my sample were 
able to provide insight into the factors they considered during the search process.  
Examining these factors helps to shed light on decision-makers’ motivations and 
reasoning as they look to adopt new materials or approaches in their schools.  
 To analyze the factors at play in my sample, I reviewed the “factor” codes in 
the interview data and input them into the case-ordered descriptive matrix with the 
following variables: a) a description of the issue or problem at hand; b) the factor 
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that the school or district considered during its search for solutions to this problem; 
c) a marker as to whether this factor was generated internally or externally; and d) 
the stage(s) of the decision-making process that the identified factor primarily 
impacted.  Analysis from the case-ordered descriptive matrices yielded three 
separate factors that schools consider during search:  a) alignment to state and 
federal accountability policies; b) the right “fit” with identified student needs; and c) 
the accessibility of the new programs and strategies.  Below, I describe the three 
main factors in detail. 
Accountability   
 
Alignment to performance-based accountability policies was by far the 
common factor that respondents identified as informing their search process.  This 
is perhaps due to the nature of the sample – six of the eight schools were labeled in 
“warning” for failure to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under No Child Left 
Behind following the 2007-2008 school year, and had been specifically called upon 
by the state to adopt strategies aimed at improving student scores on the state test.  
The skew toward accountability is also due to the nature of the interview protocol, 
which asked specific questions about the impact of the state test on school efforts 
for improvement.  Accountability policies were nonetheless an important driver of 
school and district search strategies, even in the two schools that made AYP 
consistently throughout the three years of the study.   
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 There were two ways that schools used accountability measures to guide 
their searches.  The first, and most prevalent, was to find programs and strategies 
that were aligned to either the state standardized test or the state standards (or 
both). The Pennsylvania Department of Education encourages alignment by 
publishing “anchors” and “eligible content,” which create direct links between the 
standards and the tested content.  Decision-makers reported that they only looked 
for new products if vendors could claim that their products were aligned to the state 
standards.  Said one high school teacher, “For the math we just had a curriculum 
rewrite this summer.  We sat down and made sure there were no holes from top to 
bottom at the high school, that kids have access to every possible thing they need to 
know for the PSSAs" (Teacher, HS 3).   In fact, all eight schools in the sample 
mentioned that they actively used the standards to realign, re-sequence, or re-pace 
their instruction or curriculum to match the state standards or the state assessment.  
Two elementary schools in the sample, ELEM 2 and ELEM 4, adopted a standards-
based report card district-wide.  By the third year of interviews (in 2011), schools 
were also starting to talk about a new sort of standards alignment, namely that of 
alignment to the Common Core State Standards.  Pennsylvania adopted the Common 
Core standards in July 2010, and district administrators were already anticipating 
the many changes they might need to make to their existing materials to meet the 
standards’ rigorous career and college readiness goals. 
The second factor related to accountability was that schools used data 
gleaned from their PSSA results to target programs and strategies to identified areas 
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of need.   For example, if a school found that it did not make Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) in a particular grade for a particular subgroup of students, decision-
makers in that school would often report that they concentrated their efforts on 
raising the scores of those students.  Although schools reported that they 
concentrated their efforts on specific groups, their focus was not as laser-like as 
they might think.  In the larger CPRE study of school improvement (on which this 
dissertation is based), researchers found that, regardless of their accountability 
status, schools adopted many varied approaches for improvement in response to 
accountability measures (Weinbaum, Weiss & Beaver, 2012).  The schools in this 
subsample of mostly “warning” schools echoed those actions, choosing a whole host 
of strategies that they believed might raise student achievement and get their 
schools off the warning list.   
 That said, school and district decision-makers reported that they searched 
for and evaluated new programs and strategies that would provide them with the 
greatest gains in student achievement (subgroup deficiency focused or not).  When 
asked what factors the district considered when searching for new strategies, one 
district administrator put it succinctly, saying, “Well, the first thing is student 
achievement. What’s it going to do for my students? Is it going to help my students?" 
(Administrator, ELEM 1).  This administrator was specifically talking about 
achievement on the PSSAs.  And when asked how much AYP and the PSSA scores 
figure in to how her school finds and selects new programs, one high school teacher 
said, “Oh it’s everything we do” (Teacher, HS 1).   
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Fit 
  A search process could be said to be about “fit” if school leaders mentioned 
that they actively searched for programs and strategies that would align to their 
school’s identified needs.  First, nearly all the schools used internal data such as 
benchmark tests or teacher reports to find programs to fill identified areas of 
student need.  In many cases, schools might use the data generated from the state 
standardized test as a “starting point” and then use benchmark tests as a way to drill 
down and get a full picture of individual students’ needs over time.  One high school 
(HS 3) used benchmark testing to get more information on the subgroup of students 
that had caused the school to miss its AYP benchmarks, which was the economically 
disadvantaged subgroup.  In other schools, school leaders explained that they 
believed benchmark exams were a far more reliable indicator of student needs than 
the state tests.  Another high school (HS 2) was using 4Sight exams (probably the 
most popular benchmark assessment in the state) along with other classroom-level 
indicators to identify students for remedial classes. The principal explained:  
 
"Based off your 4Sight scores, we will use those scores to determine where 
you’re going to be scheduled for your classes. So if you’re doing well, then 
that’s an indicator. It’s one indicator. We’ll use teacher input, we’ll use your 
scores from the previous classes, and we’ll use these scores. So it’s a three-
headed monster that’s going to be used to determine where you’re going to 
be and what is best for you." (Principal, HS 2) 
 
Student-level data helped the school search for the right remediation 
strategies for each individual student.  Schools varied in their approaches to data-
driven decision-making, however.  Some schools, like HS 2 above, implemented 
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benchmark testing as a sort of pulse check to get a sense of how students were 
performing throughout the school and target remediation.  Other schools, 
meanwhile, conducted thorough data analyses of their benchmark data and used 
that information to search for the right fit with potential curriculum programs, 
supplemental materials, and instructional strategies.  ELEM 2 was perhaps the best 
example of the power of a data-driven approach to guide school search processes.  
In this school, there was a data team – consisting of the school’s principal, math and 
reading specialists, guidance counselor, and a specific “response-to-intervention” 
coordinator – that met in a “war room” to discuss the data on a regular basis.  The 
team would look at data from one of four different benchmark or universal 
screeners they were using in the different grades and look for gaps in curriculum.  In 
one instance, the data showed that first graders were not receiving adequate 
instructional coverage in phonics and the school’s reading specialist worked with 
the district reading supervisor to find a new curriculum supplement that would fill 
that specific need.  The result of this strategy was a patchwork quilt of programs 
that together formed a curriculum for students – and school leaders were constantly 
examining the quilt for holes and sewing new patches throughout the school year.   
These data-driven techniques are about finding the right fit for individual 
students or groups of students, and therefore can be labeled as “demand-driven” 
search strategies.  There is another type of evidence-based approach to finding 
programs and strategies, however, which is based on supply rather than on demand.  
School and district leaders spoke often of searching for programs that were either 
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“research-based” or “proven effective.”  In essence, they were looking for evidence 
that programs had a track record of success, as validated either through external 
scientific research or other evidence of success.  I will go into much greater detail 
about the technical and word-of-mouth searches later in this chapter, but for now I 
will simply assert that “evidence-based” programs were an important factor for 
schools as they searched for improvement strategies. 
Aside from data-driven need assessments, decision-makers also assessed 
“fit” in more personal and emotional ways.  This approach is consistent with 
Abelman and Elmore’s (1999) assertion that school personnel make decisions based 
on their “internal accountability,” including their beliefs about student learning and 
student achievement, their values, and goals for their school.   Decision-makers are 
often eager to explain their personal search criteria for new programs and 
strategies, especially if they come from a deep-seated belief that their search criteria 
will lead to better results for their students.  For example, the assistant principal in 
the school below (ELEM 1) talked about how it was important to change the 
instructional approach for the district’s high school students:  
 
"I think we need to create better thinkers, so the thing we’re focusing on now 
at the high school is a higher influence in more meaningful and complex 
reading and writing. So that’s been our new initiative, that we are slowly but 
surely going away from the more mundane PSSA tasks and strategies to more 
higher level thinking skills with complexity and thought and reflection than 
ever before." (Assistant Principal, ELEM 1)  
 
Similarly, when I asked an elementary school principal why she wanted to focus on 
character education, she responded: 
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“It is something I think is so critical in an elementary building. I have always 
believed that it is half of it; if you can get the kid to buy in that this is our 
school and [our school] is the best.  You know, respect. You walk down the 
hallway that some says Good morning Dr. [Principal], and you get a response. 
I think that builds into the performance in the classroom, without a doubt." 
(Principal, ELEM 4) 
 
In several cases, administrators took it upon themselves to redesign the way that 
their schools or districts approached the search process on the whole, for example 
by instituting frameworks around search or cyclical curriculum review processes.  
But personal beliefs drove decision-making on a smaller scale as well, with several 
teachers working on their own to identify student needs in their classrooms and 
design interventions to meet them.  In one school (ELEM 3), a fourth grade teacher 
realized that her students did not receive adequate instruction in basic grammar 
concepts, and so she took it upon herself to find online lesson plans on the Internet 
that would meet that need.  
Ease and Accessibility 
 
 This category of factors is the quintessential case of “looking under the 
lamppost.”  School and district decision-makers reported that they often searched 
for materials in familiar places – checking with colleagues, relying on previous 
programmatic use in their district or neighboring districts, or simply copying others.  
I spend considerable time in the next chapter exploring how using ease and 
accessibility as a factor during search can affect the entire decision-making process, 
leading to decisions that are limited by both geography and familiarity.  Suffice it to 
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say for now that schools and districts often lack the time and resources to do robust 
searches for new programs and strategies, and therefore limit their searches to 
what they know. 
 Choosing an “easy” search process could take three forms.  First, schools 
could simply scale up an existing program that was being offered to a subset of 
students in the district to a larger set of students.  This was the case in HS 1, where 
district administrators needed to find a remediation program for the high school.  
Instead of searching for a wide range of options available on the market, they 
decided to scale up the remediation program that the middle school was using.  Said 
one district administrator: 
 
“It was something that was being used in the district for remediation, so 
many of our teachers at the high school were already familiar with that 
program.  And it was a method for remediation.  What we decided to do was 
to use that program to create the remediation, the benchmark assessment, 
and the alternative assessment to have students show proficiency in reading 
and math because it was something we were already familiar with and we 
had that capability.” (District Administrator, HS 1) 
 
In this sense, scaling up existing programs has the advantage of a proven track 
record of success, as well as familiarity with intricacies of the program (which help 
for smooth implementation).  In this case, it was certainly possible that the program 
might not have been a good fit for high school students, or that expanding its use to 
remediation, benchmarking, and alternative assessment might flop, but the district 
felt most comfortable truncating search in favor of a familiar program.  It is 
important to note that districts that pursued this approach spoke not only of 
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“familiarity” but also of “alignment” – they believed that using familiar programs 
was an effective way to align programming throughout the district, creating a 
coherent approach to instruction and remediation.   
 A second approach was to look to other districts and copy their programs 
and strategies.  School and district decision-makers are looped in to various 
professional and personal networks that provide access to information from 
neighboring districts.  In most cases, these relationships are open and friendly, with 
information flowing in both directions and decision-makers observing other schools 
as they implemented potential programs and strategies.  Said one teacher, "I learned 
of Study Island from friends. Their children were working on it, and they live in 
other districts, and I’m saying, well, we don’t have it, and we don’t pay for it, and this 
is what we use. They were advocates, because they showed me. I said that makes 
sense. That makes a lot of sense” (Teacher, ELEM 3).  In some cases, teachers 
brought in programs that they had used themselves when they worked in other 
districts.  For example, an assistant principal at one high school described how he 
selected a new reading program for his school.  Both of his reading specialists had 
used a program called “Read 180” in their previous positions – one of the specialists 
had worked in Georgia before coming to Pennsylvania – and thought it would be a 
good fit for their high school.  So the principal asked them to pitch it to him (along 
with a few other options) and finally selected the program that the reading 
specialists knew the best.  In a few isolated cases (e.g. ELEM 3), the information flow 
was not quite so free and open.  In these cases, decision-makers felt pressured to 
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copy neighboring districts out of a fear that they would be out-scored on the state 
standardized tests; in other words, they were driven by competition rather than by 
a desire to share effective practices.   
 Finally, a third approach that falls into the “ease” category is when school an 
district decision-makers pursued a hands-off approach in which they simply waited 
for vendors to come to them with new programs and strategies.  Vendors approach 
schools often with offers to pilot their products, partake in professional 
development opportunities, and take advantage of special deals and limited-time 
offers.  For some schools, vendor pitches are simply another part of a complex and 
involved search process, whereas for others, it is the search process.  Said the 
curriculum coordinator in a relatively large urban district, “The vendors basically 
find you. You really don’t have to search them out too much, because they’re for 
profit. So they find you pretty easily. There’s a lot of good stuff out there. The thing 
is, you’ve got to sift through it and find what’s right for your district. And make sure 
that you’re not duplicating, and it’s meeting your needs” (District Administrator, 
ELEM 1).  As this administrator admits, he lets vendors determine the field of 
available alternatives and then selects from among them.   
 
Locus of Control.  Organizational theorist Karl Weick (1976) famously asserted that 
decision-making in schools resembled an “unconventional soccer match” in which 
there were several goals, the field was round and sloped, the rules were fluid; but 
the game was strangely played as if it made sense.  Cohen et al. (1972) have 
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similarly described schools as “organized anarchies,” in which teachers have 
widespread freedom to generate ideas from the ground up, or bypass administrative 
control all together.  Their depictions of the school context run in direct contrast to 
the Weberian depiction of strong bureaucratic structures that feature top-down 
control and limited teacher responsibilities (Weber, 1947).   
Which depiction more accurately fits the context of search procedures in 
public education today?    The answer is that search in schools and districts is far 
more orderly than Weick and his colleagues might believe, but also more flexible 
and collaborative than Weber might predict.  Although some districts in my sample 
exerted tighter control over decision-making than others, the overall variation 
among districts was actually quite small – the vast majority of districts employed a 
“middle-out” strategy for decision-making.  A middle-out strategy is an alternative 
to “top-down” or “bottom-up” decision-making approaches in which middle 
management – in this case, school administrators, department heads, reading or 
math specialists, etc. – play an important role in searching for improvement 
solutions (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Nonaka, 1994).  Although theorists might 
employ differing terminology – Nonaka (1998), for example calls it “middle-up-
down management” – the principle is the same.  The top-level managers provide the 
vision and some structure around decision-making, for example by setting deadlines 
and budget limits.  Mid-level managers then perform all the critical tasks of 
researching and finding potential options, getting consensus, and pitching their 
preferred solution to the top-level management.  To be successful, these mid-level 
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managers must be charismatic, organized, and detail-oriented.  Says Nonaka (1998), 
“They work as a bridge between the visionary ideals of the top and the often chaotic 
reality on the frontline of business.  By creating middle-level business and product 
concepts, middle managers mediate between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be.’ They 
even remake reality according to the company's vision” (p. 32). 
Discussions of middle-out decision-making in the education setting are 
situated within the literature on Distributed Leadership, which is a study of the 
locus of control in school decision-making.  Distributed leadership studies take as a 
given that leadership can originate from multiple sources, creating a “leader plus” 
aspect to decision-making and, by extension, search (Spillane & Healey, 2010).  
Distributed leadership, however, is not a study of management approaches in 
schools, but rather a conceptual frame for researchers to use when studying school 
settings.  The theory does not allow for descriptive findings of effective practices for 
varying levels of distribution in leadership.  I do not take a distributed leadership 
approach in this study, which allows me to make distinctions between top-down, 
bottom-up and middle-out approaches, including potential benefits from the 
middle-out approach.  Specifically, I find that middle-out approaches foster district-
wide collaboration, increase the flow of information, improve teacher buy-in to 
potential new programs for improvement, and free up district administrators to 
concentrate on broad-scale efforts for improvement. 
Before discussing districts’ middle-out approaches to decision-making, I 
briefly explain how I used case-ordered descriptive matrices to come upon these 
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findings.  I pulled the data from the codes that pertained to the locus of decision-
making control (see Figure 2) and input the quotations into an Excel spreadsheet 
along the following lines:  a) Who conducts the search; b) the degree of dispersion in 
the search process (unilateral versus collaborative search); c) the origin of search 
(top-down versus bottom-up); and d) the supportive mechanisms that enable 
search (committees, frameworks, etc.).  In attempting to classify each quotation as 
either bottom-up or top-down, I realized that this dichotomy did not fit the data, as 
many schools relied on mid-level administrators to conduct searches.  As a result, I 
employed the “middle-out” variable, and soon found that a majority of entries fit 
into this category of response.  Of the 167 total catalogued responses, 39 were 
bottom-up approaches and 47 were top-down, but 81 of the responses were labeled 
as middle-out.  Although nearly half of the cases in my sample fit into the “middle-
out” search category, not every decision that a school makes is universally a middle-
out decision.  The average school makes many different decisions at the same time, 
and some might be bottom-up, middle-out, or top-down depending on the 
perspective of the interviewee, the limitations on the search context (e.g. time 
crunches or political considerations), or the scope of the decision itself.  I 
categorized overall district approaches based on aggregated depictions of the locus 
of control district-wide.   
When employed in a thoughtful, deliberate manner, middle-out approaches 
led to generally greater levels of collaboration and reported levels of satisfaction 
among staff at all levels.  Middle-out decision-making did not exist in a vacuum, 
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however – districts employing this approach had in place supportive structures and 
guidelines for decision-making that were specifically aimed at supporting the search 
efforts of mid-level managers.  These support mechanisms included 
departmentalization, committees, and “pre-implementation” (i.e. piloting) 
strategies.  Perhaps not surprisingly, high schools were more easily able to institute 
middle-out decision-making because their larger size already lent these schools to a 
departmentalized structure.  In one high school (HS 1), a department head explained 
her role in the search process: 
 
“Things work both ways, this is one of the reasons I like working here.  You 
have communication in both directions.  If someone within the department 
comes to me with something and there is enough interest within the 
department and we think it is beneficial to the school, I take it to the 
curriculum supervisors, I go up to the assistant principals, the principals, 
whoever need to hear it and we will run it through and if they are on board 
then we will flush that out.  But it also comes the other way, usually each year 
there is something that comes down from the superintendent's level, saying 
OK, we are going to focus on this.  Principals, how are you going to do this in 
your building, the principals will go to department heads, how are you going 
to do it in your department.  It does work both ways and I have been very 
happy with that.” (Department Head, HS 1) 
 
Her explanation fits perfectly with the middle-out approach.  She is the hub for 
search activity in her school, culling together the ideas generated by teachers, and 
also making sure that the ideas generated in the school are aligned to the vision 
created at the district level.  In this particular case, the principals and the 
department heads are both the mid-level managers that make the middle-out 
approach effective.   
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 The approach worked in elementary schools as well, but was most effective 
when there was a district-wide embrace of collaborative decision-making in which 
the majority of search responsibility had been ceded to the school level.  An 
administrator in one district (ELEM 4) explained that he viewed the district’s role as 
one of the “convener” of school-level administrators so that they could come 
together to make collaborative decisions:  
 
“We set up a big whiteboard. We brainstorm everything. We synthesize them 
into categories. Okay, so this is what we think. Okay. We’re going to get a 
committee of the principals, the reading specialist, special ed representative. 
We’re going to come into the room…Agree with them, disagree with them, 
and let’s come up with different issues. Put them all on the board. What are 
the political issues? What are the educational issues? What are the 
implementation issues? What are the program issues? And then that gives 
you a structure to work through coming up with a really good solution.” 
(District Administrator, ELEM 4) 
 
This quotation provides a good example of how the district can play the visionary 
role, while allowing school administrators the freedom to explore potential 
solutions for their school context, as well as strategies that are crosscutting for all 
the schools within the district.   
 Of course, not all middle-out decisions are made in a thoughtful, collaborative 
manner.  For that matter, a middle-out approach to decision-making is not 
necessarily a better approach than a top-down or bottom-up approach.   In most 
cases, a middle-out approach was associated with greater levels of collaboration (as 
measured by the variable of “unilateral vs. collaborative” in the case-ordered 
descriptive matrix) and higher reported levels of teacher buy-in to new projects.  
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However, this was not universally the case.  In some instances, a strong-minded 
principal would commandeer the search process at the school level, underutilize 
teacher input, and conflict with district approach.  This was the case in HS 2, where 
the principal decided to implement a new program that combined math with 
physical education.  Although the teachers were not opposed to the new program, 
they were not consulted during the search process either.  And although the district 
administrators gave the principal license to pursue this new strategy, it did not align 
well with the district’s goal of focusing on test score improvement, which eventually 
lead the superintendent to grow increasingly dissatisfied with the principal’s 
performance.  By the third year of interviews, the superintendent indicated that this 
principal would most likely not stay in the district much longer.   
 Although the majority of schools in my sample searched in a “middle-out” 
fashion, there were two schools that pursued a mostly “top-down” approach (HS 4 
and ELEM 1) and one school that pursued a mostly “bottom-up” approach (ELEM 3).  
I discuss these outlier cases briefly.  I label HS 4 and ELEM 1 as pursuing a top-down 
search strategy because they met the following conditions:  First, the district had 
sufficient capacity to conduct searches; second, the district had a strong vision for 
the programs that it wanted to find; and third, the district fundamentally distrusted 
school-level personnel to search for improvement solutions on their own.  The 
district for HS 4 had a staff of at least five administrators and was in the midst of a 
tense renegotiation of the teacher contract.  As a result, the district offices dictated 
policy without asking for principal or teacher input.  ELEM 1, which was a larger 
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urban district, selected a scripted reading program because they did not trust 
teachers to raise student achievement scores on their own.  Said the principal:  
 
"It is not like I have much say on what curriculum we have.  It is pretty much, 
‘This is what we have and you need to work it.’…I had a teacher last week, I 
said, ‘You are adapting, why are you adapting?  You are a second year 
teacher, you used to teach preschool, don't adapt. You need to follow it. If you 
need to adapt you need to come talk with me or [the Assistant Principal] 
first.’  So teachers don't have a lot of leeway in that.  Well, that's okay.  If it's 
data based, again, how can you argue with it?" (Principal, ELEM 1)   
 
In this school, the superintendent wanted all the elementary buildings to work on 
the same content at the same time, and so he would not authorize teachers or 
principals to adapt the curriculum to fit their needs.  
ELEM 3 pursued a bottom-up search strategy.  While the romanticized ideal 
of bottom-up decision-making is one of teachers coming together to determine the 
direction for new programs, this was not the case in this school.  Here, teachers 
worked in a fractured manner and reported that, even though they appreciated that 
the principal usually took their suggestions without question, they felt isolated and 
even abandoned by the district staff.  The district curriculum director position 
remained vacant during the three years of interviews, which meant that the district 
had very little capacity and the superintendent couldn’t set a cohesive vision around 
search.  As a result, teachers were forced to take it upon themselves to align their 
curriculum to the state standards, pace their curriculum to align to the state tests, 
and find appropriate resources for their classrooms.  As the example of ELEM 3 
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demonstrates, truly bottom-up decision-making with little structure imposed from 
above can create a chaotic decision-making environment.  
My findings suggest that there are some programmatic and structural 
arrangements that support a middle-out orientation.  School structures that support 
teacher collaboration include altering the schedule to allow for common teacher 
preparation time or creating a structure around teacher meetings, for example by 
establishing Professional Learning Communities or topical committees.  Of the eight 
schools in the sample, two had PLCs in place and a third (HS 4) was considering 
instituting them in the future, and five of the schools had some sort of committee 
structure in place.  Carving out time and space for teachers to collaborate supports 
middle-out management because it allows mid-level managers at the school level to 
hear from classroom teachers about the issues that matter most to them. 
A second structural arrangement is to create a tier of middle managers 
where one might not have existed before, or at the very least elevate the role of 
middle managers to include search functions.  Schools employing middle-out 
approaches often had a cadre of personnel specifically tasked with searching for 
improvement solutions.  In ELEM 4, it was the reading and math specialists.  In 
ELEM 2, it was the elementary school principal.  In HS 3, it was the two reading 
specialists working in concert with the principal.  Whatever the combination, it is 
important that this person (or team of people) has a clear directive to conduct 
search activities, as well as pathways in both directions to gather input (from 
below) and present their proposed solutions to the decision-makers (to the top).   
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Finally, districts employing a middle-out approach often invited teachers to 
“pre-implement” potential improvement solutions.  Pre-implementing is a form of 
piloting a potential new program.  Administrators or mid-level managers give a 
select set of teachers access to a potential new program in their classroom for a few 
months or even a whole school year.  The teachers then provide detailed feedback 
on the program to a committee at the school or district level, which helps the 
decision-makers make the decision about whether or not to fully implement the 
program in the future.  One school in the sample, ELEM 2, expertly employed a pre-
implementation strategy, and teachers reported that they felt engaged in the search 
process, and were more likely to help their colleagues implement new programs 
with fidelity if they had been a part of the program’s selection.   
   
Sources of Information.  When decision-makers search for solutions to identified 
problems, they typically draw upon two sources of information.  The first source is 
trusted individuals who can provide feedback on programs that they have used the 
past or are using currently in their own efforts for improvement.  This may include 
individuals within the school, such as teachers, administrators, or even one’s 
personal experience from working in a previous school or district.  It could also 
include external sources, for example one’s professional network of colleagues in 
neighboring districts or friends and family who work in the education sphere.   
Evidence from business and marketing research suggests that word-of-
mouth recommendations from trusted sources are powerful determinants of 
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decision outcomes.  Berger and Schwartz (2011) find that even “idle chatter” can 
push a particular product to the top of the list of potential alternatives, and that 
popular products can quickly come to dominate the market.  This may explain why 
certain products came up again and again in this study’s findings.  In particular, the 
computer-based remediation program Study Island and the 4Sight benchmark 
testing program seemed omnipresent, even though these programs were not 
officially endorsed by an official agency or organization.  Research also shows that 
school leaders play an important role in setting the trends in education programs 
and strategies.  Findings from Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente (2010) suggest 
that people in leadership roles and who have strong social networks facilitate the 
diffusion or “social contagion” of new products, causing favored products to catch 
on quickly.  My findings echo these marketing research findings.  For example, the 
search process in HS 3 was driven by two reading specialists who were outspoken 
in their support of a particular reading program called Read 180.  Both of these 
specialists had used the program in their previous jobs in different districts. 
Although the principal asked them to come up with two other options before he 
made a decision, he said that he was heavily swayed by the strong support that they 
both expressed for their favored program, and he ultimately selected the Read 180 
program for the entire high school. 
 My findings highlight several benefits of word-of-mouth recommendations as 
a source of information during the search process.  First, meeting with sources 
internal to the school district exposes decision-makers to a wide range of 
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experiences and instructional styles, and it also provides glimpses of potential 
factors to consider during search.  (For example, decision-makers might need to 
look for programs that have a strong professional development component if many 
of the teachers in the school are new.)  Second, working with trusted colleagues in 
neighboring districts allows decision-makers to observe programs in action and ask 
questions about potential pitfalls or strategies to effectively implement the 
programs.   Third, and perhaps most importantly, school and district personnel 
report that they trust the information gleaned from personal sources more than 
they do information from third parties.  Although this was not universally true in my 
sample – certainly some individuals reported the opposite – a majority of the 
interviewees in the sample said that they leaned on their colleagues for support 
because they believe that the information they receive would be trustworthy, 
applicable to their work, and easy to understand.   
Trusting colleagues and friends is also the biggest downside to word-of-
mouth recommendations as a source of information.  Enthusiastic support for 
certain programs does not mean that these programs are necessarily well suited to 
the particular context and needs of the schools who are searching for solutions.  
Decision-makers can easily become drawn into a program if it has a track record of 
success in a neighboring district, and may subsequently ignore information 
suggesting a suboptimal fit for their school context.  This is evidence of what 
cognitive psychologists call a “confirmation bias” (Nickerson, 1998) and education 
researchers – particularly sense-making theorists – have documented that 
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confirmation bias can play a strong role in how schools make decisions and 
implement new programs for improvement (Spillane et al., 2002; Firestone, 1989).  
There were several instances of schools that had fallen victim to the confirmation 
bias in my sample, only discovering that particular programs were a poor fit after 
they had made purchasing decisions for their schools.  ELEM 3 was one such school.  
They were struggling to find a new math program because their curriculum was 
outdated and poorly aligned to the state standards.  They chose not to ask internally 
for teachers’ opinions about a new curriculum, but instead follow the lead of 
another Pennsylvania district that was considered to be a successful district.  
Explains the elementary school principal:  
 
"We looked at other schools that have performed very, very well, and the one 
example I have is [our neighboring district] – the district is the size of this 
building, I think. But they’re one of the top in U.S. News and World Report. 
They’re one of the top in the state. They have an innovative superintendent 
that does great things.  So we copy what others have as success.”  (Principal, 
ELEM 3) 
 
Only in the third year of interviews did the principal admit that he wished the 
district had invested more time in finding a program that was a good fit with the 
needs of that particular elementary building, where social capital was low and 
teacher turnover was high.  The math program they selected, he admitted, was 
facing resistance from the teachers who didn’t like the new approach to math 
instruction.  But he wrote off teachers’ complaints saying, “Not everything is perfect. 
I mean there are drawbacks to everything. Every program that’s out there, there’s 
no perfect fit” (Principal, ELEM 3).   
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 A related drawback to word-of-mouth recommendations is that copying the 
practices of outside districts makes it difficult for a school or district to be a true 
innovator.  Explains one district administrator in ELEM 2:  
 
“With the word-of-mouth, what I’ve found is that a lot of people spend time 
on ‘what is,’ instead of the vision of ‘what should be’…For me, I’d rather read 
Harvard Newsletter and find out what is the direction and where everything 
is headed so that I could make the decision.  So I do a lot of reading that way.  
Because I don’t want this district to be ‘what is’; I want it to be prepared so 
that other districts are looking to us.  For the word-of-mouth, it depends on 
who you talk to, and you want to talk to the right people.”  (District 
Administrator, ELEM 2) 
  
As this administrator suggests, technical sources of information avoid the 
potential problem of copying practices that might be a poor fit for the school or 
simply outdated.  Technical searches include a broad range of activities, including 
looking at websites, reading evaluations or other research, going to professional 
conferences or workshops, and listening to presentations from vendors.  If decision-
makers consult high quality research from trusted sources – for example the U.S. 
Department of Education’s WhatWorks Clearinghouse or well-respected 
professional association publications – they minimize confirmation bias and expose 
themselves to unbiased accounts of effective practices.  Importantly, research may 
help decision-makers determine the specific conditions under which programs and 
strategies can be expected to have an impact in their schools.  Technical searches 
have similar pitfalls to human searches, however, because the search process is 
compromised if the quality of the source is subpar.  And unfortunately there are 
many so-called technical resources that are misleading.  For example, many 
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interviewees proudly touted that their programs were “research-based,” when in 
fact the research in question was conducted by the vendor itself and was of low 
quality (for example, employing a small sample size, using anecdotal evidence, using 
ill-defined outcome measures, etc.).  In other cases, school personnel admitted that 
they did online searches for new strategies, which opened up a host of options, but 
with few checks on the quality of materials. 
Another popular source of technical information was the Intermediate Units 
(IUs), which are agencies that operate under the auspices of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education (PDE).  The IUs provide training and technical assistance 
to teachers and administrators on topics ranging from alignment to new state 
accountability measures to the adoption of new instructional strategies in the 
classroom.  While some interviewees reported that they highly valued the IU 
trainings, others noted that the trainings were outdated and not very helpful.  The 
principal at HS 2 said, “those workshops have been very frustrating because it 
seems every time you go to another one, they’ve changed their mind on something.”  
And a district administrator at ELEM 2 said, “With the IU, they don’t lead; they are 
kind of following so with them right now they’ll offer things like on Common Core as 
it’s happening.  So if you just wait for the IU you are always behind.” 
My findings suggest that human sources of information and technical sources 
of information are not mutually exclusive strategies during search – several schools 
in the sample thoughtfully combined the two strategies in a way that maximized the 
strengths and minimized the weaknesses of each approach.  The three districts that 
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employed a combination strategy were ELEM 2, ELEM 4, and HS 1.  By the third year 
of interviews, I could also include HS 3 as an organization pursuing a successful 
combination strategy for search, as this high school spent a lot of time and effort 
refining its search strategy.  Even within this subset, however, districts searched in 
different ways.  Interviewees in ELEM 2 first used technical information to identify a 
range of potential solutions and then looped in their colleagues – both internal and 
external to the district – to help them further narrow the field of alternatives.  As the 
district curriculum coordinator for math explained, “My research and best practices 
drive the dialogues that I have with the people that I work with, and that’s where 
the collaborative piece comes in.”  By contrast, HS 1 and ELEM 4 began their 
searches by asking trusted individuals to provide recommendations based on their 
needs and personal experience with specific strategies, and then validated those 
suggestions with technical sources of information.  Finally, HS 3 changed the order 
of events depending on the decision at hand.  In one case, it searched for a new 
reading program by leaning first on the personal experiences of its reading 
specialists (as detailed above), but flipped the process when searching for math 
materials.  The order of operations appeared to be inconsequential; interviewees in 
all four districts reported that, regardless of how the human and technical search 
process unfolded, the programs and strategies that they ultimately selected were 
high quality, research-based, and likely to work well with their school context.   
 A few common threads emerged from the data about how districts supported 
their combination search strategies.  The first is that districts used their 
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Intermediate Unit (IU) both as a resource for technical training and as a valuable 
networking tool.  One administrator in HS 1 explained that the district’s search for a 
new reading program began with a workshop at the IU, but continued long after the 
workshop was over when he spoke with colleagues in neighboring districts through 
an IU-run administrator list-serve.  Other interviewees mentioned that they had 
close personal relationships with particular IU employees so that they could bounce 
ideas off them in addition to attending specific trainings, for example on new state-
mandated testing policies related to the Common Core State Standards or the end-
of-year Keystone Exams.  Another valuable resource for these “combination 
districts” was conferences.   Conferences enabled decision-makers to network, learn 
from best practices, get exposure to current research, and gain access to a wide 
range of vendors.  One strategy was to send a group of people, including 
administrators and teachers, to a particular conference and then ask the group to 
share their experiences to the whole school or district upon their return.  Finally, 
combination districts all had some mechanism to gather information from teachers 
before they moved to the decision phase.  For ELEM 4 and HS 1, the mechanism was 
Professional Learning Communities.  For ELEM 2 it was asking teachers to “pre-
implement” potential new programs.  And for HS 3, it was establishing common 
teacher planning time and making clear that the principal valued input from 
teachers throughout the search process.  In all four districts, the feeling was the 
same, however – teachers were valuable sources of information, the lines of 
communication were open, and the process as a whole was transparent. 
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Decision Point 
 
 Presumably once decision-makers have identified relevant problems and 
have conducted thorough searches for potential solutions, they then make a 
decision.  The literature on bounded rationality suggests that, because decision-
makers are flawed and are constrained by their environments, they will satisfice or 
use other heuristics to make the decision process easier (Guth, Levati & Ploner, 
2010; Forester, 1984; Simon, 1972).  This, of course, assumes that the decision-
maker (or makers) has been tasked to select just one solution from a set of potential 
options.  But evidence from the larger IES study suggests that, instead of using 
mental shortcuts to help them make their decisions, school actors select a whole 
number of solutions and hope that at least one of them will help to raise student 
achievement scores (Weinbaum et al., 2012).   
The findings from this research also run contrary to the commonly held 
belief that high performing schools and low performing schools will select 
fundamentally different types of improvement strategies.  Using data from the 2009 
survey of all Pennsylvania principals, we found that low-performing schools were 
more likely to focus on test preparation strategies, but in general all schools, 
regardless of performance, selected many varied strategies for improvement 
(Weinbaum et al., 2012).  On average, survey respondents reported devoting 
moderate or major effort to 15 unique strategies (of the 46 options listed on the 
survey) to improve student performance on the state standardized tests.  In essence, 
schools operating in the context of performance-based accountability are 
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desperately throwing improvement strategies at the wall and hoping that something 
will stick.   
Just what types of strategies are schools selecting?  In the larger IES study, 
we established nine separate categories of improvement efforts where schools 
devoted their efforts (Weinbaum et al., 2012): 
 
1. New instructional approaches 
2. New student and staff schedules 
3. New or aligned curriculum 
4. State test (PSSA) preparation 
5. Remediation for struggling students 
6. Data analysis to guide improvement 
7. Outside expertise 
8. Rewards and sanctions for performance 
9. Efforts to address non-academic issues 
 
Based on the survey data, the most popular categories among schools statewide 
were adopting new curriculum materials (#3), conducting test preparation activities 
(#4), providing remediation for struggling students (#5), and conducting data 
analysis (#6).  The least popular strategies were changing student or staff schedules 
(#2), bringing in outside support (#7), and establishing reward or sanctions for 
student performance (#8). 
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The qualitative interview data from the eight schools in my sample echo 
these findings.  The most oft-mentioned decision for improvement was the purchase 
of new curriculum materials or the realignment of existing materials to 
performance-based accountability measures – I recorded 52 mentions of 
investments in curriculum across the eight schools.  Making changes to schools’ 
instructional approaches was another popular trend.  These decisions included 
investing in professional development, moving to a co-teaching model, and 
promoting differentiated instruction and other instructional techniques aimed at 
school improvement.  The third most popular category was test preparation 
activities, which included purchasing programs and strategies that used a “drill and 
kill” approach to prepare for the state test, as well as lower-cost solutions like 
practicing question types or content.  Finally, school personnel reported that they 
invested in new data collection and analysis tools, for example by instituting new 
benchmark exams or investing in data warehousing tools.   
 
  
  
 
Figure 4.2 
Decisions for Improvement by Area of Emphasis
 
*Source: Field notes, memos 
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-making in high schools under conditions of 
l” solutions.  As they defined it, peripheral solutions were 
es not constitute a fundamental shift in the way 
Area of Emphasis
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schools were selecting many varied strategies for improvement, including 
peripheral strategies like test preparation, as well as strategies more toward the 
instructional core like the adoption of new curriculum materials and new 
approaches to instruction.    
In addition to the descriptive information about the strategies schools select 
for improvement, I analyzed the data to provide insight on how schools made their 
selections.  I found it difficult to identify trends in the decision point phase, however, 
because approaches were highly dependent upon the specific context of each 
decision.  This wide variation in approaches existed both among cases as well as 
within cases.  In any one district, respondents might report that in one instance they 
took a vote to select a new program, and in another instance the principal or district 
administrator selected the program unilaterally.  The only trend that emerged was 
one that follows common sense: decision-makers took more time to make a 
selection if the options on the table were high-cost improvement efforts (e.g. new 
curriculum materials or technology tools) than they did for smaller scale and lower-
cost options.  
Summary 
 
 My descriptions above of the problem identification, search, and decision 
point phases of the overarching decision-making process are like pieces in a 
complicated puzzle. What is striking is that, in many ways, the schools in my sample 
selected a similar set of strategies for improvement.  Most notably, the majority of 
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schools in my sample used benchmark exams to identify problems, employed a 
middle-out approach to search, and select many varied improvement solutions in an 
attempt to improve student achievement scores on the state test.  Given these 
similarities, it is perhaps surprising that these same schools’ overall approach to 
decision-making was at times dramatically different from one another.   
 As the literature on the right-hand side of the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum 
suggests, the boundedness of the education environment plays an important role in 
shaping the nature of the decision-making process.  In the next chapter, I put the 
puzzle pieces together, describing how schools make sense of their environments, 
how they turn the discrete phases of decision-making into a decision-making 
“process,” and how constraints impact their approaches to improvement.   
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CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
 
Defining the Decision-Making “Process”  
 
In the previous chapter, I described how schools approach the discrete stages 
of the decision-making process – problem identification, search, and the decision 
point.  In this chapter, I analyze how schools and districts put those pieces together 
into an overall process around decision-making.  At the outset, I define a decision-
making “process” as a district’s strategic approach to improvement that is echoed 
across multiple different decisions district-wide over a period of at least a year.  In 
other words, one teacher’s personal method for selecting materials for her 
classroom would not constitute a district’s decision-making process unless her 
approach represented a common approach in the district as a whole.  In this way, I 
base my categorizations of decision-making processes on self-reported practices 
corroborated by multiple actors across the district.  Additionally, I base my 
characterizations of decision-making processes on a conglomeration of many 
decisions that occurred over the three years of interviews, because most schools 
had slight variations in their processes from decision to decision and from year to 
year.  
 To conduct my analyses in this chapter, I first return to the theoretical 
framework that I presented in Chapter One.  In my Conceptual Map (see Figure 5.1), 
I depict the school/district as the primary agent in charge of making decisions for 
improvement under performance-based accountability measures, and this entity 
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operates under internal and external constraints, leading to decisions that fall at 
some point along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum.  As I explained in the opening 
chapter for this dissertation, the Spectrum is a tool that situates a broad range of 
decision-making literature from various disciplines on a spectrum that ranges from 
depictions of schools as rational decision-making organizations to depictions of 
schools as utterly chaotic decision-makers. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Conceptual Map 
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I define schools’ placement on the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum along two 
literature-based dimensions.  The first is linearity, which is the degree to which 
schools’ decision-making processes follow the “rational” sequence of problem 
identification, search, and decision point (Simon, 1955).  A school that follows the 
decision-making steps in that order has been judged in previous empirical research 
to be more chaotic than one that completes the steps out of order (Farley-Ripple, 
2008).  The second factor in determining schools’ placement along the Spectrum is 
an assessment of the degree to which a school has a “systemic process” around 
decision-making.   I define a “systemic process” as one in which decision-makers 
were able to articulate a cohesive, consistent approach to school improvement in 
the school or district, for example by identifying common approaches for the 
discrete steps in the decision-making process, alignment of decision-making 
strategies to the stated school goals or mission statement, and thoughtful 
consideration of sources of information (both internal and external, human and 
technical).  For example, a school in which decision-makers identified many 
disjointed approaches to decision-making that were poorly aligned to the school’s 
stated mission would be to the right of center on the Spectrum.   
I used evidence from the individual case studies to analyze the schools in my 
sample on each of the two criteria – linearity and “systemic process” – making sure 
to weight these two criteria equally.  Then, I created case-ordered descriptive 
matrices to look at trends across districts, paying particular attention to the order in 
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which districts approached the decision-making phases, as well as alignment 
between school goals and reported decision-making approaches.   
This exercise yielded two main findings about school and district decision-
making processes.  First, schools and districts approached the decision-making 
process in a mostly linear fashion, beginning with the problem identification phase, 
followed by a search for solutions, and then a selection from among available 
options.  Second, six of the eight schools in my sample met the standard of having a 
“systemic process” around decision-making in place.  These two findings combined 
suggest that schools and district may not be nearly as chaotic as the literature on 
educational decision-making suggests (e.g. Farley-Ripple, 2008; Gross, Kirst, 
Holland and Luschei, 2005; Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).  With that said, my third 
finding is that the decision-making environment in schools and districts is bound by 
a great number of contextual and environmental constraints.  These constraints can 
compromise the quality of each phase of the decision-making process, but seem to 
have an especially detrimental effect on the search phase.  Below, I describe each 
finding in detail, as well as the method of analysis that I used to come to these 
findings, and then I provide an analysis of the overall effect on decision-making 
processes for schools. 
Linearity in Decision-Making 
 
 The garbage can model of decision-making characterizes decision-making in 
education as a chaotic endeavor in which solutions often “seek” problems and 
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search is omitted all together (Cohen et al., 1972).  In her empirical study of 
decision-making in one large district, Farley-Ripple (2008) found that a school 
district distorted the decision-making process on several occasions, for example by 
putting decisions before problems.  And in their empirical study of high schools in 
the context of high-stakes accountability, Gross et al. (2005) characterized the 
decision-making process as chaotic.  They write, “…the dependence on ad hoc, 
individual, and uncoordinated decision situations suggests that schools in large part 
have not generated a truly organizational response to their state accountability 
systems” (p. 50).   
Evidence from this study, however, runs in contrast to the studies above.  I 
found that six of the eight schools in my sample made decisions in a linear or fairly 
linear manner.  HS 4 was the most chaotic district in the sample and acted in a 
chaotic manner not unlike the scenario that Gross et al. (2005) describe above, in 
which there was no common pattern of decision-making behavior, linear or 
otherwise.  But school and district leaders in the remaining six schools were able to 
articulate how they made decisions by following a linear procedure.  First, they 
described how they identified problems within their schools, as well as the obstacles 
they faced in doing so.  In some cases, these problems were obvious – for example, 
students were complacent about the state test or the curriculum was outdated – but 
in other cases schools used elaborate data collection methods to identify issues.  In 
all cases, however, everyone from the teachers on up to the superintendent was well 
aware that the school had barriers to effective school improvement efforts.  Second, 
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although search efforts were often truncated, rarely did school leaders omit this 
step entirely.  A truncated search might have involved a quick online search for 
potential solutions, a phone call to a trusted colleague or friend polling them on the 
products they had used in the past, or it might have involved asking a number of 
vendors to come in and explain their products.  The majority of schools conducted 
searches that were incomplete, which is to say that they did not carefully consider a 
broad range of options, nor did they spend time comparing and contrasting their 
available options.  These searches, though incomplete, did occur in a linear fashion 
in that they were an intermediate step between problem identification and the 
decision point.  Finally, schools and districts made a decision that they believed best 
met the needs of the school and its students, taking into account factors like 
alignment to accountability policies, cost, and other considerations.   
Although I do not have the ability to determine whether schools selected the 
“best” decisions from the available alternatives, achievement data from the schools 
over the three-year period of the study show that, of the six schools that initially 
failed to make AYP following the 2007-2008 school year, all but one school (HS 2) 
was able to get out of its “warning” status over the course of the study.  This 
suggests that at least some of the decisions that schools made for improvement 
were the right ones. 
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“Systemic Process” around Decision-Making 
 
Rational decision-making isn’t just about the degree to which decision-
makers approach problems in a linear manner, however; it is also about the degree 
to which decision-makers had a “true process” around decision-making.  Again, I 
define a “systemic process” as one in which decision-makers approach problems 
thoughtfully and align their process to their stated school goals and mission.  I 
gleaned the majority of this information from the Year 2 interview protocol, which 
contained specific questions about schools’ mission and goals for improvement (see 
Appendix B).  In response to these questions, some respondents parroted the 
school’s official written mission statement, while others spoke freely about their 
instructional philosophies and goals for their students.  I found that the schools in 
my sample were, for the most part, able to articulate a cohesive decision-making 
philosophy.  Of the eight schools in the sample, six schools met the standard of 
having a “systemic process,” meaning that they articulated a school or district-wide 
approach to identifying problems, finding potential programs, and/or making 
decisions for improvement.  The content of their philosophies and missions was less 
important than the simple fact that they had one, especially if this philosophy 
extended to others throughout the school and pervaded the school or district’s 
decision-making strategy.  
In ELEM 2, for example, respondents uniformly expressed their commitment 
to using district frameworks to search for new programs and then pilot them in the 
classroom before full implementation of new strategies.  In ELEM 4, school leaders 
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talked about the importance of involving teachers across subject areas and grade 
levels during the decision-making process.  In HS 1, district administrators and 
school leaders talked about the increasing dependence on formative assessments to 
guide their decision-making process.  By contrast, respondents in ELEM 3 each 
seemed to have different personal goals for their students, which in part explained 
why teachers pursued individual, disjointed strategies without forming a 
collaborative approach to improvement.  And in HS 4, district administrators said 
outright that the enormous amount of staff turnover had left the district without a 
cohesive process for making decisions, as each new staff member came in with his 
or her own vision for improvement, and at times those visions were in direct 
conflict with one another.   
Interestingly, the two schools that did not possess a “systemic process” were 
the same schools that did not approach decisions in a linear manner, as explained in 
the previous section.  Although more research with a larger sample is necessary to 
determine the degree to which linearity and “systemic process” are correlated, my 
research suggests a strong positive relationship.   
In Figure 5.2, I depict the rough placement of each school along the 
Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum that I first outlined in Chapter One, using both 
linearity and “true process” indicators with equal weighting.  The figure depicts six 
schools (ELEM 1, ELEM 2, ELEM 4, HS 1, HS 2, and HS 3) as operating in 
environments that are bounded, but not so bounded that their decisions become 
chaotic or nonsensical.  The remaining schools are further toward the “chaos” end of 
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the spectrum.  ELEM 3 is farther to the “chaos” end because this district lacked a 
cohesive approach to decision-making, which presented itself in a haphazard top-
down decision-making approach on some issues, although most of the time the 
district left teachers to come up with their own strategies for improvement, which 
were rarely scaled to the school or district level.   Furthermore, ELEM 3 frequently 
omitted the search component of the decision-making process and made decisions 
without careful consideration of relevant problems. HS 4, meanwhile, is farther 
along to the right of the spectrum because the levels of social capital in this district 
were dismally low and the school was in the midst of a major administrative 
upheaval.  As a result, there was no cohesive decision-making process in place 
during the three years of my visits, and decisions preceded problems and searches 
in many instances.   
Figure 5.2 
School Placement on Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum 
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Despite the evidence from these two schools, the overarching story from the 
sample is that the schools were not nearly as chaotic as the literature might suggest.  
Although the schools were not purely rational organizations, they generally 
approached problems in a linear manner and utilized all steps of the decision-
making process.  They also included a variety of actors and approached decisions in 
a middle-out fashion, meaning that the locus of decision-making generally 
originated at the school level with the principal or other school administrators 
and/or specialists and then radiated outward to include teachers in the classroom 
as well as administrators in the district offices.  The most vulnerable phase in the 
decision-making process was search– this was the phase that decision-makers were 
most likely to truncate, postpone, or skip when facing pressure from performance-
based accountability systems to improve.  Additionally, most schools had a 
“systemic process” around decision-making on the whole.  Even with a linear 
approach and a cohesive philosophy around search, however, schools and districts 
still operate under conditions of uncertainty and boundedness in their decision-
making environments (see Figure 5.2).  To understand the forces that caused 
schools to deviate from the more rational approach to decision-making requires a 
more in-depth examination of the various factors that bound decision-making in 
schools, especially since some schools in my sample operated in environments that 
were dramatically constrained by politics, internal school culture, and other factors.   
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Constraints on Decision-Making 
 
A key assumption inherent in accountability theory is that all schools, 
regardless of their contexts and environments, have the necessary tools at their 
fingertips to enact changes to improve student achievement.  Evidence suggests 
however, that context matters more than policymakers would like to think.  Politics, 
financial constraints, personal beliefs, human capital, and social dynamics can all 
constrain the decision-making process in real and meaningful ways, which in turn 
can lead to drastically different approaches to school improvement.  To ignore 
school and district context is to severely undermine the pressure put upon schools 
to meet the rigorous standards that accountability systems set.  By the same token, 
however, simply asserting that “context matters” is an equally egregious 
oversimplification of the reality of schooling.   
The literature identifies numerous forces, both internal and external to the 
school district, which can constrain the decision-making environment (Coburn & 
Talbert, 2006; Gross et al., 2005; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Abelman & 
Elmore, 1999; Hannaway & Kimball, 1998).  Internal constraints generally arise 
from the intricate ways in which students, staff, and administrators interact and set 
goals for achievement.  They include human capital constraints, school norms and 
culture, personal experiences and beliefs about student achievement, district size, 
and time. External bounds, on the other hand, are those pressures that outside 
sources place on schools.  They include policy mandates, politics, budget, and 
community pressures.  The boundary between internal and external bounds is not 
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always clearly delineated, but does provide a useful guideline to distinguish 
between the various types of constraints that might affect educational decision-
makers.  The literature also identifies specific constraints on search, including 
familiarity (Coburn, 2007; Honig, 2003; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), search 
misalignment (Gross et al., 2005), and accessibility (Gilovich, 1991; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990).  
 Consistent with my analysis strategy in previous chapters, I used a case-
ordered descriptive matrix to examine the various constraints on the decision-
making process.  In addition to the case-ordered descriptive matrices, I conducted a 
selective document analysis of the Pennsylvania accountability framework 
document called “Getting Results” that each school was required to fill out if they 
failed to meet the accountability standards set forth by the state.  (I asked schools to 
provide me with their Getting Results documents and three of the eight schools in 
my sample allowed me access to these documents.)  I found that respondents 
identified many different factors that constrained decision-making in their schools.  
The most severe constraints on search were policy mandates from performance-
based accountability systems, tight budgets, pressure from the community and the 
school board, time constraints, staff turnover, a negative school culture, and 
outdated technology.  Generally speaking, the first three constraints in this list fall 
into the category of “external” constraints and the next four constraints fall into the 
“internal” category, which signals a relatively even split between the two.  Below, I 
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provide details on the constraints, including their impact on each individual phase 
of the decision-making process.   
 
Table 5.1 
Decision-Making Constraints Area of Emphasis 
External Constraints 
Constraint Problem ID Search Decision Point 
Policy 
Mandates 
Narrowly defines 
problems in terms of 
performance on state tests 
“Scientifically-based” 
requirement limits field of 
options 
 
Prioritizes alignment to 
standards/ assessments 
Truncates timing 
and hurries 
decisions 
Tight Budgets N/A Limits field of options  
 
Limits ability to gather 
information 
Delays decisions  
 
Greater 
transparency 
Community 
Pressure 
Redefines problems 
through political lens 
Limits field of options 
based on cost/politics  
 
Delays decisions  
 
Internal Constraints 
Constraint Problem ID Search Decision Point 
Time Overlooks underlying 
problems  
Limits exposure to new 
ideas  
Leads to unilateral 
decisions  
Staff 
Turnover 
Muddles problem ID  Leads to inconsistent 
approaches to search 
Delays decisions  
 
School 
Culture 
Excludes critical 
viewpoints  
 
Muddles problem ID 
Limits searches by 
familiarity 
 
Leads to fractured 
approaches 
Exclusionary 
 
Creates 
disagreement over 
common 
improvement goals 
Outdated 
Technology 
Makes data less accessible 
 
Limits technical searches 
 
Leads to avoidance 
of technology-based 
strategies 
 
 
Before I detail the specific constraints on the schools and districts in my 
sample, however, it is important to state at the outset that not all constraints are 
inherently negative forces on decision-making.  After all, schools are public entities 
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that serve a vulnerable, underage population (Ingersoll, 2003; Lortie, 1975) and 
some bounds on decision-making behavior are designed to protect the academic 
and social wellbeing of students.  School boards, for example, were created with the 
specific intention of keeping district administrators’ decision-making ability in 
check.  Although they do not necessarily operate in the best interest of the school 
district at all times, they could play a positive role if they were to force schools and 
districts to choose new programs and strategies in a careful and deliberate manner.  
To be sure, constraints can negatively impact decision-making as well.  For example, 
a distrustful working environment is likely to hamper efforts to come to decisions in 
a collaborative manner, which can narrow the field of options, make consensus 
building difficult, and impede implementation.  And sometimes the line between the 
positive or negative impact of a constraint is blurry.  For example, administrative 
turnover might disrupt the decision-making process and cause a lack of continuity, 
but it might also bring with it the opportunity for fresh ideas and renewed 
commitment to improving academic achievement.  In the analyses below, I mention 
both the positive and negative effects of decision-making constraints, and I also 
point out instances where the effect might be ambiguous or context-specific.   
 
Policy Mandates. Performance-based accountability measures affected all stages of 
the decision-making process.  This is perhaps due to the nature of the sample, as six 
of the eight schools in my sample were labeled as “in need of improvement” after 
the 2007-2008 school year, which meant that these schools felt the pressure to 
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improve their students’ scores on the state standardized tests.  In term of problem 
identification, my case study schools reported that they had received a report from 
the state prior to Year 1 of the study indicating their school’s accountability status 
for the following year, disaggregated by student subgroup.  For the vast majority of 
schools, these results did not come a surprise – teachers across all cases said that 
they knew which students were in danger of missing the “proficiency” mark on the 
state tests.  Still, the schools were well aware that the state had publicly announced 
the “problems” in the school, and that it was now their responsibility to address 
these problems, however narrowly defined they might be. 
 In Pennsylvania the state requires that schools in “warning” status also fill 
out a document called “Getting Results” that details their perceptions of school-wide 
problems and their strategies for improvement.  Specifically, school leaders must 
identify a “school improvement team,” review and analyze state test data, identify 
the root causes of performance deficiencies, and detail their plans for improvement.  
Although the state does not dictate which strategies schools must choose to improve 
their scores, the Getting Results document serves as a problem identification 
framework for schools.  Whenever possible, I analyzed schools’ Getting Results 
frameworks to see how they described the problems in their schools.  In the three 
schools that allowed me access to their documents (ELEM 1, ELEM 2, and HS 3), I 
found that the frameworks forced schools to be honest about their shortcomings 
and look closely at the data from the state assessments to determine which pockets 
of students needed extra attention.  In the three years of interviews, I also asked 
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how the document affected their approach to school improvement for the sample as 
a whole.  Most schools asserted that the Getting Results framework did not 
fundamentally alter their approach to improvement, but that it did push them to 
look more closely at school-level data and examine the needs of student subgroups 
that might previously have been overlooked.  A special education administrator in 
ELEM 2 explained how the framework highlighted the specific needs of special 
education students: 
 
“With the change in curriculum materials…they really look at the special ed 
component and how will this affect our special ed students.  And I don’t 
know.  Before the curriculum changed it was like ‘oh gee this looks good, let’s 
try it.’  And I don’t know that anyone ever thought about the special ed 
population, and now it’s definitely considered.” (District Administrator, 
ELEM 2) 
 
In this way, the effect of accountability measures on problem identification might be 
both positive and negative.  On the positive side, the comments of the administrator 
above highlight how accountability policies and frameworks can push schools to 
concentrate on previously overlooked students.  On the negative side, however, 
defining problems through the lens of students’ scores on state standardized tests 
might cause schools to ignore other pressing issues that cannot be expressed 
through student test scores, for example school culture, critical thinking skills, or 
graduation rates.   
Policy mandates also affected the search phase of the decision-making 
process.  The No Left Behind Act law mandates that all programs and strategies in 
schools be based on “scientifically-based research” (NCLB, 2001).  Although many 
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have critiqued the scientifically-based research requirement as vague and poorly 
defined (e.g. Eisenhart & Towne, 2003), the provision does, at least hypothetically, 
limit the programs that schools can select to those that have been tested and found 
to have positive effects on school performance.  The schools in the sample 
mentioned that they felt constrained to look for programs that fell into this 
“scientifically-based” category, although perhaps not as much as one would have 
expected.  This may be due to the fact that the provision had been in place for a 
sufficient period of time that vendors were able to conduct research – or at least 
claim that they conducted research – that helped their products appear to meet the 
minimum standards.   
Districts also reported that they received enormous pressure to align their 
curriculum to the state academic standards.  Pennsylvania helps districts align their 
curriculum by publishing the standards, providing webinars and trainings on 
alignment, providing a list of tested content or “anchors,” and offering technical 
assistance from regional providers or “Intermediate Units.”  Schools in this study 
reported that pressure from the state caused them to seek out vendors that could 
claim their products were well aligned.  Said one district administrator:  
 
"I think at the time that we began to create the Study Lab and the resources, 
there were limited resources available.  There were companies that were just 
coming about with the notion that we were looking for something that would 
be aligned with the Pennsylvania Academic Standards.  In fact, at the time 
that we selected Princeton Review, even they were not aligned at that point.  
But they were indicating that they were going to be aligned within the next 
year or two and in fact they were.  And they were a company that we felt very 
comfortable with.” (Administrator, HS1)   
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By the third year of the study, interviewees were also mentioning a new type of 
alignment, namely that of alignment to the Common Core Standards, which is a set 
of college and career readiness standards that nearly all states have agreed to 
support (NGA & CCSSO, 2010).   Study participants reported that “Common Core” 
became a buzzword as they searched for new programs, and any vendor touting a 
new program would proudly proclaim alignment as a major selling point for their 
materials.  
The pressure generated from the “scientifically-based” requirement and the 
standards-alignment movement also operated in a subtler manner.  Some programs 
have gained popularity within performance-based accountability systems because 
they have been found to be effective at raising student achievement due to their 
inclusion in the U.S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse.  When 
schools or districts were searching for new programs, they reported that they felt 
pressured to choose these rigorously tested programs over other programs that 
might align more closely with their specific needs.  For example, respondents in one 
high school (HS 4) reported that they were unhappy with their existing curriculum 
but felt unable to change it because those programs were so highly regarded by 
proponents of performance-based accountability systems.   
Finally, accountability measures truncated the time allotted for the decision 
point phase of the process.  Because the testing period in Pennsylvania is in the 
early spring, most schools must put in place any new improvement programs in the 
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fall if they realistically hope to see any meaningful results.  Since schools don’t 
typically receive their scores back until early summer, the time they have to make 
decisions is limited to the summertime.   One teacher at a struggling elementary 
school (ELEM 3) mentioned that her school wanted to align their test preparation 
program to the state standards but that those efforts were frustrated when the 
truncated decision-making period for decisions caused them to rush the process, 
which ultimately cut teachers out of the decision point phase of the process and led 
to an unpopular curriculum choice.  Another district (ELEM 2) was faced with the 
same problem and solved it by paying its teachers overtime during the summer 
months to work on aligning the curriculum to the standards and plan professional 
development activities before the start of the school year.  
 
Tight budgets.  I began my school interviews in the spring of 2009, soon after the 
beginning of a nationwide recession.  By the end of third round of interviews in the 
summer of 2011, all eight districts in the study reported that they had been affected 
by the recession, although some districts felt the budget crunch more acutely than 
others.  One administrator in a well-off district (ELEM 4) put the issue of budget 
woes into perspective, saying that the recession forced them to slash their 
curriculum budget by about eight hundred thousand dollars in a single year, which 
was about half their total budget.  And the principal of a suburban high school said, 
"Things have changed a little bit with the change in the economy.  Although they still 
want to have the best intentions for our kids, the economy plays a role.  You can't 
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keep going back to your taxpayers and raising taxes when people are losing jobs and 
salaries have been frozen in a lot of different areas and so forth" (Principal, HS 3). 
School and district leaders did not identify specific ways in which tight 
budgets affected their efforts at problem identification, but they explained in great 
detail how they limited their search processes by narrowing the field of options to 
less expensive programs and strategies.  In some cases, this meant that decision-
makers would not even consider programs that cost too much or required 
additional full-time employees to administer.  Several administrators in one high 
school (HS 4) reported that they had recently purchased curriculum materials for 
Advanced Placement courses but were weighing sending the books back to the 
publisher because they could not justify the ongoing cost of the technology licenses 
that came along with the books.  In other cases, schools would only partially 
implement programs, for example by purchasing a few licenses and piloting them in 
one classroom while they lobbied the school board for funding to extend licenses to 
a broader student population.  
 Tight budgets also limited decision-makers’ ability to gather information 
about potential new programs and strategies.  Personnel in a majority of the schools 
in the sample mentioned that budget woes caused them to curtail or even eliminate 
sources of information for their searches, including travel budgets, subscriptions to 
journals, and memberships to professional associations.  Several schools said that 
they also had to cut staff positions, which meant that there were fewer people to 
conduct searches and everyone’s time was more crunched.  In one elementary 
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school (ELEM 4), the district cut several reading and math specialist positions, 
which forced classroom teachers to conduct their own searches for new strategies 
during their rare free periods.  When it came to travel budgets, several school 
administrators mentioned that one of the first things to get cut was travel to 
conferences, which meant that they had less freedom to explore new and innovative 
solutions for their schools.  One high school principal who was young, energetic, and 
eager to search for new programs for his school explained that he had stopped going 
to conferences himself, “Because I feel bad, for one thing, going to a lot of 
conferences.  Especially since I've told my teaching staff that they're not allowed 
because of the budget. The superintendent saying you need to cut- we had to cut our 
conference and travel budget by, oh, it was like eighty percent. So I didn't have 
much” (Principal, HS 3).  In this way, the findings show that tight budgets limited 
technical searches (i.e. searches that lean on third-party information, such as 
research, professional development materials, journal articles, and professional 
organization pieces), and therefore caused decision-makers to lean more heavily on 
human resources (i.e. word-of-mouth recommendations, examples from 
neighboring districts) during their search processes.   
 Although interviewees viewed budget woes as a negative constraint on 
search, the impact on the decision point was both negative and positive.  On the 
negative side, insufficient funds could postpone or indefinitely delay decisions.  
When asked what sort of new programs her school had adopted that year, a teacher 
responded matter-of-factly, saying, “Yeah, we haven’t gotten anything new. I don’t 
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think anything new is being bought because we don’t have any money, so that’s 
pretty much what we have” (Administrator, HS 2).  In its “Getting Results” 
document, however, this high school had listed numerous ways in which it planned 
to improve student scores on the state tests, including purchasing new materials.  
This high school teacher was not alone in believing that the budget had delayed 
important decisions for improvement.  One elementary school principal (ELEM 3) 
said that he desperately wanted to buy new computer-based remediation materials 
for his students, but financial problems in the district had forced him to spend the 
money in the district’s general fund to cover the basic salaries of teachers.  And a 
district administrator (HS 4) in charge of curriculum and instructional programming 
described how the budget cuts had caused her to completely revisit how she 
purchases new materials.   Buying programs ad hoc, she said, “eats up my entire 
budget. So it's going to have to become more cyclical. I didn't really want to do that. I 
really wanted everybody to bring everything they needed this year, and we'd try to 
work out with them- hey, if I get you this half, can you wait for this half? That's 
gonna hugely differ, so that will be a fall-out from the Governor's budget” 
(Administrator, HS 4). 
On the positive side, however, interviewees acknowledged that budgetary 
constraints often forced their schools and districts to make decisions in a more 
transparent, collaborative, and deliberate manner.  Said one high school principal: 
 
"Realistically in the last couple of years you have to be really careful about 
every dollar that you spend.  I think we've gotten better at some of our 
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decision-making because of that.  We've gotten more thorough.  Because God 
forbid we make a mistake and spend a couple hundred thousand dollars and 
find out that we just wasted all that money." (Principal, HS 1) 
 
Although the data does not support a determination as to the extent to which one 
decision was “better” than another, almost all of the subjects in this study believed 
that a slower, more deliberate process was better than a hasty process.  And some 
teachers who were very vocal about their disdain for budget constraints in general 
reluctantly expressed their gratitude when the budget caused the process to become 
more collaborative, because it meant that administrators were more likely to seek 
their opinions on new programs and strategies.  Interview respondents also 
reported that the community – particularly school board members – liked the 
decision-making process to be slow, methodical, and collaborative because they felt 
they had greater control over how their dollars were spent.  
 
Community pressure.  My findings suggest that the community – that is, taxpayers, 
parents, and the school board – all played an important political role and affected all 
stages of the decision-making process.  Forces in the community often attempted to 
interpret schools’ accountability status based on their personal politics and 
preconceived notions of how the schools in their community should operate.   
School boards were perhaps the most instructive example of how the 
community injected politics into the problem identification phase of the decision-
making process.  The school board was so divisive and politically polarized in two 
schools in my sample that it made the purchase of any new materials an uphill 
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battle.  The school boards in these districts reflected the larger national political 
polarization, with half of the board opposing any new spending in public education, 
and the other half supporting robustly funded education reform.  Ironically, these 
schools were the only ones in my sample that were not on the state’s watch list for 
improvement, which suggests that school board politics represent a pressure for 
schools that is wholly separate from accountability pressure.  Four schools in the 
sample had school boards that were powerful, but had a collaborative and friendly 
relationship with the schools.  The remaining two schools in my sample reported 
that the school board rubber-stamped all their requests. 
 School boards constrained the problem identification phase by bringing their 
own biases, experience, and opinions to the table.  In many cases, school boards 
contributed their own interpretations of the problem to the decision-making 
process, and these identified issues were sometimes in conflict with the problems 
identified by performance-based accountability systems.  This was the case with HS 
2, where the school board interpreted the high school’s “warning status” as a sign 
that students were less engaged and showed less school pride, even though the 
superintendent was adamant that the problem was academic in nature.   School 
boards exerted their control over the search process primarily by controlling the 
purse strings in the district.  Politically polarized communities, such as the 
community for ELEM 4, found it difficult to approve new capital purchases because 
the school board was wary of using taxpayer money on large educational 
investments.  School and district leaders reported that they tried to anticipate the 
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school board’s stinginess by avoiding consideration of programs that might draw 
undue attention from the board.   
Aside from school boards, vendors also constrained search processes in my 
sample schools and districts.  Although some schools reported that their decisions 
were completely unaffected by vendors pushing their products, other schools 
admitted that they did not conduct a thorough search because vendors actively 
sought them out.  Small, understaffed districts like ELEM 3 seemed to be the most 
susceptible to vendor pitches  
Political pressures in the community also affected the decision point phase of 
the decision-making process.  School boards, for example, could delay or even derail 
the decision process if they disagreed on funding allocations for new programs and 
strategies.  Note the differences below in the way that these two administrators in 
different districts talk about how they work with the school board to select new 
programs.  The first district had a friendly relationship with a school board and 
worked collaboratively with the board to select new programs and strategies.  The 
second operated in a highly political environment with a very contentious school 
board. 
District A: "We meet with the board once a year in a workshop that lasts 
probably most of the day.  And we go over what we consider to be our goals, 
and then we take input from the board members about things that they feel 
are important.  So the administrative team, which consists of the central 
office and the principals, will sit and have that discussion about what our 
goals should be with the board.  When we're done with that, we take two 
days at the end of June to assess how we did last year on what our goals were 
and then take those same goals and say well how far do we expect to get next 
year.  And then we use the input from the board to say whether this is the 
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direction that the community and the board feels that we're going." (District 
Administrator, ELEM 2) 
  
District B: “They're very unrealistic. It's a split board. They either love you or 
they hate you, depending upon the week. They are doing it for political 
reasons and don't understand….that it's really about the kids. We're in a 
contract year. Some of the board members, they want to see blood. They're 
missing it. They're missing the big picture of what their purpose is.” (District 
Administrator, ELEM 4) 
 
In the first district, the educators guided the decision point phase and involved the 
board as community collaborators, using them to refine their district’s goals at key 
points along the way.  In this case, the school board was a positive force because it 
helped the district to clearly articulate its goals to the community.  In the second 
district, however, the adversarial relationship with the school board caused district 
decision-makers to cede control over the decision point when their ideas for 
improvement became mired in school board politics. 
 It is important to discuss the various forces within the community that did 
not affect decision-making to a great degree.  First, I found that teachers unions did 
not seem to constrain any of the decision-making phases in a major way.  With the 
exception of two districts that underwent contentious contract negotiations at some 
point during the three-year study, interview respondents said that unions did not 
exert undue pressure on their decision-making processes.  This may be because the 
districts had good working relationships with their teacher unions, or it may be that 
administrators were so used to operating within the bounds of the contract that 
they did not even view it as constraint.  For example, interviewees nearly 
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universally mentioned that they wished they had more time to conduct professional 
development around new programs and strategies.  While they did not mention 
teacher contracts as a limiting factor, it is certainly the case that contracts placed 
limits on the hours in the school day, which in turn made it difficult to schedule 
these activities.   
Second, I did not find that parents and community groups greatly 
constrained any of the decision-making phases.  Some school-level personnel 
mentioned that their community newspaper had printed the results of their schools’ 
scores on the state standardized test, which increased their anxiety about the tests 
in general.  However, only in a few isolated cases did respondents mention that 
parents constrained their search or decision-making process.  
Finally, I did not find that vendors or district personnel exerted undue 
influence during decision-making, for example by arranging under-the-table deals 
for exclusive contracts with certain vendors or forgoing a collaborative process to 
make way for products advocated by family members or friends.   Although it is 
possible that interviewees censored their comments during the interviews – after 
all, the data is entirely based on self-report – interviewees generally felt comfortable 
being candid during the interviews because they did speak about several other 
sensitive topics.  This is not to say that impropriety did not indeed occur in these 
eight districts, but there is not evidence in this study to support that it was a 
pervasive constraint on decision-making.    
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Time constraints.  Talk to any teacher, principal, or district administrator and the 
one thing they can almost certainly agree upon is that there are never enough hours 
in the day.  Teachers wish that they had more time to search for the right materials 
to fit their class’ needs, collaborate with their peers, and participate in professional 
development.  Specialists wish that they could meet with teachers, observe more 
classrooms, and find the right programs and strategies for pockets of struggling 
students.  Principals wish that they did not get mired down in issues of building 
maintenance so that they could dedicate more time to instructional improvement.  
And district administrators wish they could spend more time researching the right 
programs for their schools.   
 These time constraints are, in many cases, symptoms of a larger problem.  
When budgets are tight, staff are usually spread thin, which makes it difficult for 
people to fully examine the barriers to improvement in their schools or conduct 
thorough searches for new improvement programs and strategies.  Accordingly, the 
pressure to look for shortcuts during the problem identification and search phases 
of the decision-making process is strong (Feldman & Tung, 2001).  In terms of the 
problem identification phase, harried decision-makers in my sample did not have 
sufficient time to delve into the data and investigate underlying causes for 
underperformance.  Teachers in many schools admitted that they had taken only a 
cursory look at student achievement data and did not talk to students’ previous 
teachers before the start of the school year.  Instead, they relied on administrators 
to tell them where to concentrate their efforts, assuming that the administrators 
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themselves had conducted a thorough needs assessment, which was not always the 
case.  When asked whether his school would be using new sources of data to help 
identify areas for improvement, one assistant principal at a struggling elementary 
school (ELEM 3) said: “It would be nice to have the information, but we’re not 
utilizing all the data we have today to its fullest. Why bring in any more if it’s not to 
be used as it possibly could be?” (Building Administrator, ELEM 3).   
 Tight schedules also prompted decision-makers to cut their search processes 
short.  Decision-makers reported that they were more likely to take only a cursory 
look at research-based materials and other technical sources of information such as 
journals, clearinghouses, and articles from professional associations.  They were 
also less likely to take the time to visit conferences and other outside learning 
opportunities.  Similarly, decision-makers pressed for time were more likely to 
make only courtesy inquiries to friends and colleagues about the programs they 
were using in their schools, forgoing any process to find out if the programs were a 
good fit for their student populations and identified needs.  Even administrators in 
districts with well-developed decision-making frameworks reported that time 
constraints affected their search processes.  When asked how she would spend her 
time if gifted some additional hours in the day, one district administrator in ELEM 4 
responded, “Certainly more time to read.  Certainly more time to network.  I don't 
like sitting here. I wish I had more time to do that, to answer the emails, to really 
write a really good response to something that [my colleague] is putting together for 
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Keystones, but I'll throw that together. It'll be okay" (District Administrator, ELEM 
4).  
Limited time frames also had a severe effect on the decision point phase of 
the larger decision-making process.  These schools and districts often rammed their 
decisions through with very little input from their peers.  In extreme cases, decision-
makers acted unilaterally and without much evidence to back up their decisions.  In 
these instances, interviewees mentioned that teacher buy-in to the decisions was 
very low, and that fidelity of implementation suffered as a result.  One salient 
example came from HS 3, which selected a problem-based learning curriculum 
program for math without much input from teachers.  When asked why they had 
selected the program in the first place, administrators said that they knew they 
needed a new math program because their materials were outdated, but didn’t have 
much time to find a new one.  They knew they were looking for “alignment” – 
although they had trouble defining exactly what they were looking to align the 
curriculum to – so they simply followed the path of a neighboring district that had 
selected a problem-based learning approach for its high school.  They made the 
decision to switch to the new materials over the summer and implemented them in 
the fall, when the high school principal was out on leave.  The teachers, as it turned 
out, hated the new approach and the accompanying materials.  By Year 2, the 
principal (who had returned from leave) was already looking to give teachers more 
flexibility in their instructional approach.  
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Although there is insufficient information to determine the degree to which 
time constraints made decisions substantively worse than decisions that were made 
carefully and deliberately with a longer time frame, the qualitative evidence 
suggests that a thorough search and a structured decision-making process takes 
time – and that well-funded, robustly staff districts are more likely to have that time 
to spend.  Said one district administrator in a high-performing, well-funded district:  
 
“We have a committee that we put together that includes district 
administrators, school administrators, teachers, parents, and community 
members. Well, that takes time, and it should take time. You want it to take 
time, and you put all the resources out there, and that's typically three-to-
four meetings – an hour to an hour and a half each” (District Administrator, 
ELEM 4). 
 
This was a common opinion voiced by those schools that had robust decision-
making processes in place, namely that search takes time and should not be rushed.  
 
Staff Turnover.  Another major decision-making constraint was staff turnover.  
Staff turnover affected all stages of the decision-making process.  In terms of the 
problem identification phase, new personnel often come in the door with different 
philosophies and ways to conceptualize the problems that a school faces.  One high 
school (HS 2) reported that it had gone through three principals in as many years, 
which made it nearly impossible to get anything done because each principal had a 
different understanding of the gaps in achievement in the student body.  An 
administrator in a different district (HS 4) said that the worst part about 
administrative turnover was that employees’ differing goals and strategies for 
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improvement meant that the decision-making process started from scratch every 
time.  Said one administrator, "[Our superintendent] left and with that came nine 
different approaches on what it is we are all about" (Administrator, HS 4).   
Administrative turnover impacted the search phase as well.  Administrators 
were usually the people who established procedures and processes around search – 
for example by creating curriculum review cycles or setting guidelines for 
collaborative decision-making – and when they left, their search methods often left 
with them.  In one district (ELEM 2), the turnover of administrative staff left the 
district without a cohesive process around search.  Even though the incoming 
assistant superintendent had intended to create a real process around search, he 
found that there was simply too much to do and too little time to do it.  As he 
described it, “Unfortunately we were literally in the ‘building the airplane as we 
were flying it’ mode.  And in fact I often remarked that we not only building it, we 
were reconstructing it, redesigning it, and then putting it back together while we 
were in flight” (Administrator, ELEM 2).  This administrator reported that he had to 
create all new procedures around search, and a colleague of his said that she was 
forced to borrow a curriculum review guideline from her previous employer (a 
neighboring district) because there simply wasn’t enough time to create her own.   
Staff turnover affected the decision point phase of the decision-making 
process as well, especially when incoming administrators had differing leadership 
styles.  A teacher in HS 4 spoke about how her school coped when the 
superintendent and the high school principal left in the same year: 
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“And that was half of our team gone, new people in. Some of those new 
people were never in an administrative job or did so very, very early on in 
their careers.  So we were left mentoring each other. And that works 
sometimes, and sometimes it can really be biting, and what I what happened 
is, it's kind of a loss of trust and credibility among the team, and it's borne out 
of frustration with that whole mentoring each other kind of piece, and trying 
your luck at different types of leadership styles” (Teacher, HS 4).   
 
New leadership styles, new improvement goals, and new personalities can all push 
off decisions or even prevent them from occurring.  Just as the high school above 
(HS 4) became accustomed to its new principal’s leadership style, the 
superintendent, who was only in the first year of his new job, announced that he 
would be leaving, which led the school to push off its selection of a new test 
preparation program for the high school. 
 
District Culture.  Staff turnover also highlighted the importance of school and 
district culture during the search and decision-making process.  Findings from my 
sample showed that a school culture characterized by distrust or competition 
limited the degree to which school leaders made decisions in a thoughtful, 
collaborative, and goal-oriented manner.  I found two factors that led to a negative 
school or district culture and constrained decision-making: a lack of trust between 
teachers and administrators; and a poorly articulated or conflicting philosophy 
around improvement.  Both of these cultural constraints affected all phases of the 
decision-making process. 
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The most frequently cited culture problem was a lack of trust between 
teachers and administrators.  Of the eight schools in the sample, only three 
consistently reported that they had a positive, collaborative decision-making 
environment.  The other five schools reported a great degree of mistrust between 
the different levels of hierarchy in the district. The principal of a struggling 
elementary school (ELEM 3), for example, said that he had tried to involve the 
teachers in the decision-making process regarding the selection of new curriculum 
materials but now excluded them because collaboration was too difficult to manage.  
And a high school teacher in a district where contract negotiations had created a 
strained relationship between teachers and administrators said: 
 
“As much as I believe the administration thinks it was all about the contract, 
there were many things that happened that made staff feel unimportant and 
not valued and as much as we know we give our heart and soul in classes and 
teach the kids and show them how much we love teaching as much as they 
love or not love learning.  There were some of us that got the impression that 
we didn't do anything because we didn't have a contract.  It made some very 
hard, negative feelings that I don't think are going to be quick to go away.”  
(Teacher, HS 4) 
 
This teacher’s comments highlight the importance of creating a culture of trust and 
collaboration, and point to the effects of distrust on all phases of the decision-
making process.  In terms of problem identification, when teachers were excluded, 
they did not speak up about the barriers to school improvement that they see.  In 
Year 1 of this study, teachers in HS 2 reported that they were not consulted after the 
school received its “warning status” determination, even though they would have 
liked to be a part of the decision-making team.  In terms of search, when teachers 
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felt as though their opinions were not valued, they were less likely to search for new 
materials or explore instructional strategies that could be implemented on a large 
scale, choosing instead to implement targeted strategies for their classrooms alone, 
or forgo new programs or strategies all together.  In several cases, this caused 
teachers to become resistant to change over time, which in turn encouraged 
administrators to limit the number of options on the table to ones that they think 
that teachers will more readily accept.  In practice, this meant that the options ere 
not as innovative as they could be – they merely tweaked the existing system.  ELEM 
3 fit this description, as teachers reported they would search for strategies that fit 
their classrooms or perhaps their grade levels, but never did they take any big ideas 
to school or district level to bring their ideas to scale.  Finally, in terms of the 
decision point, teachers were more likely to take a backseat to school improvement 
efforts, instead letting administrators lead the charge for improvement.  Teachers in 
HS 4, for example, had been systematically cut out of the decision point phase for so 
many years that they reported they never asked to participate anymore. 
Another constraint on decision-making was a set of poorly articulated or 
conflicting goals for improvement.  The Year 2 interview protocol (see Appendix B) 
contained three specific questions about school personnel’s perceptions of their 
school’s mission and goals.   In their responses, interviewees usually recited the 
school’s mission statement or articulated a broad set of school goals for 
improvement.  Interviewees in several schools, however, had trouble articulating 
their school’s mission or presented conflicting visions for the school or district.  In 
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two low-performing elementary schools (ELEM 1 and ELEM 3), nearly everyone we 
interviewed said that the school didn’t really have a guiding mission or set of goals 
for improvement.  Their goals were more short-term, for example to get new staff to 
participate in professional development activities after school.  In ELEM 3, 
respondents said that the school was looked down upon in the district and one 
teacher actually said that the school had no identity other than being the “red-
headed stepchild” in the district.  And although respondents in ELEM 2 reported 
that that their principal worked hard to instill a sense of ownership and 
entrepreneurship in all school staff, the principal himself expressed deep frustration 
that the district superintendent did not respect these leadership goals.  The district 
was trying to make his school into a “Stepford school,” he said, which belied 
conflicting goals around decision-making in the district.  
The problem of conflicting philosophies affected all stages of the decision-
making process.  It confused the problem identification phase because it allowed 
people to identify different or even conflicting problems.  It stymied search because 
it failed to provide the impetus for change, essentially leaving it up to individuals to 
set personal goals for themselves and their students.  Finally, poorly articulated 
philosophies made it difficult for decision-makers to come together in a 
collaborative manner at the decision point because they had difficulty agreeing on a 
common set of goals for improvement.   
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Technology.  Whether it was a data management tool for tracking student-level 
data, a curriculum supplement, or a computer-based remediation program, the 
schools in my sample were investing large amounts of money in new 21st Century 
learning tools.  With these tools, however, came various stumbling blocks for 
schools.  First, technology required that someone in the district as available to set up 
the technology and troubleshoot problems with connectivity, access, and other 
technical problems.  Second, investments in innovative technology-based software 
only worked if the school or district had already made the necessary investments in 
hardware.  A new computer-adaptive remediation program was useless if the school 
didn’t have enough computers.  Finally, teachers and administrators must be trained 
on how to use the technology hardware and software, which necessitated an 
investment in professional development. 
 At first glance, technology might seem like a constraint that only affects the 
implementation phase of the decision-making process.  After all, teachers may lose 
instructional time and become frustrated when technology tools don’t run smoothly 
in the classroom, but the tools themselves have already been selected.  On the 
contrary, I found that technology problems plagued all phases of the decision-
making process.  In terms of the problem identification phase, outdated or poorly 
implemented technology meant that administrators and teachers did not have the 
appropriate data management tools to track student data, such as benchmark test 
scores, achievement levels in previous grades, and areas of opportunity.  Said one 
high school teacher:  
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"We have tons of data but it is not easily accessible, it is still a matter of going 
to three different things and look up three different scores and supposedly 
they have a program that we are going to get next year called Tetra Data, that 
is going to give you all the kids’ numbers.  We are still a little ways away from 
that but that will save us a lot of time and get people more interested in the 
data.” (Teacher, HS 3) 
 
As this teacher points out, without the proper tools, it may be difficult for school 
leaders to spot potential achievement gaps or design improvement plans for at-risk 
students.   
In terms of search, many search processes themselves were technology 
based, for example when teachers used online lesson planning websites or when 
administrators conducted technical searches for new improvement strategies or 
programs.  If technology did not run smoothly, decision-makers redirected their 
searches away from technical searches and toward human searches (i.e. word-of-
mouth recommendations).  In some cases, this meant that searches became 
constrained by familiarity and, if the decision-maker’s network were local, 
geography.  Another potential outcome was that searches became drawn out, 
delayed, or eliminated all together.  Decision-makers in nearly half of the schools in 
the sample mentioned that they would have loved to use technology to help them 
manage data and target individual student needs, but they lacked the time or 
support to find appropriate programs.  This problem affected teachers as they 
searched for strategies for their classroom, but it also impacted administrators and 
other school-level personnel who were unable to spend as much time as they would 
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like finding the right ways to support their teachers.  Said one high school teacher 
leader:   
 
"I don’t think I’ve made as many changes as I hoped to.  I think when I went 
through the classes and I thought about a lot of the group efforts and 
business and contacting business and getting them involved in my classroom, 
I think I had good intentions.  I wrote some proposals that made sense and I 
don’t feel like I have really followed through, whether it’s because of the time 
factor or whatever." (Teacher, HS 1) 
 
This teacher’s struggles demonstrate that searches for technology-based programs 
and strategies were inherently more complicated than traditional searches for new 
improvement strategies.  Because technology required a capital investment in 
hardware, decision-makers needed to search both for the programs themselves and 
for grants to fund the purchase of the programs.  This teacher leader was looking to 
local businesses for support but had trouble finding the time to do that sort of 
networking.   
 Finally, the decision point became complicated when teachers anticipated 
difficulties implementing technology-based programs and strategies in their 
classrooms.  In particular, decision-makers became skittish if they thought that 
technology problems would detract from successful implementation of new 
programs.  This was the case for three schools in my sample.  In the most striking 
example, a high school (HS 1) delayed the rollout of its new math curriculum by a 
whole year, deciding instead to invest in teacher training around new technology 
tools.  The principal’s reasoning was that the school could only unveil one major 
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initiative at a time, and that an investment in technology tools would have to push 
other decisions to the side. 
Spotlight on Search 
 
 The cross-cutting effects of decision-making constraints presented above 
highlight the fact that schools feel enormous amounts of internal and external 
pressure to change their decision-making processes.  In some cases, this pressure 
helps them to focus and refine their approach, and in some cases pressure has the 
opposite effect, essentially confounding and muddling the decision-making process.  
In Table 5.2, I show how each of the constraints identified by the schools in my 
sample affected every nearly stage of the decision-making process, including 
problem identification, search, and decision-making.  Reading this table may leave 
one with the misleading impression, however, that each stage of the decision-
making process was equally vulnerable to internal and external bounds, when in 
fact the search process was by far the most vulnerable phase of the three.   
 To determine the differential effects of decision-making constraints on each 
of the individual phases of decision-making, I went back to the detailed profiles that 
I had created for each school in my sample, which in turn were based on a careful 
read of the interview data pertaining to each school.  In these profiles, I detailed the 
collective effect of constraints on problem identification, search, and the decision 
point.  After reviewing each of the profiles, I defined the whether these constraints 
had a “minor” or a “major” influence on each of the decision-making phases.  A 
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minor influence was where, on the whole, constraints were specific to an isolated 
incident and did not affect the school or district’s larger approach to decision-
making, whereas a major influence was one that affected a broad set of stakeholders 
and permanently changed the way the approach to decision-making.   
Table 5.2 details the results of this analysis.  For each school I list the major 
constraints that respondents identified within their school or district, omitting only 
the “policy mandates” category, since this was a precondition for all but two schools 
in the sample.  I then list whether the constraints had either a major or minor 
influence on the individual decision-making stages. 
Table 5.2 
School-Level Analysis of Differential Constraint Impact 
 
School Major Constraints Problem 
ID 
Search Decision 
Point  
ELEM 1 Time, Technology, Human Capital Major Major Minor 
ELEM 2 Community, Time Minor Minor Major 
ELEM 3 Human Capital, Budget, Community, Time Major Major Major 
ELEM 4 Community, Budget, Time Minor Major Minor 
HS 1 Time, Technology Minor Major Minor 
HS 2 Human Capital, Budget, Community, Time Major Major Minor 
HS 3 Human Capital, Budget Major Major Major 
HS 4 Human Capital, Community, Budget Major Major Major 
 
In Table 5.2, I show that the bounds on the decision-making environment 
were a major influence on the search phase for seven of the eight schools in the 
sample.  Contrast this with the problem identification phase (five of the eight) and 
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decision point phase (four of the eight), and search emerges as the phase that is 
most vulnerable to internal and external decision-making constraints.   
This finding is not directly in contrast with the literature, as several authors 
(e.g. Farley-Ripple, 2008; Coburn, 2006; Gross et al., 2005; Honig, 2003) point out 
that searches can quickly become chaotic or even omitted when the decision-
making environment becomes constrained. My research is the first, however, to 
specifically highlight the vulnerability of search as directly compared with the 
problem identification and decision point phases of the overarching decision-
making process.  Especially given the great number of resources dedicated to 
studying evidence use and data-driven decision-making, this work suggests that 
researchers pay more attention in the future to search.  
Summary 
 
Based on the descriptions above, I characterize schools as linear decision-
makers that operate under moderate-to-severe constraints.  Many of my findings in 
this chapter are in line with the literature.  My findings confirm that schools acutely 
feel the pressure from performance-based accountability systems (e.g. Stecher et al., 
2008; Hamilton, Berends & Stecher, 2005; Linn, 2005), and are affected by other 
external constraints as well, including community politics and budgetary limitations 
(Hess, 1999; Kingdon, 1995).  They are also affected by internal constraints like 
school culture (Abelman & Elmore, 1999), leadership (Coburn & Talbert, 2006; 
Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Hess, 1999); and time (Gross et al., 2005).  
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My findings also depart from the literature on search and decision-making in 
several ways.  Although the literature identifies access to information as a major 
search constraint (Gilovich, 1991; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nelson et al., 1987), I 
found little evidence that school and district decision-makers lacked access to 
materials that would inform their decision-making processes.  Even those schools 
and districts that reported they were under extreme pressure from accountability 
systems to improve student performance said that they had access to all the 
information they needed – it was simply a question of finding the time and money to 
make good use of that information. The literature also identifies district size as a 
constraint on the decision-making process (Hannaway & Kimball, 1998), as districts 
that are too large have overly rigid processes and districts that are too small lack 
capacity.  Although none of the schools in the sample were from extremely large 
urban districts, I found that the larger districts in my sample did not overly 
structure their decision-making process.  My research does confirm the findings on 
the other end of the scale, however, as I found that small districts lacked sufficient 
human capital to make decisions in a structured, thoughtful manner.   
Finally, my research highlights the especially vulnerable nature of the search 
process in schools and districts.  Although Table 5.1 displays how internal and 
external constraints generally press upon all phases of the decision-making process, 
the detailed findings reflect the fact that decision-makers often compromise, 
truncate, or eliminate the search phase before they compromise the problem 
identification or decision point phases.  Additionally, as I detail in the previous 
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section, I found that the compounding effects of decision-making constraints 
affected search more than the other two phases.  Although the decision-making 
literature does highlight the vulnerable nature of the search process (see, for 
example Coburn, 2006; Honig, 2003), my work is the first to systematically analyze 
constraints that pertain to each of the decision-making phases, which highlights the 
differential affect that constraints have on search as opposed to problem 
identification and the decision point.   
In the next chapter, I provide a set of decision-making typologies that 
describe the different decision-making approaches that I observed in my sample 
over the three-year study period.  These typologies provide additional insight into 
why schools are differentially affected by the bounds inherent in their internal and 
external environments.  More importantly, however, they form a framework for 
researchers to categorize the range of decision-making approaches, taking into 
account districts’ unique context, including their culture, mission, and contextual 
constraints.   
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CHAPTER 6: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 
 
The Need for a Framework 
 
In Chapters Four and Five, I found that complexity, ambiguity, organizational 
structure, and internal philosophies all shaped the decision-making process in the 
schools and districts in my sample.  Since context matters for decision-making, it 
stands that there should be a way to categorize schools’ differential responses to 
environmental pressures, including that of performance-based accountability.  In 
this chapter, I present a framework for understanding the types of approaches that 
schools have toward decision-making.  Specifically, I identify four typologies of 
decision-making behavior. 
 A framework categorizing decision-making behavior is a valuable 
contribution because it links contextual factors to school and district approaches to 
decision-making.  Although some authors offer frameworks to describe the decision-
making environment in schools and districts, their work is narrower in scope than 
my own.  Coburn and Talbert (2006), for example, look through the lens of 
performance-based accountability at the different ways that district leaders think 
about the validity of evidence use in schools, ultimately offering four categories of 
conceptions of evidence use.  Their framework helps to shed light on how, even 
within just one district, people can have fundamentally different assumptions about 
the value, validity and purpose of evidence.  But their work is limited to the problem 
identification phase of the decision-making process, and therefore touches on only a 
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narrow portion of my conceptual framework, which attempts to operationalize the 
decision-making process as a whole. 
 Another framework from the literature is Abelman and Elmore’s (1999) 
work on internal accountability.  This framework posits that three interrelated 
concepts shape a school’s response to performance-based accountability systems:  
individual conceptions of responsibility; shared norms and expectations; and formal 
or informal conceptions to accountability, both internal and external.  Again, this 
framework provides valuable guidance on a limited portion of my theoretical 
framework, namely the role that internal constraints play in bounding the decision-
making environment in the context of performance-based accountability.   
 There are two efforts to establish frameworks that look at the decision-
making process as a whole.  The first is Gross, Kirst, Holland & Luschei’s (2005) 
framework, in which the authors study how decision-making constraints operate in 
the context of performance-based accountability.  Their framework helped greatly 
to inform the work of the overarching IES-funded study, because it detailed the 
different buckets of strategies that schools might select when they face potential 
sanctions for failing to meet achievement targets.  These buckets included remedial 
strategies, curriculum strategies, instructional practice, and organizational changes.  
In the Gross et al. (2005) framework, the authors define what “peripheral,” 
“moderate,” and “core” strategies look like in each of the buckets.   The framework, 
however, has two limitations – one major and one minor – that impacted my ability 
to apply directly it to my theoretical framework.  The major limitation is that is it 
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more concerned with the outcome of the decision-making process – that is, the 
actual decision – than it is with the process or approach that the school took to 
arrive at that decision.  The authors concluded that the schools in their sample were 
chaotic organizations, conforming to Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can 
model of decision-making and did not explore the various contextual conditions that 
might lead to variation from school to school.  The second point is a minor one – 
their sample contained only high schools, which arguably are not as regularly 
responsive to the pressures of performance-based accountability systems because 
they contain only one tested grade.   
 The framework that is most directly applicable to my work comes from 
Farley-Ripple (2008), who studied the decision-making processes in one district in 
Delaware.  She divided the decision-making process into components that were 
aligned with my theoretical framework, including organizational characteristics, the 
characteristics of decision-makers themselves, the characteristics of the evidence 
that decision-makers employ, and the characteristics of the decisions themselves.  
While her findings in each of these areas greatly informed my work (including my 
theoretical framework), her study did not take the extra step of distinguishing 
between different approaches to the decision-making process, which is a function of 
the fact that the scope of her research was of multiple decisions within just one 
district.   
The literature lacks an empirically based framework that describes the 
differential approaches that schools and districts might take when they are called 
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upon by state and federal performance-based accountability systems to 
demonstrate student achievement gains.  In previous chapters, I have demonstrated 
that many different internal and external forces shape the decision-making 
environment in schools and districts, leading them to use certain types of evidence, 
lean on certain sources for support, and involve a variety of different stakeholders 
while developing strategies for improvement.  I attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature by offering a framework that uses my findings from the comparative case 
study to establish four typologies of decision-making behavior. 
 
Conceptualizing Decision-Making Approaches 
 
 Before I present the framework, I present the assumptions behind it.  First, I 
take as a given that there is no one best approach to decision-making.  I assume that 
all decision-makers in public education strive to make decisions that are optimal for 
their schools, by which I mean that the results of their decisions are aligned to their 
stated objectives.  In the context of performance-based accountability systems, one 
objective is likely the improvement of student scores on the state standardized test, 
but I do not assume that this is the only goal toward which school leaders aspire.  
Thus there are no “optimal” decision-making approaches, but rather multiple 
decision-making methods by which schools may, if they avoid potential pitfalls, 
achieve their goals.   
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 Additionally, I assume that schools are dynamic, not static, organizations.  
When a school’s mission, philosophy and leadership changes, so too can the school’s 
decision-making approach.  As I depict in the framework, HS 3 spans two categories 
over the three-year study period and HS 4 spans three categories over the same 
time period.  Categorizing schools as one typology or another does not brand the 
school with that classification.  The final year of data collection for this dissertation 
was in the spring of 2011, and it is highly possible that these schools have changed 
their decision-making approaches since that time.  I define the four approaches to 
encompass a full range of responses, with the expectation that a school making a 
change in its decision-making approach will still fit into one of these basic 
categories.   
 In my original review of the literature in Chapter One, I identified four 
potential dimensions across which schools decision-making approaches might vary 
(see Table 6.1).  The first was the degree to which schools and district looked within 
the school walls for information versus exploring externally validated sources of 
information (Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002; Abelman & Elmore, 
1999).  The second hypothesized relationship was whether a school or district 
prioritized human sources of information over technical information (Honig & 
Coburn, 2007; Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh, Pane & Hamilton, 2005; Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002). The third relationship was 
whether a school pursued a top-down approach to decision-making or a bottom-up 
approach (Bidwell, 2001; Weick, 1976; Weber, 1947).  Finally, the fourth 
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hypothesized relationship was whether a school or district made decisions in a 
linear manner or whether their process was more chaotic (Cohen, March & Olsen, 
1972; Simon, 1955).  
 
Table 6.1 
Literature-Based Dimensions that Influence Schools’ Decision-Making Approach 
 
Internal      <----------------------------------------------------------------------->   External 
Human       <----------------------------------------------------------------------->   Technical 
Top-Down <----------------------------------------------------------------------->   Bottom-Up 
Linear         <----------------------------------------------------------------------->   Non-Linear  
 
My findings in Chapter Four, however, suggest that schools are by-and-large 
linear decision-makers that pursue middle-out strategies to decision-making.  
Without sufficient variation in the sample along these dimensions, I was able to 
exclude them as factors when creating the framework.   
To develop the framework, I read through each of the individual case study 
notes and write-ups, and I revisited the case-ordered descriptive matrices for 
information on the internal/external and human/technical dimensions of decision-
making behavior.  I then categorized each school along a continuum for each of the 
two dimensions, where the x-axis was internal/external and the y-axis was 
human/technical.  Visually depicting where each school lay helped me to create the 
  
 
four typologies because it showed where groupings occurred.  Once I had placed the 
schools along these two spectrums, I began to 
provide meaningful characterizations of each typology.  
eight different groupings 
groups until I had four categories that encompassed the full range of decision
making behavior in my sample.  Finally, I assigned a name to each of the discrete 
categories.   
Figure 6.1 
Two Dimensions of Decision
170
group them in ways that would 
I developed as
of behavior and then consolidated and re-consolidated the 
-Making  
 many as 
-
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 Figure 6.1 represents the final consolidated version with the four typologies 
that comprise the framework.  In the figure, the clouds represent the variation that 
can exist among schools within a particular typology.  In several cases, it proved 
difficult to place a school in the same group over the three years of the study due to 
drastic changes within the school or district (for example, a cultural shift that came 
with a new set of administrators).  In these cases, I split the school up by year, 
noting which typology fit for each specific year of the study.  Below, I present the 
formal framework (Table 6.2) and explain, using specific examples from the cases, 
the common strengths, common pitfalls, and supportive structures of each of the 
typologies.
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Table 6.2   
Decision-Making Approach Typologies 
  Name Description Common Strengths Potential Pitfalls Supportive 
Structures 
Sample 
Examples 
Evidence-
Based DM 
Schools highly value technical 
information.  Schools favor 
internal data to inform problem 
identification and external 
technical data to inform search.  
• Robust problem ID through 
internal data analysis 
• Scientific evidence of success 
• Robust search  
• Schools as innovators 
• “Over-testing” 
• Over-diagnosis of the problem 
• Ignores local trends 
• Blindness to school context 
• Exclusionary  
RTI, curriculum 
review cycles, 
data analysis 
teams, piloting 
ELEM 2,   
HS 3 (Y2, Y3)  
HS 4 (Y3) 
Organic 
DM 
Schools look from within to 
identify problems and search for 
solutions, examining both 
human and technical sources of 
information.   
• Robust problem ID 
• Collaborative, inclusive 
• Leverages expertise and 
experience at all levels 
• Robust search 
• “Over-testing” 
• Ignores local trends 
• Strong voices may overpower 
DM process 
• Search limited by geography 
and familiarity 
RTI, PLCs, 
committees, 
piloting 
ELEM 4 
HS 1  
HS 4 (Y2) 
Instinctual 
DM 
Schools make decisions based on 
gut reactions to problems, ideas 
for improvement.  Primary 
sources include past experience, 
beliefs, and information from 
trusted colleagues and friends. 
• Leverages expertise and 
experience of key decision-
makers  
• Enables quick decision-making 
• Accounts for school/district 
context  
• Highly dependent upon 
leadership orientation, district 
capacity 
• Exclusionary 
• Confirmatory bias in search 
Improvement 
teams, 
committees 
ELEM 3, 
HS 3 (Y1) 
HS 4 (Y1) 
Externally 
Validated 
DM 
Schools lean on external sources 
of information above internal 
sources.  Schools use both 
human and technical sources of 
validated information, but 
generally place greater trust in 
professional networks and 
neighboring districts’ success 
stories.  
• Enables quick decision-making 
• Accounts for school/district 
context 
• Strong community support 
• Ability to learn from others’ 
experiences in implementation 
 
• Poor use of internal technical, 
human data 
• Districts more likely to be 
followers of trends, rather than 
trend-setters 
• Confirmatory bias in search 
• Blindness to school context 
Local networks, 
professional 
associations 
ELEM 1, 
HS 2 
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Evidence-Based Decision-Making.  I found that schools using an evidence-based 
approach to decision-making highly valued technical information over human 
information, although they got their sources of information from both internal and 
external sources.  These schools invested a large amount of time, energy, and 
resources into the problem identification phase of decision-making by adopting new 
methods of collecting school-level data.  Evidence-based schools usually had in place 
at least one benchmark testing implement,  and this robust investment in identifying 
problems set a solid foundation for the search and decision-point phases.  ELEM 2, 
for example, created a “War Room” for collecting and analyzing data from internal 
sources such as benchmark exams and student report cards, as well as external 
sources of information such as the data gleaned from the state standardized tests.  
HS 3 and HS 4 also invested in the rigorous implementation of benchmarking tools 
during the duration of the study. 
The experience in ELEM 2 also highlights a potential area of tension for 
schools falling into the Evidence-Based Decision-Making typology, namely that 
district stakeholders (for example, teachers and parents) might complain that the 
culture of testing became overbearing for students and take time away from 
classroom instruction.  Additionally, a problem that all three schools in this category 
experienced was that school leaders were likely to over-diagnose the problem, 
which in turn led to an over-prescription of solutions, as school leaders saw every 
data point as a need for a full-blown school-wide solution.  In ELEM 2, a district 
administrator admitted that part of the district’s challenge was to put in check its 
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instinct to find specific solutions to each identified problem, regardless of how 
miniscule that problem might be.  “We need to get a little bit better at looking at 
what becomes the litmus test for what we take in as the new thing we take in from 
down the pike,” he said (District Administrator, ELEM 2). 
One way that school leaders in these three schools attempted to avoid the 
“over-diagnosis” or “over-prescription” pitfall was to meet regularly to discuss the 
data and analyze the various issues facing the school as a whole.  For ELEM 2, this 
took the form of the “War Room” and using the Response-to-Intervention (RTI) 
framework as a supportive structure to reinforce discussions around internal data 
analysis.  In HS 3, the principal employed school improvement planning teams by 
the second year of the study, and he used this structure to gain a variety of 
perspectives across the school about the meanings and appropriate uses for student 
data.  And in the third year of the study, the principal in HS 4 instituted a committee 
structure in which teachers met by grade level, by content area, and across the 
school to identify problems using technical data from the benchmark exams.    
For the search phase, the three schools in the Evidence-Based Decision-
Making typology depended on external technical information, such as professional 
associations, nationally vetted technical information on intervention programs (for 
example, the What Works Clearinghouse), and state-led technical assistance 
seminars.  For these schools, human sources of information still played a valuable 
role in helping schools to select new programs and strategies, but the order of 
operations put technical sources as decision-makers’ first source.  School leaders 
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said that they mainly used word-of-mouth recommendations as a tool to convince 
school board and community members of the need for a new program or strategy.  
The principal of HS 4, who took over in the second year of the study, reported that 
he was constantly scouring the Internet for education publications that would clue 
him into new potential improvement programs and strategies.  Once he found a 
program that sounded interesting to him, he would ask the teachers in the high 
school for their opinion – but only in that order.  A district administrator described 
the principal’s search philosophy: 
 
“[The principal] is the guy who will cite the most recent best practice, 
research-based information until you are blue in the face.  He attends 
national conferences, he teaches for the collegiate level so he is always 
forcing himself to learn.  He completely believes that his job is to be well read 
and glean from what it is that he believes best practice is based on and what 
really works.  He is a research-based guy.”  (District Administrator, HS 4) 
 
Although the other decision-makers in the school and district may not originally 
have been as inclined to lean on technical sources of information, the principal 
reoriented the school culture over the two years that I observed him, making the 
district as a whole focus on technical sources of information to a much greater 
degree than was the case before his tenure.   
This approach highlights both strengths and weaknesses for evidence-based 
decision-making schools.  On the positive side, schools are more likely to invest in 
programs that have been validated through rigorous testing, including randomized 
control trial designs and other rigorous quasi-experimental testing.  Additionally, 
staying abreast of new advances in educational improvement provides schools with 
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an opportunity to be innovators in their field, unbound by the typical constraints of 
geography and familiarity.  On the negative side, however, schools might place too 
much value on external research, looking for “what works” for a broad swath of 
schools without careful evaluation of the specific markers that would make a 
particular program a good fit for a school’s specific context and needs.  An example 
here is HS 3, where school leaders searched for and selected a new math curriculum 
during the second year of the study.  The program they selected was nationally 
recognized and had a strong record of success in raising student test scores.  It also, 
however, represented an entirely new way of teaching math, and teachers nearly 
uniformly reported that they hated the program.  By the third year of the study, 
school leaders said that they regretted their decision.   
One way that ELEM 2 avoided this problem was to involve school and district 
personnel during the search phase by instituting a robust “pre-implementation” 
process for program selection.  And by Year 3, HS 3 had learned from its mistakes, 
forming an improvement planning team that gathered input from teachers and 
administrators across different departments within the high school to inform search 
and decision-making.   
In summary, schools employing an evidence-based approach to decision-
making generally made deliberate, informed decisions around improvement that 
were based on technical evidence of success.  These decisions took time and highly 
skilled staff at both the school and district levels to execute well.  HS 3 and HS 4 
spent years trying to become evidence-based decision-making organizations, 
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achieving this goal only at the end of the study period and thanks to leaders that 
pushed this approach with strong conviction and authority.  As the lessons from the 
schools in this typology show, the successful implementation of an evidence-based 
approach requires systematic use of data to inform processes, and that data must 
become part of the fabric of the school or district, with stakeholders at all levels in 
accordance that data informs their strategy around instructional improvement.   
 
Organic Decision-Making.  Schools following an organic decision-making process 
typically gathered information from a variety of sources internal to the district and 
processed that information in a way that involved multiple stakeholders.  Although 
school-level managers (the principal, assistant principal, specialists, etc.) managed 
the flow of information, ideas for improvement were encouraged from anywhere 
and anyone.  Accordingly, teachers played an important role because they believed 
that their observations and ideas might well turn into improvement solutions that 
could be implemented school- or district-wide.   
Although the name “organic” suggests that ideas might sift through to middle 
managers in a haphazard fashion, there were several mechanisms that provided 
structure around organic decision-making.  Two of the three schools that fell into 
the Organic Decision-Making typology employed Professional Learning 
Communities (PLCs) as a way to gather feedback from teachers.  PLCs are an 
organizational strategy that allow teachers to meet in groups to discuss learning and 
instructional techniques, challenges, and ideas.  The structure of PLCs varied from 
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district to district – in ELEM 4, teacher groups met by grade levels in afterschool 
periods, and in HS 1 they met by area of instructional expertise during common 
planning blocks.  The common thread with these two schools was that teacher 
expertise was a valued component of the decision-making process.  Another way 
that Organic Decision-Makers involved a broad constituency of actors was by 
establishing committees to address specific needs in the school. ELEM 4, for 
example, had a strong committee structure that was working on a number of areas, 
including aligning the school’s report card to the state standards.  A district 
administrator summed up the school’s PLC and committee approach to search and 
decision-making:   
 
“It gets down to, is it useable? Is that usable? Does the teacher find value in 
it? Does the teacher feel equipped? Do they feel prepared to be able to 
implement this? So with all that in mind, with this really firm investment in 
our teachers and our implementers, that’s why we want to go to this model of 
professional learning communities, so we’re going through that process right 
now, and when you talk about what works and doesn’t work, from a research 
standpoint, I mean, we’re going through that now. We have all these 
committees formed. We have administrators, teachers, school-based, 
department-based, we have central office based people on these 
committees.”  (District Administrator, ELEM 2) 
 
HS 4 also instituted a number of committees that were tasked with addressing a 
broad range of issues, including student discipline, curriculum selection, and 
student drug testing.   
Finally, organic decision-makers often piloted new programs before fully 
implementing them.  A teacher in HS 1, for example, came up with the idea to 
institute a “Study Lab” for struggling students in math.  In the first year, the program 
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was voluntary and only available to a select set of identified students.  By Year 2, the 
program was an official program in the school that was mandatory for a larger 
group of identified struggling students.  And by Year 3, the district had expanded the 
Study Lab idea to the middle school. 
These three supportive structures highlight the emphasis that organic 
decision-makers placed on internally generated information.  This information was 
slightly skewed toward human sources, as shown in the schools' placement in 
Figure 6.1, but decision-makers in these schools also considered technical sources of 
internal information, specifically student-level performance data.  In this way, 
organic decision-makers had at their fingertips multiple sources of information on 
student performance to create a plan for improvement.   
With this approach came three potential pitfalls.  The first was that schools 
might fail to combine human and technical sources of internal information in a 
thoughtful and cohesive manner.  In the second year of interviews, HS 4 exemplified 
this problem.  The principal was new to the job and accepted teachers’ suggestions 
for improvement without checking first to see if their suggestions were in line with 
the problems identified from benchmark exams.  Although the school may have 
collected both human and technical data for improvement, the principal did not 
have the leadership skills necessary to narrow the field of options to those that were 
both supported by the data and by school-level personnel.  As a result, the school 
pursued many different strategies and quickly depleted the school’s budget.   
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Another potential pitfall was that, by focusing almost entirely on internal 
sources of information, schools did not always learn effectively from common 
practices in the field.  If a neighboring district had trouble implementing a new 
improvement strategy, it would be useful for the decision-making district to have 
this knowledge a priori to the decision point and include it as a factor in the 
decision-making process.   The principal of ELEM 4, for example, said she did not 
take advantage of the state technical assistance agency (or “Intermediate Unit”) in 
the local area because she preferred to meet with actors internal to the district.  And 
yet she admitted that the Intermediate Unit was doing trainings that were aligned to 
a number of district initiatives.  
Finally, a third pitfall was that Organic Decision-Makers were highly 
influenced by the leadership characteristics of specific individuals at all levels across 
the district, and just one strong voice could overpower discussions and harm a 
district’s culture of collaboration.  In HS 1, for example, the school depended a great 
deal on its technology coordinator, who worked with teachers to integrate 
technology into their instructional techniques.  Said the high school principal: 
 
“If he ever leaves, I’m going right after him.  Because he is the guy that I lean 
on.  If I’ve got in-service time, I’ll say, ‘Here’s what we got, here’s my goal, 
now run with it.’  He’ll run with it.  He’ll set it up, he’ll bring the people in.  
And that’s me delegating to him.  It would take me twice as long to organize 
it, and it probably wouldn’t be as good.  He knows who the people are, he 
knows what we need, and he’ll go out and set something like that up.  Having 
that kind of person with those skills has been essential for us.” (Principal, HS 
1) 
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The principal freely admits that the organic nature of decision-making in his school 
was largely dependent upon the skills of one person, who personally gathered 
information from teachers and facilitated the entire decision-making process.  ELEM 
4 attempted to avoid this pitfall by hiring and promoting personnel who strongly 
believed in the participatory nature of the decision-making process.  The principal 
for ELEM 4 was widely respected throughout the district as an organic decision-
maker, and was eventually promoted to an administrative position in the district 
office where her primary objective was to create stronger communications between 
the various elementary buildings in the district.  Her first initiative was to force 
principals to visit the other elementary schools to learn from practices in the other 
schools.  In this way, the district invested in human capital as a way to sustain its 
philosophy around organic decision-making.  
 
Instinctual Decision-Making.  Even in the age of high-stakes accountability when 
school leaders are constantly bombarded with external accountability data to 
inform their decisions for improvement, some schools still relied primarily on their 
instincts as educators to make decisions.  The schools and districts from my sample 
that fall into this group of Instinctual Decision-Makers generally favored human 
sources of information over technical ones, and internal sources (slightly) over 
external ones.  In some instances, these preferences represented an intentional 
approach to school improvement; in others, it was the result of low levels of district 
capacity.   
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HS 4 (in Year 1) was an example of the former, as administrators at the 
school and district level rested on the assumption that their experience in the field, 
their familiarity with their district’s context, and their in-depth knowledge of 
student needs would set the stage for informed decision-making around 
improvement.  Personnel in this school remarked that technical information such as 
standardized test data only confirmed what they already knew to be true about 
areas for growth and improvement. For this reason, the decision-making process in 
HS 4 was highly dependent upon the personalities, experience, and beliefs of the 
decision-makers themselves.  The high school principal in HS 4, for example, had 
been the principal for ten years and believed that his experience would guide the 
high school to make the best decisions for its students, regardless of whether his 
opinions were shared among teachers and other administrative staff.  
 Although some schools might consciously choose to employ an instinctual 
approach to decision-making, for others this approach was the fallback when the 
district lacked capacity to adequately collect and interpret technical information.  
ELEM 3 was an example of such a school.  The district was small and the 
superintendent was overstretched in her duties – the curriculum director position 
remained vacant for the three years of this study due to budgetary constraints.  With 
insufficient capacity to analyze research, attend conferences, and join professional 
associations, ELEM 3 had great difficulty finding a new set of curriculum materials 
for math.  By Year 3, the superintendent felt that she had to select new materials 
that were aligned to the standards, and she worked with the principal of the other 
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elementary school (not ELEM 3) to select a new program.  She was fully aware that 
her process was exclusionary and based on her personal beliefs and experiences, 
but she lamented that she just didn’t have the time or the money to fully explore the 
research on other potential programs.   
As the experiences of HS 4 and ELEM 3 highlight, the Instinctual Decision-
Making approach is only as reliable as the instincts of the leader or leaders making 
the decisions, which the psychological research suggests is subject to myriad 
cognitive flaws and misunderstandings (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Simon, 1972).  The predispositions, experiences, and beliefs of 
decision-makers can lead to a confirmatory bias in decision-making (Lord, Ross & 
Lepper, 1979), wherein school leaders only search for programs that meet their 
preconceived notions of what will work in their schools.  Findings from my sample 
show that these preconceived notions could limit the field of options and render 
searches superficial.  For example, when school leaders at HS 3 (in Year 1) searched 
for a new reading intervention program, the principal asked the reading specialists 
to present him with three different options.  Although the specialists did as they 
were asked, they favored one option far above the others, and their searches were 
perfunctory.  In the end, the principal chose the favored program, and the search 
itself – which involved reaching out to neighboring districts – only served to confirm 
a decision that they had already made informally.   
Additionally, even in schools with charismatic leaders, there was a tendency 
for decision-making to become exclusionary.  Although instinctual decision-makers 
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often made decisions quickly, they did so at the expense of a thorough and inclusive 
inquiry into the underlying reasons for achievement gaps and the vetting of 
potential solutions.  In the first year of the study, HS 3 and HS 4 both relied on 
school leaders’ instincts to make decisions.  While the principals in both schools 
touted the new improvement solutions underway – a new math curriculum in HS 3 
and a new remediation tool in HS 4 – teachers in both schools expressed 
disappointment and frustration that they had been excluded from the decision-
making process.  By the end of the first year of the study, school-level administrators 
in HS 3 had already recognized that they needed to take steps to include a larger 
group of people in the decision-making process, because excluding teachers and 
other personnel had created conflicting philosophies and beliefs around 
improvement strategies, which in turn impacted buy-in to new decisions for 
improvement.  In response to this need, HS 3 decided to establish improvement 
teams and committees that were tasked with solving specific problems.  
 My sample of Instinctual Decision-Making schools also shows that this 
typology may also be a way station for schools and districts that are under new 
leadership.  While new school or district leaders find their footing and establish new 
processes and procedures around problem identification, search, and decision-
making, they may need to rely on their gut instincts and predispositions.  Both HS 3 
and HS 4 fit into this category.  HS 3’s principal was new and he wanted to use 
internal technical data to make decisions, but he didn’t yet have the appropriate 
benchmarking tools in place.  By Year 2, he had implemented a benchmarking exam 
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and was avidly working to become a consumer of external research; in essence, he 
had turned his school into an Evidence-Based Decision-Making organization.  HS 4 
was also experiencing a transition, as both the high school principal and the district 
superintendent were set to leave at the end of the school year.  Because he had been 
in the school for so long, the principal had made decisions based off his instincts 
about school needs, student deficiencies, and staff areas of professional 
development.  The new principal who took over in Year 2 changed the school’s 
decision-making approach to an Organic Decision-Making approach (and, in Year 3, 
an Evidence-Based Decision-Making approach).  Instinctual Decision-Making does 
not have to function in this way, however.  Although there were no schools in my 
sample that intentionally selected an instinctual approach as a permanent method 
for decision-making, the Year 1 data from HS 4 suggests that this approach could be 
a realistic and achievable goal for districts that have sufficient capacity both in 
terms of resources and human capital, as well as consistent leadership.   
 
Externally Validated Decision-Making.  This final category describes schools that 
valued information from external sources above internal sources.  Schools leaders in 
this typology were accustomed to reaching out to external partners, including 
friends and colleagues in neighboring districts as well as national third-party 
reviews of potential programs and strategies.  Although these schools consumed 
both human and technical information, they trusted human resources more than 
technical ones – in other words, they saw research based programs as good, they 
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valued them much higher if neighboring districts were already using these 
programs with some success.  These schools were copiers rather than innovators, as 
they were rarely the first to adopt a new strategy that did not have a long track 
record of success.  In HS 2, for example, the principal reiterated over and over that 
he valued improvement programs that were “research-based” because they would 
then have a greater chance of success in his school.  But he also reiterated how 
important it was to his community that he validated these research-base decisions 
with neighboring schools and districts.  As is evidenced by this principal’s account of 
his approach, decisions in Externally Validated Decision Making districts were 
somewhat less contentious because community members, (i.e. parents and school 
boards) generally liked to copy practices from neighboring successful schools.  
 The two schools in this typology also highlighted several potential pitfalls 
with the Externally Validated approach.  Although school leaders stood to learn a 
great deal from human and technical reports of programmatic success, they tended 
to ignore contextual factors specific to their school or district that may have 
impacted program implementation success.  For example, ELEM 1 adopted a 
standardized, scripted curriculum for reading because the What Works 
Clearinghouse reported that the program was effective at creating measurable gains 
in student academic achievement.  The school’s reading scores, however, remained 
low and even slipped over time – by the second year of our visits, the school had 
entered School Improvement I.  Teachers in the school said that they hated the 
program because it didn’t allow for instructional flexibility with their students.  
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Although the program might have been externally validated as “successful,” it did 
not align well with the culture of the school.  
 A related pitfall is that the schools in this typology tended to select solutions 
that did not align well with identified problems.  Again in ELEM 1, the district was 
looking to adopt a new math program, even though it was in reading that the real 
barriers to improvement existed.  Although this school had instituted benchmark 
exams to measure student growth, it was not effectively using this internally-
generated information to inform decisions for improvement.  
 ELEM 1 and HS 2 highlight the need for Externally Validated Decision Making 
schools to invest in various supportive mechanisms that expand their reach into 
technical and human networks.  On the technical side, school leaders in these two 
schools did not fully utilize technical information from professional associations and 
technical assistance agencies, which could have provided timely information on the 
latest research, access to education conferences, and other materials.  District 
administrators in HS 2, for example, said that they were working to change district 
culture to become more actively involved in searching for a broader set of technical 
sources of information, but in general they still tended to familiar sources of 
information such as their informal networks with neighboring districts.  The 
principal of the high school in the same district where ELEM 1 was located was a 
possible exception to this trend.  He proactively looked at technical resources and 
human resources, reporting that he weighed them equally.  When evaluating any 
new program or strategy, he asked probing questions about potential barriers to 
  
 188
adoption, price, competing programs on the market, and ease of implementation.  
Although this principal’s approach was not common to the district, his approach 
points the way for Externally Validated Decision Makers to make efficient use of 
external information. 
Academic Value of the Framework 
 
 The framework that I present in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2 advances what we 
know about how schools under pressure from performance-based accountability 
systems approach the “what now?” question.  Because I designed the framework to 
fit for any school operating in this context (which, in 2013, was essentially any 
public, non-charter school), researchers can apply the framework to their own 
samples to see if it holds up to scrutiny.  Broader use of the framework in the field 
would allow researchers a lens through which to examine inter-school differences in 
response to performance-based accountability pressures.  While it may be intuitive 
that schools act differently when the state identifies them as needing to improve, 
this framework allows them to categorize their responses on two literature-based 
dimensions and determine where they fall among four typologies.  Additionally, 
knowing where a school or district falls on the framework is helpful because it 
provides insight into an organization’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as the 
opportunities and challenges to decision-making.   
A nuanced feature of the framework is that it does not treat the two 
dimensions that comprise the framework – human and technical information; 
internal and external information – as a polarized dichotomous response.  In other 
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words, it allows for the fact that, in a given decision, a school may very well consult 
both internal and external information sources, as well as both human and technical 
sources.  The strength of the framework is that accounts for the fact that schools 
generally rely more on one type of information than on the other, for example by 
consulting one type of information before pursuing other options, which belies a 
fundamental belief that one type of information is more valuable or trustworthy 
than another.  In the Year 3 interview protocol for this study (see Appendix C), I 
asked respondents which types of information they used to make decisions – human 
or technical.  Every single respondent was able to identify sources in both categories 
that they used to help them identify problems, search for solutions, and select 
improvement options.  But then I asked a follow-up question: which of these sources 
did respondents trust the most?  Again, respondents were able to clearly identify 
which source of information was more trustworthy.  I did not ask the same question 
to distinguish between internal and external sources of information – instead I 
discovered this dimension through analysis – but I suspect based on my review of 
the data that a similar preference exists given the nature of respondents’ attitudes 
toward internally and externally generated information. 
Although the framework has potential to add value to the field, more 
rigorous testing is necessary to strengthen its external validity and generalizability 
to a broader set of schools.  Doing so could simply involve researchers using the 
framework as a qualitative component of studies of schools under pressure to 
improve student achievement, or it could take the form or a larger, more cohesive 
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approach to test the framework assumptions using quantitative methods.  The latter 
approach would likely involve surveying a large sample of school personnel about 
their decision-making habits and determining the degree to which their responses 
are consistent with the two-dimensions that form the backbone of the framework.  
In addition to filling a gap in the literature on decision-making and providing 
a tool for researchers, the framework can also function as a practical tool for district 
and school leaders who are looking to understand more fully the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that their schools face given their particular 
decision-making approach.  In the final chapter, I place the framework and the 
broader discussion of decision-making into the larger policy context, which includes 
the recent waivers to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the Common Core State 
Standards (CCSS), and the Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative.  I then bring my work 
into focus by relating my findings back to the original theoretical framework, 
addressing broadly the ways in which my research adds to the literature base on 
decision-making in education.  I then discuss implications of my work for 
policymakers, practitioners, and vendors, including ways in which these 
stakeholders can use the framework for practical purposes.  Finally, I address what 
the future might hold for schools, including ways in which technology might 
drastically change how schools identify, search for, and select decisions for 
improvement.   
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Contextualizing the Dissertation 
 
As demonstrated in this dissertation study, performance-based 
accountability systems lead schools to adopt a variety of different decision-making 
approaches in an effort to find the right programs and strategies that “fix” identified 
problems.  The purpose of my study was to gain further clarity into the nature of 
these approaches and analyze the various forces at play that might cause a school to 
select one approach over another.  Additionally, I provided descriptive accounts of 
how schools under pressure from accountability systems made sense of their 
environments, gathered information, and ultimately selected improvement 
programs and strategies.  To this end, I employed a comparative case study design 
that included eight Pennsylvania schools (and their corresponding district offices) 
from a variety of different circumstances, geographic regions, and student 
demographics.  What the schools had in common was this:  a mandate from the state 
to improve the scores of their students on the state test or face sanctions that would 
ratchet up year after year.  My findings highlight that all schools – even those that 
were relatively high performers – felt pressure to improve and accordingly selected 
many varied strategies for improvement.  Additionally, schools operated under 
conditions of uncertainty, which added complexity to their decision situations.   
This complexity is certain to increase even more over the next few years as 
schools are forced to contend with changes to existing accountability systems and 
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new policies around school improvement.  This study began in 2008 and data 
collection concluded in 2011.  In this small three-year window, there were a number 
of important policy changes that affected the way that schools will approach school 
improvement in the future.  The first major shift in education policy occurred in 
2009 when President Obama signed into law a stimulus bill that contained $4.35 
billion to support a “Race to the Top” (RTTT) education fund.  This fund incentivized 
states to adopt rigorous standards, create state longitudinal data systems, and lift 
existing caps on charter schools.  Pennsylvania received a Phase 3 RTTT grant in 
December 2011.  The next major policy change was the Common Core State 
Standards, which were designed by the Consortium of Chief State School Officers 
(CCSSO) in collaboration with the National Governors Association (NGA) and were 
made public in 2010.  The Common Core standards encourage states to align their 
standards and assessments to a set of rigorous college and career readiness 
standards.  Pennsylvania agreed to adopt the standards in 2010 and has been 
working since that time to align the state assessment to the standards.  Although the 
Pennsylvania State Department of Education signaled in 2013 that it might be 
backing off its commitment to the Common Core, the state also unveiled the 
“Pennsylvania Core Standards” which, similar to the Common Core, are designed 
around college and career readiness goals.  When this study began, school leaders 
had not yet heard of Common Core State Standards, but they were well aware of 
them by the final year of data collection and reported that their schools were 
scrambling to make sense of how these new standards would affect their 
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curriculum, instruction, and professional development efforts.  Finally, a third major 
policy change occurred in 2011 when the Obama Administration announced it 
would issue waivers for the proficiency requirements in No Child Left Behind if 
states agreed to meet a set of requirements, such as linking teacher evaluations to 
student test scores.  Pennsylvania received its waiver in August 2013, and this will 
change the way that the state incentivizes performance on the state standardized 
tests, which in turn could have broad implications for school decisions and 
improvement strategies.   
That these three major education policy initiatives were released in the short 
window for this study was coincidental.  However, it belies the underlying fact that 
public schools operate in an intense, complex, and dynamic accountability 
environment.  To thrive in this environment, schools themselves must adapt to new 
external stressors.  It is my hope that researchers, policymakers, and practitioners 
will use this dissertation as a means to better understand the process by which 
schools come to make decisions for improvement, including the various internal and 
external forces that constrain schools as they strive to make improvements in the 
context of ever-changing accountability mandates.   
In this concluding chapter, I return to the literature to compare my findings 
from this study to the body of research on decision-making, stating the limitations of 
my dissertation study and discussing the implications of my study for academics.  I 
then discuss the broader implications of my research for policymakers and 
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practitioners.  Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the future of decision-
making research and practice.   
 
Revisiting the Decision-Making Literature 
 
 Theorists and researchers generally agree that context can constrain the 
decision-making environment in organizations and make it very difficult for 
organizations to operate in a purely “rational” manner.  They disagree, however, on 
the degree to which these contextual constraints disrupt the decision-making 
process. Bounded rationality theorists (i.e. Forester, 1984; March, 1994; Simon, 
1972) describe the decision-making process as impacted, but not destroyed, by 
internal and external constraints.  On the other end of the Rationality-to-Chaos 
Spectrum (see Chapter One), Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) describe organizations 
as little more than “organized anarchies” (p. 1).  One goal of my dissertation study 
was to determine where schools and districts fit into this schematic.  I found that 
schools did indeed operate under powerful contextual constraints, but that these 
constraints did not cause them to devolve completely into chaos.  The degree to 
which these schools tended toward chaos depended, not surprisingly, on the 
intensity of the constraints in question.  Schools operating under conditions of 
greater ambiguity (for example, unclear or conflicting goals for improvement in a 
politically charged environment) were likely to fit the conditions put forth by 
organizational theorists such as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Weick (1976) that 
described schooling as “loosely coupled.”  On the other hand, the majority of schools 
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in my sample fit into the slightly less-constrained environment described by 
theorists of bounded rationality, suggesting that there remains a certain degree of 
rationality in decision-making in public education, as expressed through schools’ 
relatively linear, methodical approaches to decision-making.   
Although it might be tempting to determine how “rational” a school is in its 
decision-making approach, there is danger in placing each school in a specific 
location along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum, as I do in Chapter Five (Figure 
5.2).  First, placement on the Spectrum might provide context for school decision-
making practices, it tells one very little about how a particular school approaches 
the decision-making process.  Whereas the framework offered in Chapter Six is 
intended to establish a set of decision-making typologies that apply to schools and 
districts, the Spectrum is intended more as a guide to the literature.  Additionally, 
the different theories of action on the Spectrum have different assumptions about 
the nature of organizations, making it difficult to directly compare one theory to 
another.  For example, bureaucratic theory is mainly concerned how the nature of 
organizational structures impacts decisions, whereas sense-making theory looks at 
decision-making as a collection of individuals operating in tandem to come to the 
decision point.  In this way, the theories on the Spectrum offer different lenses 
through which researchers can analyze decision-making in schools and districts, 
and are not a means of strict categorization.  
Looking at the Spectrum in this way – as a guide rather than as a 
categorization tool – also highlights two realities about the decision-making 
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literature.  The first is that much of the literature comes from disciplines other than 
education.  Although there is nothing wrong about borrowing from economics, 
psychology and sociology to explain decision-making processes in public schools, 
my research points to several ways that schools are a very different type of 
organization from the ones described in the literature borrowed from other 
disciplines.  Specifically, schools are public organizations with an underage clientele, 
a de-professionalized workforce, and a flat hierarchy that makes them worthy of 
specialized attention in the decision-making literature.  Some education researchers 
have turned their attention to this area in the last ten years (e.g. Coburn, 2006; 
Honig, 2003) but more concentrated attention would be a worthy investment.  
Second, the literature depicted along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum is outdated.  
Much of the literature on decision-making comes from the 1970s, including Simon’s 
analysis of bounded rationality (1972), Tversky and Kahneman’s examination 
psychological heuristics (1974), Meyer and Rowan and Weick’s organizational 
theory analysis (1977 and 1976, respectively), and Cohen, March & Olsen’s garbage 
can theory (1972).  Although these remain seminal works in the field, organizations 
themselves have changed dramatically in forty years – they operate in an 
increasingly global environment where technology creates both increased 
opportunity as well as increased challenges for decision-making.  The ways that 
organizations identify problems, search for solutions, and make decisions for 
improvement have changed due to these advances, and the literature must be 
updated to reflect the current reality.  Furthermore, the task of applying the 
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literature to education is made more difficult by the fact that performance-based 
accountability did not exist to nearly the same extent in that decade.  Since the 
advent of high-stakes accountability in education, schools operate in a 
fundamentally ambiguous environment:  they experience a large amount of top-
down pressure for improvement at the same time they are called upon to act in a 
linear, rational manner to improve their performance.  Accordingly, more targeted 
research in the high-stakes, performance-based accountability environment of 
public education would help to advance the literature, as well as provide practical 
guidance for schools struggling to meet rigorous accountability performance 
targets.   
Another key finding from my research is that, when constraints press upon 
schools, the search process is the most adversely affected phase of the decision-
making process, as schools often truncate or rush their search for improvement 
remedies when they are short on time, money, or human capital.  This finding 
suggests that the decision-making literature, which generally examines the whole of 
decision-making processes, would benefit from a closer look at search in particular.  
Literature on search processes generally focuses on the various limitations on a 
thorough search process – geography, familiarity, etc. – but a more detailed inquiry 
into the mechanisms that can encourage a more thoughtful, deliberate process 
would be worthwhile.   
 The gaps in the literature that I name above may be due to the fact that 
education researchers have focused their attention and efforts lately on a narrow 
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component of decision-making, namely the use of evidence to inform decision-
making.  This body of literature examines how school leaders make use of data, 
including state data, school data, and student-level data to inform their decisions.  
Their primary concerns are to determine the patterns of data use that accord with 
the adoption of specific strategies for improvement (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh, 
Pane & Hamilton, 2005; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002) and/or the various 
barriers to effective data use (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Doyle, 2003; Massell, 2001; 
Stringfield, Reynolds & Schaffer, 2001).  While both of these questions are 
interesting and align to my work on decision-making as well, my work takes the 
issue further by broadening the scope to all types of decisions in schools – those 
based on data and those that are not – and also by focusing on the specific 
mechanisms that cause schools to adopt one type of decision-making process over 
another.  In this way, the two literatures overlap, but are not the same.   
 Another area ripe for further inquiry is the relationship between decision-
making strategies and school achievement levels.  Bounded rationality theorists 
claim, for example, that bounded decision-making environments cause decision-
makers to select suboptimal outcomes (e.g. Howes & Lewis, 2009; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  In education, this would suggest that school leaders select less 
effectual improvement solutions when they operate under conditions of contextual 
constraints.  This is a difficult relationship to measure, however, because there may 
be confounding factors at play within the school, for example the school’s qualifying 
subgroups, previous year’s performance, and other variables.   
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It is a limitation of my dissertation that I do not fully explore this relationship 
using quantitative methods, however.  Future research should attempt to fill this 
gap by seeking to answer the following questions.   
First, what characterizes a “successful” decision?  The most obvious outcome 
measure would be meaningful effect size improvement in student achievement 
scores in reading and math.  The challenge here would be measuring improvement 
in high schools, as secondary schools are only required to test one grade (as 
opposed to elementary school that test students in grades three through eight).  
Another tempting approach would be to measure schools’ ability to meet Adequate 
Yearly Progress requirements.  However, this approach is flawed because AYP 
thresholds vary by state and schools may qualify for state forgiveness measures 
such as Safe Harbor (i.e. making a sizeable jump in scores even if scores remain 
below the threshold) or Confidence Intervals (i.e. using statistical techniques to 
determine if the threshold bar is within the margin of error).  Additionally, 
researchers may consider using other outcome variables that are not explicitly 
linked to performance-based accountability, such as student growth (as measured 
on benchmark tests), student engagement, collaboration, or teacher satisfaction.   
Second, what types of decisions lead to better outcomes for schools?  The 
main challenge here is that it is difficult to isolate one decision from the many 
decisions that the average school makes in the hopes of improving student test 
scores (Weinbaum, Weiss & Beaver, 2012).  Assuming that researchers were 
seeking to isolate the effects of one decision on school improvement, a randomized 
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control trial would be appropriate, as this method can test the impact of the decision 
in question versus the status quo.  The problem here would be external validity, as 
an “effective” decision in one school might prove ineffectual in another due to 
differing contextual constraints.  Finally, RCTs can only test effectiveness of the 
decision itself – it cannot take into account the decision-making process.   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a more worthwhile endeavor would 
be to measure the validity of my decision-making framework by surveying a very 
large sample of schools about their decision-making habits and analyzing the degree 
to which their responses are consistent with the two-dimensions that form the 
backbone of my framework.  In either case, a quantitative study can build upon my 
qualitative work, as I expose the potential mediating and/or moderating variables 
that impact a school’s overall approach to decision-making. 
 
Implications for the Broader Stakeholder Audience 
 
 Aside from filling gaps in existing research and suggesting areas for future 
research, this dissertation study also offers some practical tools for policymakers, 
practitioners, and vendors.   
 First, policymakers benefit from the descriptive accounts of decision-making 
constraints.  My research shows that schools aren’t just generically “under pressure” 
to improve from performance-based accountability systems – they are being 
squeezed from all sides, often with conflicting goals and strategies for improvement.  
This immense pressure to perform under conditions of uncertainty may steer 
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schools away from the tough decisions and toward the so-called “low hanging fruit” 
such as gearing curriculum improvements toward tested subjects, investing in test 
preparation, and focusing on students on the bubble of proficiency.  
To incentivize more meaningful improvement goals, policymakers would be 
wise to give local decision-makers the tools they need to overcome some of these 
internal and external barriers.  Although the reach of performance-based 
accountability is purposefully limited – it is not the work of federal or state 
governments to control school board politics, nor can they set the tone of a school’s 
collaborative culture – to the extent possible, policymakers can provide financial 
incentives for meaningful change and avoid unfunded mandates.  Relieving schools 
of acute financial stress makes them freer to select programs and strategies that fit 
their improvement goals, which are based on identified student needs.    
Even more importantly, policymakers can use the framework to target 
technical assistance to schools in more meaningful ways.  Given time and resource 
constraints at the state level, it is often easier for policymakers to treat all schools 
and districts as equals in terms of technical assistance.  The Intermediate Units (IUs) 
in Pennsylvania, for example, provide trainings on Common Core alignment and 
other timely topics, but these trainings generally follow a one-size-fits-all approach.  
My framework allows state policymakers to provide targeted trainings that take 
into account schools and districts’ differential approaches to the decision-making 
process.  A school that fits into the “Externally-Validated Decision-Making” category, 
for example, would learn best by observing other schools in the state and by 
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attending presentations on research-based programming options.  Meanwhile, a 
school that follows “Intuitive Decision-Making” would derive more value from a 
technical assistance approach that allowed school leaders to pilot new programs in 
their schools and then formed focus groups to discuss broader implementation.  
Although more research is needed to test this relationship, it is my hypothesis that 
aligning technical assistance to a school or district’s decision-making approach will 
improve training efficacy and ultimately lead schools to make wiser, more 
deliberate decisions for improvement over time.  A detailed list of considerations for 
each of the decision-making typologies is below. 
 
• Evidence-Based Decision-Makers: These schools like to use data to make 
their decisions.  Accordingly, states can provide detailed, disaggregated data, 
including specific tested areas that were troublesome for students at all 
ability levels.  The state can also help schools by providing research and 
policy briefs that gather together information on the latest research trends 
and findings that align to specific decisions the school is looking to make in 
the future (for example a new curriculum program or computer-based 
remediation program).   
 
• Organic Decision-Makers: These schools prefer to come to decisions 
internally and may resist state guidance.  States can add value during the 
decision-making process by providing programs for schools to pilot 
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internally, or helping schools interpret internal data from benchmark tests 
and other data points.  If school culture is poor, the state can make available 
facilitators to encourage schools to collaborate and come to a consensus on 
school improvement goals.  In general, policymakers would do well to have 
in-person meetings about improvement with a broad group of decision-
makers in the school. 
 
• Instinctual Decision-Makers:  These schools typically make decisions based 
on their internally held views and beliefs about student achievement gaps 
and needs, and therefore may mistrust state interference in their decision-
making process.  The state can provide guidance by explaining external data 
sources (such as student achievement scores or relevant research), but it can 
also add value by linking school and district-level personnel to a larger 
network in the local community, thus lessening the geography/familiarity 
constraints on decision-making.  Additionally, policymakers may want to 
press school decision-makers to identify on paper what they see as the 
problems the school faces, as well as the solutions they have in mind for 
improvement, because doing so lets the schools fully understand how their 
experiences, beliefs, and culture guide their decision-making process. 
 
• Externally-Validated Decision-Makers:  The state has a large role to play with 
this type of decision-maker, as these schools generally welcome state 
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guidance.  Accordingly, the state can offer a variety of services – explaining 
research, interpreting data, facilitating improvement teams, etc. – but it can 
also take its cues from the districts themselves and provide trainings on 
specific topics of concern.  The state can also help schools select programs 
that are not only successful on the broad scale, but also have a good track 
record in meeting the specific needs and context of their schools.   
 
Although vendors are not the primary audience for this dissertation study, I 
should note that my work does have implications for the vendors of instructional, 
remedial, curricular, and data warehousing products.  Knowledge of the differential 
decision-making approaches of schools and districts may help vendors to target 
their products to schools’ unique needs, especially since many products are modular 
and customizable.  In an ideal world, when school and district leaders become aware 
of their district’s opportunities and challenges, they will be better equipped to talk 
intelligently with vendors, and this in turn will lead vendors to better target their 
products.  It is my hope, however, that vendors will not abuse the framework.  One 
way that they could do this is to use the school profiles to align their “pitches” to 
particular types of school decision-makers without making any effort to actually 
check to see if the product reasonably meets the schools identified needs.  Worse, 
vendors could examine the weaknesses of a school’s profile and use those 
weaknesses against them, for example by limiting exposure to competitive products 
to exacerbate the problem of familiarity.  Luckily, however, most vendors are not 
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familiar enough with the internal machinery of school and district culture to 
determine with great accuracy where schools fall on the framework – schools 
themselves are best equipped for this task, and it is their choice whether to share 
this information with vendors.   
My framework also provides practical tools for practitioner, allowing school 
and district decision-makers to identify which category best fits their schools’ 
context.  Because a framework can identify potential pitfalls for each category, 
school leaders can work to address potential problems before they manifest 
themselves.  If, for example, a particular approach is likely to engender feelings of 
resentment from teachers, school leaders can head off this problem by meeting with 
teachers, explaining their approach, and asking for structured feedback on 
decisions.  A framework also allows school leaders to think outside the box by 
exposing them to other types of decision-making approaches.  School leaders who 
are looking to make a change in the way they make decisions for improvement 
under the banner of performance-based accountability can use the framework to 
guide their new approach.  Finally, because the findings from the previous chapters 
highlight the importance of search to the overall decision-making process, this 
framework can guide district leaders to conduct more robust searches for new 
improvement programs and strategies.   
While efforts to make the decision-making process more inclusive and 
collaborative (for example, through Professional Learning Communities or 
Distributed Leadership initiatives) are becoming more popular, schools must 
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ultimately choose the decision-making approach that best fits their needs.  School 
decision-makers should think of their approach to improvement as a “process” in 
and of itself, which they can influence and improve upon. 
My framework is not the only practical tool to assist policymakers and 
practitioners in selecting programs and strategies for improvement.  The 
Pennsylvania “Getting Results” document was an attempt to create such a decision-
making framework, but it fell short of providing meaningful guidance, and instead 
represented simply more red tape.  Instead of more paperwork, school actors need 
real training in how to make decisions.  Even if they do not employ my framework, 
policymakers can use simple worksheets to help schools detail their plans for 
improvement, including ways in which they will engage community stakeholders, 
collaborate both within the school and the district, and use resources effectively.  
Although constraints, such as the ones examined in this dissertation, are certainly 
unavoidable on the whole, they are far more manageable when decision-makers are 
aware of their existence well in advance of the decision point and are prompted to 
strategize ways to overcome them.   
Looking Ahead 
 
My dissertation focused on a set of schools that I believe are fairly typical of 
K-12 schools throughout the country.  Although they might have had high-speed 
Internet connections and a couple of computers in the classroom, they were not 
“high tech” classrooms.  No school that I visited had, for example, a 1:1 laptop-to-
student ratio or used a blended learning approach to instruction.  Teachers typically 
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received some training on incorporating innovative new ideas into their classrooms, 
but these approaches did not represent a wholesale reorientation of the learning 
process around 21st century technology tools.  With that said, those technology tools 
have the power to transform the decision-making environment in schools over the 
next decade, which may render my research outdated.  Although there are many 
technology-based innovations that may shape decision-making in schools, I 
highlight three trends that are particularly relevant to my study. 
 First, data warehousing tools are becoming extremely sophisticated tools for 
school and district administrators during the problem identification and search 
phases of the decision-making process.  This technology makes it exponentially 
easier for school leaders to identify student-specific problem areas very early on in 
the school year.  Data warehousing products are not new – most schools in my 
sample employed some type of software program to keep track of students’ growth 
over time as measured in interim assessments.  What is new is that these tools are 
increasingly linked to specific interventions that narrow the field of options during 
the search phase.  
The second trend, personalized learning, is linked to the first, as both are 
concerned with using technology to pinpoint student-specific interventions.  
Personalized learning goes farther than aligned data warehousing tools, however, 
because it represents a coordinated effort to tailor instruction, curriculum, and 
remediation to each student’s unique needs.  Instead of the traditional one-size-fits-
all classroom model in which students sit quietly while the teacher talks at the front 
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of the class, personalized learning supports a model where students become the 
center of the learning environment, using technology tools to work at their own 
pace on projects specifically designed for them.  Because personalized learning 
presents a dramatically different perspective on the fundamental relationships 
among students, teachers, and the curriculum, the adoption of a personalized 
learning approach has definite implications for the decision-making process overall.  
Instead of selecting a curriculum that will fit for all students, for example, schools 
might decide that they prefer technology-based tools and supplemental materials 
that fit a wide range of student abilities and instructional preferences.  Remediation 
might well take place inside the classroom as opposed to after school or in a 
designated tutoring block.  These types of changes mean that decision-makers must 
open their field of options to new and innovative solutions, and that researching 
potential options may not be as easy as calling colleagues in neighboring districts to 
ask what types of tools they are using.  Personalized learning pushes decision-
makers beyond the bounds of familiarity and geography, encouraging them to 
pursue different avenues for ideas, including blogs, wikis, social media, and other 
technology-based tools for learning.  In this way, the search becomes both more 
nuanced and more open, as teachers and administrators use their most trusted 
source of information – trusted friends and colleagues – in new ways.  Teachers and 
administrators can expand the base of their human searches by using technology 
tools to scan the products that others in their extended social network are using, 
and they can expand their technical searches as well when people in their social 
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network post studies of effectiveness, product reviews, and other technical 
information.  The power of technology tools in general and social networking tools 
in particular also means that decision-makers must constantly be on the lookout for 
digital content while screening these materials to ensure that they are high quality, 
aligned to the standards, and relevant for students given their specific academic and 
social needs. 
Finally, technology brings with it a fascinating new opportunity to gain 
feedback during the search and decision point phases of the overall decision-making 
process.  Schools are beginning to experiment with “crowdsourcing” to get ideas and 
input on decisions from a broad range of community and school actors.  
Crowdsourcing is the practice of gathering ideas through online communities or 
specially designed digital hubs for the purpose of solving problems.  Or, as defined 
in the scientific literature, it is “an online, distributed problem-solving and 
production model” (Brabham, 2008, pg. 75).  Schools are starting to look to 
crowdsourcing techniques as a way of outsourcing the search phase of the decision-
making process.  A 2013 EdWeek article (Davis, 2013), for example, profiled the 
Poway Unified School District in southern California, which used a crowdsourcing 
approach to determine new safety and security policies for the district.  Using an 
online platform, all 4,000 school district employees were able to voice their opinions 
around new safety measures.  Doing so helped the district to avoid the “familiarity” 
pitfall by allowing individuals who were not traditionally the “decision-makers” 
contribute to the field of alternatives.  And it impacted the decision point by 
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allowing the decision team to organize the proffered ideas into categories and 
tallying their popularity across a broad swath of district stakeholders.  
These three trends, while exciting, raise important questions for 
policymakers and practitioners.  The most important question is how to strike a 
balance between data-driven decision-making and educators’ intuition.  Data is 
certainly useful and is becoming more plentiful every day, but decision-makers run 
the risk of not being able to see the forest through the trees if they turn every 
decision into a dispassionate analysis of school and student data.  And even if we 
assume that all decision-makers are expertly trained in data analysis – which most 
likely they are not – many will argue that we are still missing the expertise that 
comes from working with students every day and understanding their academic and 
social needs on a personal level.  In essence, this debate is a reformulation of the 
“technical” versus “human” sources of information debate that I discuss in Chapter 
Five.   The trend is certainly toward more technical sources of information, 
particularly internally generated student-level data analysis, but schools report that 
they still highly value personal connections in which they discuss school needs and 
areas for improvement with trusted colleagues. 
A second question is how to involve stakeholders in a meaningful way 
without adding undue complexity to the decision-making environment.  Opening 
decisions to a broad range of stakeholders through efforts like crowdsourcing 
represents an innovative approach to decision-making, but it also adds complexity 
to the political environment because it exposes decision-makers to contrarian 
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opinions and political factions (for example strident school board members).  
Similarly, investing in personalized learning requires coordination across multiple 
stakeholders, most notably parents and the students themselves, which means that 
schools may need to engage this broader audience during all stages of the decision-
making process.  If schools do not expertly manage the broadened stakeholder pool, 
decisions may veer toward the “garbage can” model that is highly susceptible to 
political forces and is chaotic in nature.   
Finally, technology-based innovations raise the question of how schools can 
keep up with the demands of 21st Century learning tools and decision-making 
techniques while also keeping pace with the demands of performance-based 
accountability measures.  Many technology tools tout their alignment to the 
Common Core State Standards, for example, but it is up to school leaders to 
determine whether the products will actually help their students achieve to the 
standards.  Furthermore, while performance-based accountability is moving at a 
quick pace, technology tools are moving even faster, which means that schools must 
exercise caution before purchasing costly technology, lest these tools misalign to 
practical needs for improvement or are incompatible with one another. 
Looking into the future, it appears as though, while the No Child Left Behind 
Act with its strict 100% proficiency and AYP requirements will soon be a thing of 
the past, performance-based accountability is likely here to stay.  If this assumption 
holds true, it will be the responsibility of policymakers, especially those at state 
departments of education, to work with schools and districts to make sure they 
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receive the best possible information and the appropriate tools to tackle their 
challenges to successful school improvement.   In the introduction to this 
dissertation, I asserted that performance-based accountability systems provided 
clear descriptions of front-end problems and back-end proficiency requirements, 
but was opaque in the middle.  As my findings in this dissertation show, the middle 
of the decision-making process should not be opaque, but rather transparent and 
well defined.  During the next legislative examination of the federal role in education 
policy (should that day ever come), policymakers should provide clear guidelines to 
states about their expectations around the three critical phases of the decision-
making process – problem identification, search, and the decision point.  States, in 
turn, should provide technical assistance to districts to aid them in making choices 
that fit the needs, constraints, and general context of their schools.   Additionally, it 
is the responsibility of school leaders to carefully analyze their needs, conduct 
thorough searches, and minimize the constraints that pose challenges for successful 
school improvement.   Finally, a new age of performance-based accountability 
presents an opportunity for researchers to study how schools and districts respond 
to top-down calls for improvement in a changing political environment.  It is my 
hope that this dissertation provides a theoretical framework and a classification tool 
that can be adapted to this changing accountability context.  
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APPENDIX A: YEAR 1 PROTOCOL (PRINCIPAL) 
 
Protocol Introduction 
 
To give you a little background, I am working with a team of researchers at the 
University of Pennsylvania and we are conducting a study of how schools across the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student performance.  This 
is part of a federally-funded research program.  This interview is part of our data 
collection for the study.  In addition to this visit, we hope to return to your school next 
year to follow its progress.  Your school was selected for this study based a stratified 
random sample in combination with factors related to student performance and 
demographics.  Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with interviews 
of others to produce an overall picture of schools across the study.  I'd like to ask you to 
sign this consent form that explains a bit about the study and describes our 
commitment to keeping this conversation confidential, so we hope that you will feel 
comfortable being as candid as possible.  Also, I'd also like your permission to tape our 
conversation.  No one other than the research team will have access to this recording, 
but it will be helpful in our analysis of all of the information that we collect.  Your 
participation is voluntary and you are free to stop at any time or skip any questions you 
choose not to answer. 
 
 
Background questions 
 
1. I’d like just a little bit of background.  I think I remember you told me you’ve 
been principal for __ years? Were you a principal elsewhere?  What did you do 
before you became principal? 
 
 
Perceptions and Beliefs 
 
2. Can you tell me a little about: 
a) student performance at this school? 
b) teacher morale and community at this school? 
c) are there particular groups of students or teachers about whom you are 
concerned? 
 
3. What are some of your short-term (1 year) goals for this school?  Longer-term (3 
year) goals?  
 
4. How, if at all, do the state AYP goals influence your goals? (pressure from 
district,  school, community board, etc.) 
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5. How meaningful are the PSSAs as an indicator of this school’s performance? 
 
6. What (other) types of data do you find to be useful?  And how do you use them? 
Who does the analysis of the data? 
Probe for using data inform to decisions about instruction, curriculum, 
remediation, resource allocation, professional development  
 
 
General school improvement strategies 
 
7. We understand that your school was labeled as “in warning” following last 
year’s PSSA results.  What efforts have been introduced in response to this 
label this year? 
(Curricular, instruction, resource allocation, test prep, remediation, data use, outside expertise, additional 
rewards and sanctions, non-academic issues) 
 
8. How much do these changes affect what teachers do in their classrooms on a 
daily basis? 
Probes:  
a) More time for instruction? 
b) Covering more content? 
c) Using more effective instructional strategies? 
d) Focusing on different skills or knowledge? 
e) Better aligning instruction to state standards or anchors? 
f) Focusing on tested skills or question types? 
 
9. Tell me about these programs.    How many students and teachers are involved?  How 
would you describe the overall effort that each of them is receiving? 
 
10. Why were these particular programs chosen? (What need/problem did they seek to 
address?) 
 
11. Do you plan for these efforts to be lasting or are they interim measures?  Why? 
 
 
Targeted school improvement 
 
12. Your school did not make AYP last year due to the performance of [insert name of 
subgroup].  Are any of the programs that you listed designed to address the needs of 
these students in particular?   
 
13. If yes:  When were these programs introduced?  Were any introduced just this year? 
(focus on the new one). 
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If no: Are there particular programs introduced this year that you hope will help 
these students, among others? 
 
14. Of these programs, which do you think is most important for the [name failing 
subgroup]? 
 
15. Walk me though the process of choosing/designing this improvement strategy. 
 
a. Who (or what group of people) were responsible for choosing/designing?  
b. Were the programs generated by the school or district or by an external 
source? 
c. To what extent were teachers involved in the planning and development of 
initiatives? 
d. In the search for new solutions, what kind of information was taken into 
account? 
e. What other options, if any, did you consider? 
f. What input do you get from the district?  
 
16. Was this selection process similar to the selection process for other initiatives 
that you have introduced in this school?  How so? 
 
17. Do you believe this program is a good fit for your school?  Why or why not? 
 
18. Who has been responsible for the implementation of this program?  
a. For the program to be effective, do teachers work independently or is 
collaboration required? 
 
19. Is there any type of monitoring/evaluation going on in the school that looks at 
how the new strategies are being implemented?  Please describe. 
 
20. What successes and challenges have you experienced in implementing this 
program? 
Probes: 
a. How have the teachers and staff reacted to this new program? 
b. Have there been unintended consequences of these targeted efforts? 
 
21. How much of a departure from tradition is this for your school?  Has your role 
changed? 
 
22. Does your school receive outside help to implement this program?  Does it need it? 
 
23. Has the central office taken any special interest in this initiative or is their 
involvement similar with all of the improvement efforts that you undertake?  If 
different, why? 
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Resource Allocation 
 
24. Did the new program require additional resources? 
 
25. Was the school allotted additional funds to pay for the new program? 
 
26. (If no new funds were made available) What programs/areas were cut to free up 
funds for the new program? 
 
27. Thinking again about all of the improvement efforts that you’ve introduced this year, 
has there been a reallocation of staff to implement these programs?  
 
28. In general, has there been a district-wide reallocation of staff or funds to address 
schools with struggling students? 
 
 
Program Results 
 
29. Do you see any evidence that the changes made this year are affecting students?  
Please describe. 
 
30. We hope to return to visit you and your school next year at about this time.  Do 
you think that there will be other new programs that we will find in place next 
year?  What? 
 
 
Final Question 
 
31. Next year, what would you expect us to see related to the program/s we’ve been 
discussing and the particular subgroup that missed making AYP? 
 
32. Do you have any other comments regarding improvement strategies at your school? 
Is there anything you would like to add to what you have shared?  
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APPENDIX B: YEAR 2 PROTOCOL (PRINCIPAL/ADMIN/TEACHER) 
 
Introduction 
 
As you may remember, I am working with a team of researchers at the University of 
Pennsylvania and we are conducting a study of how schools across the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student performance.  This is part of a 
federally-funded research program.  This interview is part of the second (and final) 
year of data collection for the study.  Your school was selected for this study based on a 
stratified random sample in combination with factors related to student performance 
and demographics.   
 
Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with the interviews of others to 
produce an overall picture of schools across the study.  I’d like to ask you to sign this 
consent form that explains a bit about the study and describes our commitment to 
keeping this conversation confidential, so we hope that you will feel comfortable being 
as candid as possible.  Also, I’d like your permission to tape our conversation.  No one 
other than the research time will have access to this recording but it will be helpful in 
our analysis of all the information we collect.  Your participation is voluntary and you 
are free to stop at any time or skip any questions you choose not to answer.   
 
Background Questions 
1. (Although I know we spoke last year), could you please tell me (remind me of) 
your name and position in the school? 
 
2. Has your role in the school changed at all over the past year (since we spoke 
last)?  If so, how? 
 
General Goals 
3. Thinking back on this year, what were your personal goals as a 
[teacher/administrator/principal]? 
 
4. Now thinking more broadly about the school as a whole, what would you say 
were your goals for the school?  Do you think these goals are the same or 
different from those of your colleagues in the school?  How are they the same or 
different? 
 
5. What would you say is this school’s mission or guiding principle?  How did you 
first become familiar with the school’s mission?  How much (do you, does the 
principal) stress the importance of incorporating this mission into practice? 
(A mission can be set of instructional practices, an educational philosophy, a 
content area, vocational focus, etc.) 
 
Accountability 
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6. We see that your school is [making AYP, in School Improvement] following last 
year when the school was in warning status.  Given this change, how, if at all, 
have your goals for the school changed? 
 
7. For Principal/Admin: How personally do you take the school’s ability to make 
AYP?   
 
For Teachers:  How personally do you take your students’ performance on the 
PSSAs?  How about your students’ academic achievement aside from their PSSA 
performance? 
 
8. Why do you think the school [failed to make, made] AYP this year? 
(What are the underlying reasons why this change took place?) 
 
9. How has this change in the school’s status affected your day-to-day job 
responsibilities, if at all? 
 
Strategies for Improvement 
10. When we spoke last year, you mentioned _________ as the major improvement 
effort(s) underway in the school.  Are these efforts still in place?  How are these 
efforts going?   
 
11. What successes and challenges has the school faced in implementing these 
efforts? 
 
12. Do you think the school will continue these efforts in future years?  Why or why 
not? 
 
13. If made AYP:  To what extent, if at all, do you credit the school’s success in 
making AYP this year to these efforts? 
 
If didn’t make AYP:  In light of the school’s current difficulties, do you think 
that these strategies are appropriate?  Are they helping the school to meet its 
accountability goals?  Why or why not? 
 
14. Did the school adopt any new strategies for improvement this year?  What was 
the impetus for the adoption of this new strategy? 
(Was it adopted due to past PSSA performance?)   
(Probe for: Instruction, curriculum, organization, accountability, etc.) 
 
15. Here is a list of areas that schools generally work in.  Can you briefly describe 
your school’s efforts in each of these areas, and state whether these efforts are 
causing student achievement to improve, decline, or stay the same? 
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a. Instruction 
b. Curriculum 
c. Organization 
d. Remediation 
e. Data Use 
f. Accountability 
g. Social Support 
 
16. What do you think is the goal of the new strateg(ies)?  Are they intended to 
target a particular group of students?   
 
17. Thinking back on all the strategies you’ve mentioned – from both this year and 
last year – which would you say consume most of your attention and energy?  
Why is this? 
 
18. Last year, your school did not make AYP due to the performance of the ______ 
subgroup.  This year, that subgroup of students [is meeting its goals/ continues 
to not make AYP].  What specific activities are underway to address the needs of 
these students? 
 
19. Do you think the new strategy is an effective approach?  Does it fit well for your 
students?  Why or why not? 
 
Search and Decision-Making 
20. (For Principals): Thinking back to this new strategy (or a strategy adopted last 
year), can you tell me how the school selected this particular strategy over other 
options? 
a. When did you start the process of searching for solutions?  How long did 
the total process (from search to decision) take? 
b. How did you look for potential solutions?  Where/who did you turn to for 
help in determining what your options were?  Did you use school data to 
inform your search? 
c. What other options were on the table?   
d. What factors did you consider when choosing this strategy over others?  
How, if at all, did you use data to guide your decision-making? 
e. Who did you lean on for support and guidance during the decision-
making process?  Why did you lean on these people? 
f. Was the final decision a team decision or an individual decision?  Explain. 
 
21. (For Staff/Teachers):  When the school decided to implement _______, how 
involved were you in the process? 
 
If involved:  Use questions in #20 
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If not very involved: 
a. Would you have liked to be more a part of the decision-making process?   
b. Why do you think you were not more involved in the process? 
c. Was your experience with this decision-making process typical of how 
decisions are made in this school?  How so? 
d. If you had an idea for a new improvement strategy for your school, do you 
feel that your views would be heard?  What would the process be for 
making your idea a reality? 
 
22. (For Teachers):  Have you implemented any new improvement strategies in your 
classroom this year or last year?  What are they? 
(If so, use prompts from #20) 
 
23. When choosing a new strategy for (your classroom or) the school as a whole, 
how much does AYP and/or PSSA performance typically figure into the decision-
making process? 
 
Concluding Questions 
24. In general, would you say that student achievement at this school is improving, 
declining, or staying the same?  Why do you think this is the case?  Please 
explain.   
 
25. Do you think that the school will meet its NCLB goals next year?  Why or why 
not? 
 
26. Do you have any other comments regarding improvement strategies at your 
school?  Is there anything you would like to add that what you have shared? 
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APPENDIX C: YEAR 3 PROTOCOL (DISTRICT PERSONNEL) 
 
Introduction: 
I am a student at the University of Pennsylvania and I am conducting a study of how 
schools and school districts in Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student 
performance.  Specifically, I will ask questions about how your district makes decisions 
regarding new improvement programs and strategies.  Your school district was 
selected for this study because researchers at the University of Pennsylvania (including 
myself) had previously visited a school in your district to discuss student achievement 
efforts.  This study is a continuation of that previous study, and our questions will be in 
reference to the school that was previously visited. 
 
Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with the interviews of others to 
produce an overall picture of schools and school districts across the study.  Also, I’d like 
your permission to tape our conversation.  No one other than myself and my research 
advisor will have access to this recording, but it will be helpful in our analysis of all the 
information I collect.  Your participation is voluntary and you are free to stop at any 
time or skip any questions you choose not to answer.    
 
Introduction Questions 
1. Two years ago, [school] was labeled in “warning” for not making AYP.  Were 
you working at the District at the time?  If so, what did you perceive to be the 
main reasons why the school did not make AYP that year?  
 
Probe for: 
a. Resource and funding challenges  
b. Curriculum and instruction challenges 
c. School climate/community challenges 
d. Policy and politics challenges 
 
2. In response to the school’s “warning” status classification, can you recall 
what were the main programs or strategies adopted to improve performance 
in the school? 
 
3. If you can, walk me through how the decision was made to select [choose one 
strategy/program to focus on] as a new strategy or program for the school.   
 
Specific Search Questions 
Still keeping in mind the decision to adopt [program or strategy], I’d like to ask some 
questions about the search process. 
 
4. Who is responsible for searching for new programs and strategies?  What 
role do you play in this process?  
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5. What were the most important factors under consideration when the district 
gathered information on [program or strategy]?  In other words, what were 
you searching for? 
 
a. How many options were on the table? Were any of the potential 
options piloted in any schools or classrooms? 
 
b. How did the district use data to support the search process? 
 
c. To what extent was your search guided by federal or state 
accountability policies?  (AYP subgroups, anchors, Getting Results 
document, etc.) 
 
d. Were there any frameworks or protocols in place to help guide the 
search process? 
 
6. There are many resources out there for districts that are searching for new 
strategies for the school.  When searching for [program or strategy], what 
sort of technical or professional resources did the district use most?  Why 
was this? 
 
Probe for: 
a. Research  (WhatWorks Clearinghouse, professional associations, Ed 
Week, etc.) 
b. PA Dept of Education or Intermediate Units 
c. Professional development (seminars, conferences, materials, etc.) 
d. PA’s Standards-Aligned System (SAS) 
e. Vendors 
 
7. Another common source of information is people.  When searching for 
[program or strategy], who did the district lean on for support? 
 
Probe for: 
a. “Word of mouth” recommendations (colleagues, family, friends, etc.) 
b. Involvement of school-level personnel (principal, teachers, support 
staff) 
c. PA Dept of Education or Intermediate Unit staff 
 
8. Of these two sources of information – technical resources and what I’ll call 
“personal resources” – which do you trust the most?  Why? 
 
9. What factors do you think constrained the search process for [program or 
strategy] at the district level? 
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Probe for: 
a. Time constraints  
b. Access to resources 
c. Human capital  
d. Political constraints 
 
10. Why and how was [program or strategy] ultimately selected for the 
district/school? 
 
11. Was the search process for [program or strategy] typical for the district?  
Why or why not?   
 
Concluding Questions 
12. The classic model of decision-making has 4 steps:  Problem identification, 
search for solutions, decision, and implementation.  We will set aside 
implementation, as that’s a whole other can of worms.  Of the first three, 
however, where do you think the district spends most of its efforts?  Why? 
 
Definitions: 
 
a. Problem identification – An issue that is identified by at least one of 
the following sources: AYP status, data review, board or 
superintendent directed initiative, school-level initiative, or parent 
complaints. 
 
b. Search – Any action taken for the purpose of putting options on the 
table.  May include technical/professional resources, human/personal 
resources, piloting, etc.   
 
c. Decision – The process surrounding the selection of a new program or 
strategy, which may involve committee selection, the 
recommendation of the new program or strategy to the board, and 
board/district/school action.   
 
13. In terms of the search process, what do you think the district does well?  
Where could it improve? 
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